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ABSTRACT 
Murray Rothbard's anarcho-capitalism represents an largely 
unexplored portion of American political thought. Despite an overwhelming 
array of publications on politics, economics, history, methodology, and other 
realms of social theory, his writings have received very little attention from 
the community of social theorists. 
A significant reason for the lack of analysis concerns the unique and 
radical nature of Rothbard's thought. Although this research concludes that 
his form of anarchism is surely an American phenomenon, he combines the 
influences upon his writings in ways which ultimately separate him from 
even his libertarian colleagues. Still, he is an extremely influential figure in 
the largely successful revival of contemporary American libertarianism or 
classical liberalism, despite his overly radical anarchist tendencies . 
This project integrates Rothbard's social theory and critiques it from 
within the confines of a libertarian negative rights framework which defines 
ethical parameters around the notion of individualism and non-interference. 
It focuses upon five components of Rothbard's work: 1.) Methodological and 
epistemological foundations; 2.) Economic theory; 3 . )  Political ethics; 4.) 
Anarcho-capitalist society; and 5.)  Strategies in the achievement of the 
libertarian system. 
After a thorough analysis of each of these areas, the research concludes 
that Rothbard's system of libertarian ethics and his society of anarchy and 
property rights are quite feasible theoretically and potentially provide practical 
advantages over current State-imposed alternatives in many arenas . 
However, some major concerns remain. Concerning the private provision of 
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defense, Rothbard underestimates the propensities for free riding which may 
only be overcome (as in other arenas entailing spillover effects) with time, 
which makes the removal of the State apparatus highly problematic without 
complete international consensus. In the case of external opposition, 
transitional costs make his theoretical framework untenable. Moreover, the 
entire libertarian model faces serious tactical problems--in which Rothbard's 
absolutist and monistic style and theory do not relieve. He is never clearly 
able to guarantee that his brand of anarchism necessarily protects or cultivates 
the ethics of libertarianism. A rigid ethical dichotomy of the market and 
political processes tends to cloak this fundamentally crucial issue in his 
theory. 
Nevertheless, Rothbard Is a significant figure both in the historical 
understanding of the modern libertarian revival in America and in the 
theoretical advancement of these ideas. 
v 
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INTRODUCTION TO THE WRITINGS 
OF MURRAY ROTHBARD 
Why Study Rothbard? 
Murray Rothbard has written approximately twenty books, dozens of 
scholarly articles, and hundred of articles in libertarian and popular 
periodicals. In combination, these writings represent a highly coherent system 
of social thought that has influenced a small but apparently expanding core of 
modern thinkers. Yet, outside this libertarian circle, Rothbard's works have 
received scant attention. 
The scholarly community's overwhelming ignorance of this prolific 
writer's thought is an unfortunate circumstance. There has been very little 
critique of Rothbard's writings, despite the fact that his work, as a substantial 
and comprehensive "theory of liberty," spans across the bulk of social theory.l 
The intellectual world has been clearly witnessing a rejuvenation of 
classical liberalism in recent years. And Rothbard is a critical player in this 
unfolding drama. First, he may be viewed, as much as anyone, as the founder 
of this "libertarian" revival. His writings in the 1960's and early 1970's were 
some of the first works that began to define the new movement. Second, his 
radical anarcho-capitalist ideas are in many ways the foundation for the 
1 .  There are a few exceptions, although the discussions tend to be 
limited. See Newman (1984, pp. 76-91); Green (1987, pp. 34-54); Sampson (1984, 
pp. 223-232); and Barry (1986). 
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milder forms of minimalism and laissez-faire which today are enjoying such 
intellectual success. While part of the libertarian revival is surely due to the 
attraction of writers like Rothbard and dedicated political activism, there are 
other factors which opened the door to these ideas. Historical and theoretical 
shortcomings in the choices provided by the American ideological spectrum 
in the 1960's and 1970's produced a window of opportunity for libertarianism. 
Whereas Rothbard's perspective has remained steadily consistent since he 
began writing in the 1950's, the mainstream remained far from his point of 
view until the social, political, and economic problems that surrounded the 
turbulence of Vietnam, economic stagflation, Watergate, and other similar 
events. Consequently, because of these potentially unexplainable events, the 
existing mainstream of American political economy suffered numerous 
chinks in its paradigmatic armor. A Watergate could not occur in America's 
democracy. Neither could a Vietnam. And Keynesianism had promised an 
age of prosperity. But in each case, the myths were uncovered, creating 
unexplainable gaps for the ideological status quo and an opportunity for new 
and different ideas. One of the most popular perspectives seeking to fill the 
void left by the demise of the New Deal, Keynesian, and Vietnam mentalities 
was a modernized notion of classical liberalism. The shift in the direction of 
libertarian thought has brought attention to its more radical counterpart, 
anarcho-capitalism, best found in the writings of Rothbard. 
In important ways libertarianism represents a substantially different 
alternative to the political status quo. The "hard core" of Western thought for 
the majority of the twentieth century has entailed a more "collectivist" 
foundation than the preceding century, whether found in its conservative, 
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liberal, or more radical forms. As could be expected, it was within the more 
individualistic American political culture that criticism of this collectivist 
mentality first reemerged. Libertarianism, at first more critique than 
substance, has subsequently matured to provide a developed and 
comprehensive system of ideas. One of the key contributors to this 
renaissance is Rothbard: An analysis of his substantial writings would be a 
timely endeavor which, as of yet, has not been undertaken. 
The Nature of Rothbard's Writings 
In examining Rothbard's scholarship, three characteristics in his 
writing stand out in particular. First is the breadth of interdisciplinary 
knowledge evident in his work. Heavily influenced by an intellectual 
tradition that views social science as an intertwined and inseparable 
discipline, his writings span philosophy, economics, politics, history, and 
practice. Yet, all of these fields of study are combined in a singleness of 
purpose: to develop a comprehensive and convincing theory of liberty. 
Therefore, even within the expanse of his writings, there is always a common 
and unifying theme and purpose. And this purpose is, of course, an extremely 
radical one, namely, the removal of the State as an economically unviable 
and ethically dastardly entity. In this sense Rothbard is the quintessential 
libertarian. 
Thus, his mission guarantees that, secondly, Rothbard will never fail to 
be provocative. His thought demonstrates both innovat ion and 
insightfulness, as he refuses to fit into common categories of theory. For 
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instance, while he is quite clearly an anarchist, he retains few philosophical 
similarities with the more familiar collectivist and syndicalist brands of 
anarchism. His brand of anarchism more resembles the native American 
individualistic kind, with still enough substantial differences in both 
economic and political theory to clearly distinguish his writings from these 
nineteenth century writers. Yet, he ironically never seems comfortable with 
even his philosophical neighbors in the minimalist and other classical liberal 
camps. In fact, Rothbard has quite often been a vocal critic of these writers. 
However, this intellectual "loneliness" in no way implies a lack of 
logical consistency or a haphazard research program. In fact, this uniqueness 
is more likely the consequence of the exact opposite circumstance, an 
absolutist and rigorously derived system of social theory--all based upon 
similar foundations. Therefore, Rothbard's third characteristic and perhaps 
strongest attribute is his logical rigor. His staunchly deductive and axiomatic 
approach to both economics and political ethics leads him to a consistent and 
comprehensive--and radical--system of thought. 
While this rigor is usually a positive attribute, it may be occasionally 
damaging to a system of thought. First, the absolutism leaves the opportunity 
for scholarly dialogue severely limited. If one rejects Rothbard's foundations, 
there is little reason beyond the sheer appreciation of the logic and 
comprehensive nature of the axiomatic system for a scholarly conversation to 
continue. Secondly, Rothbard's is a demanding system and even at times, 
perhaps, a dogmatic one. This method clarifies the dichotomy of reality and 
theory. While this recognition may direct action toward the ideal, it may also 
ignore the realities of the world and make the argument entirely untenable. 
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Thus, the same attributes which make Rothbard a powerful theorist serve to 
diminish the appreciation he might otherwise garner. 
Rothbard's Major Contributions to Social Theory 
We may rather neatly divide Rothbard's contributions to social theory 
into six general areas: 1 .)  economic theory; 2.) political theory and politics; 3.) 
public policy; 4.) epistemology /methodology; 5.) strategies of activism; and 6.) 
history. This research examines the substantial portions of the first five of 
these areas. Considering the interconnectedness of the research program, this 
division may appear rather arbitrary in certain ways. Yet, as careful reading of 
Chapters II through VI will demonstrate, there is an observable chain of logic 
that directs Rothbard's system of thought from the metaphysical principles of 
epistemology to the concrete concerns of intellectual and political strategy. 
Rothbard's writings in economics spans across his entire career. 
Influenced heavily by Ludwig von Mises, Rothbard has maintained a strict 
adherence to the traditional tenets of the Austrian School of Economics that 
originated in the writings of Mises' mentor Carl Menger in the late 
nineteenth century. Rothbard's most important contribution to the Austrian 
school is probably his magnum opus Man, Economy, and State (1962c), 
arguably the last of the traditional comprehensive treatises on economics. 
This work was followed in 1970 by Power and Market (1977a), a companion to 
his 1962 publication which developed his views on government intervention 
in the market. One of the Austrian School's most important contributions to 
economics is Rothbard's "Toward a Reconstruction of Utility and Welfare 
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Economics" ( 1956), a critical appraisal of welfare economics' failure to 
maintain a strict subjective value theory. In 1983, Rothbard specifically 
provided his views on monetary theory in The Mystery of Banking (1983b) in 
which he further developed his arguments for the return of the gold 
standard. Other contributions in monetary theory includes What H a s  
Government Done to Our Money? (1985b; 1964 originally), E conomic  
Depressions: Causes and Cures (1983a), "Austrian Definitions of the Supply of 
Money" ( 1978a), "The Austrian Theory of Money" ( 1976a), and "The Case for 
the 100 Percent Gold Dollar" (1962a). Finally, he has written substantially on 
economic history, applying Austrian insights to the recession of 1819, in The 
Panic of 1819 (1962d) and the Great Depression, in America's Great Depression 
(1963a) . Other contributions to economic history include "The Federal 
Reserve as a Cartelization Device: The Early Years, 1913-1930" (1984) and "The 
New Deal and the International Monetary System" (1976e) . 
Rothbard's major contributions to political theory are found generally 
in two of his works. For a New Liberty, originally published in 1973 and 
expanded in 1978, represents a "manifesto" of the libertarian movement 
(1978b). The work encompasses a combination of both political theory and the 
framework for anarcho-capitalism. However, Rothbard's most philosophical 
writings are found in The Ethics of Liberty (1982a). Further development of 
these themes may be explored in Egalitarianism as a Revolt Against Nature 
(1973a), Left and Right (reprinted 1979d), "Capitalism versus Statism" (1972a), 
"Freedom, Inequality, Primitivism, and the Division of Labor" (1971 a), 
"Justice and Property Rights" (1974c), "The Logic and Semantics of 
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Government" (1963b), "Society Without a State" (1978d), and "Law, Property 
Rights, and Air Pollution" (1982b) . 
Rothbard's discussions of public policy may be found in literally 
hundreds of sources. In general, the best source is still For a New Liberty. One 
may also examine "The Myth of Neutral Taxation" (1981c) and "The Great 
Society: A Libertarian Critique" (1973b). He has also written a good deal on 
education specifically, including Education, Free and Compulsory (1972) and 
"Total Reform: Nothing Less" (1976i) . 
The best general source of Rothbard's views on methodology are found 
in Individualism and the Philosophy of the Social Sciences (1979c), which 
includes several articles which appeared in other forms earlier. One may also 
find discussions of praxeology in Man, Economy, and State (Chapter 1), 
"Praxeology: The Methodology of Austrian Economics" (1976g), "Praxeology, 
Value Judgments, and Public Policy" (1976h), "In Defense of Extreme 
Apriorism" (1957), "Value Implications of Economic Theory" (1973c), and 
"Epistemological Problems of Economics" (1962b) . 
The majority of Rothbard's contributions to the literature on 
libertarian strategy may be encountered in the numerous libertarian journals, 
magazines, and other assorted forms of print that arose from the late 1960's to 
the present.2 However, these arguments are generally systematized in the 
concluding chapters of The Ethics of Liberty and For a New Liberty. 
Finally, Rothbard has written extensively in American revisionist 
2. For a generally complete list of all of Rothbard's work (through 1986) 
see Block and Watner (1986, pp. 34-37, 45-72) . 
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history. While we will not be investigating these contributions in the present 
analysis, they still are a substantial addition to the literature of liberty. The 
most important of his works is the ongoing series on early American history, 
Conceived in Liberty, a four volume work (a fifth has yet to be published) that 
traces the American experience up through the Revolution. Rothbard has 
also written widely in recent history, particularly relating to American foreign 
policy, including "Harry Elmer Barnes As Revisionist of the Cold War" 
(1968), "The Hoover Myth" (1970), "War Collectivism in World War I" 
(1972c), and "The Foreign Policy of the Old Right" (1978c) . 
The Research Program 
Our research follows this division of Rothbard's contributions to social 
theory in Chapters II through VI. While there are threads which weave all 
these categories into a comprehensive whole, it is not difficult to find the 
means to make these categorizations. In a sense, the chapters appear in a kind 
of descending order, beginning with Rothbard's and other Austrians' 
discussions of the ultimate foundations of epistemology and methodology, 
and concluding with the "real-world" concerns of the strategies to be used in 
actual practice to achieve the libertarian society. 
We need to provide the reader two warnings . First, whereas the 
interconnectedness of these categories will remain obvious, it will be our task 
to try to separate each "realm" and analyze it on its own merits. Therefore, 
each chapter will limit its focus to the subject at hand; we leave it to the 
reader to recognize the subtle relations between these categories. While these 
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divisions may not provide perfect justice to Rothbard's arguments, it is a 
necessity of analysis. 
Second, we examine Rothbard in "his environment". In investigating 
and critiquing his contributions to social theory we will remain within the 
confines of those traditions that have influenced Rothbard. There will not be 
thorough expositions of the kind of criticisms that a Marxist value theorist or 
a Keynesian economist might heap upon Rothbard's economics, for example. 
We limit our discussion to the "paradigm" in which Rothbard writes, 
namely, Austrianism, libertarianism, anarchism, etc. 
Chapter II explores the epistemological and methodological 
foundations of Rothbard's thought. This requires an investigation of 
praxeology, an apriori notion of science which is deductively built upon 
fundamentally true axioms. Since the bulk of Rothbard's understanding of 
praxeology originates in the writings of Mises and other earlier Austrian 
writers, Chapter II focuses upon the role of Rothbard's mentor in the 
development of these materials. Rothbard's contributions to this body of 
thought are quite clearly resting upon the shoulders of earlier Austrian 
theory. However, although Rohbard's unique contributions in this area are 
limited, these discussions are required to establish the foundations and 
illuminate the reader to this thinker's more original work in other realms of 
social theory. We conclude by examining a contemporary issue of the 
Austrian School that helps to elucidate the foundations of Rothbard's 
methodology while also uncovering a potentially widening gulf within this 
rather unique methodological tradition. 
Chapter Ill investigates Rothbard's contributions to economic theory. 
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The chapter is divided into three parts. First, we briefly examine the general 
themes of the Austrian School of economics. Secondly, we explore Rothbard's 
most important contributions to Austrianism. Our focus concerning 
Rothbard's contributions is on particularly two areas of economic theory, 
namely, monetary and monopoly theory. Thirdly, expanding this discussion, 
we investigate Rothbard's most unique contribution to economics, the 
praxeological consequences of what he terms "hegemonic" intervention, the 
admittance of government into the free market. 
Although one may discuss the consequences of particular policies 
scientifically, Rothbard argues that in order to promote a specific set of 
prescriptions from these conclusions we require an objective set of ethics. In 
other words, even though Austrian economics may generally appear to 
promote certain policy conclusions, it may legitimately only explain the 
consequences. Chapter IV examines Rothbard's efforts to create the ethics 
which allow for a theory of liberty. In this discussion, we explore his 
grounding of ethics in natural law, based upon the rights of self-ownership. 
He develops in a method similar to his economics the body of libertarian 
ethics founded on the principles of property rights and the axiom of non­
aggression. Finally, we examine his discussion of the State in political 
philosophy or, more correctly, the realization that the State represents for 
him the epitomy of criminality and ought not to exist. 
Chapter V continues the themes that are created by the anarchist 
conclusions of the preceding discussion. In this chapter we transcend the 
mere critique of the State by Rothbard in order to look at the kinds of 
institutions which, he argues, may replace the functions now provided by 
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governments. The result is the anarcho-capitalist society in which all goods 
and services, including those traditionally viewed as public goods, are 
provided through the market process. To achieve this system Rothbard seeks 
to consolidate ethical imperatives and real demands. The chapter explores 
and critiques these policy solutions in a substantial number of specific areas, 
concluding in almost all cases that his efforts at linkage are, in fact, successful. 
Chapter VI examines Rothbard's major contributions on libertarian 
strategy by exploring a problem common to radical systems of thought, 
namely, the pitfalls of political acceptance and practical implementation. 
Without adequate successes in this tactical arena, an entire system of thought 
faces intellectual extinction. Thus, the chapter examines several problems 
facing libertarian activism--many that are peculiar only to libertarianism. 
Chapter VII concludes our study by reweaving Rothbard's work into a 
whole fabric. In our final discussions we seek to place both Rothbard and the 
larger libertarian movement in historical and theoretical context. Specifically, 
we look at the libertarian heritage and its relationship to other contemporary 
American ideologies. Moreover, we search for Rothbard's place within these 
American contexts. And, finally, we conclude by briefly speculating on what 
the future may hold for the ideas of Rothbard and libertarianism. 
The current problems facing the more collectivist and politically 
interventionist arenas in the world have created an intellectual "stage" which 
humanity has not witnessed in many generations. These concerns require 
one to return and reexamine first principles of political theory in 
fundamental ways . In contemporary society, libertarian thought is a key 
component in this reexamination. The fundamental task of this research is to 
1 1  
analyze perhaps the most influential and provocative contributor to this body 
of ideas, Murray Rothbard. 
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CHAPTER II 
ROTHBARD AND THE METHODOLOGY 
OF THE AUSTRIAN SCHOOL 
Introduction to the Austrian School's Methodology 
Before one may adequately critique Rothbard 's  more original 
contributions in political economy, he must investigate the uncommon 
methodological tenets of the Austrian School of Economics. The bulk of his 
thought has a distinctly Austrian component, a tradition that explicitly 
originated during the subjectivist/marginalist revolution of the 1870's in the 
writings of Carl Menger and that were later elucidated in the thought of his 
student Ludwig von Mises (Menger, 1981;  1963) . While Rothbard has 
provided significant contributions to the body of this methodology, to 
completely understand these ideas one is required to explore other Austrian 
predecessors .  Therefore, Chapter II will be a more comprehensive 
investigation of these foundations, which focus not only on Rothbard's 
writings but also on the more general tradition of Mengerian/Misesian 
Austrian methodology. 
Menger, along with fellow Austrians Friedrich von Wieser and Eugen 
von Bohm-Bawerk, developed a methodology plainly in contrast to the 
popular German Historical School of the late nineteenth century) As a result, 
1 .  For overviews of the history of Austrianism, see White (1984); 
Reekie (1984, Chapter 1); Taylor (1980, Chapter 1); and Rothbard (1979c, pp. 45-
61). 
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this Methodenstreit, or "battle over methods," pitted the Historical School, 
which in its more naive forms sought science founded on pure 
"inductivism" without any unifying formal theory, against the Austrians.2 
The Austrians, Rothbard argues, were a synthesis of two sources: the 
individualistic deductive tradition of the classical political economists (J .B. 
Say and Nassau Senior in particular) and the "Southwest German School" 
(Rothbard, 1980a, p. 30) .3 
In the twentieth century, the older  dis t inction of  
historicism/institutionalism and Austrianism has been superseded by the 
dominance of modern positivism or empiricism. Epistemologically, 
empiricist truth-claims require verification by sensory experience. Reason 
alone is inadequate; mathematics and logic are retained but as purely analytic 
statements, true by definition, which are utilized to organize meaningful 
statements. Phenomena outside this realm (such as metaphysics, as 
positivists define it) are either impossible to verify (or falsify) or are 
completely non-sensical. Theorists in the mainstream of neo-classical 
economics, mimicked by other "less rigorous" social sciences, have adopted 
these overtly natural science methods and have applied them to the study of 
human action. Relying heavily on mathematical formalism and statistics, 
many modern empiricists have viewed the goal of science to produce 
2. The label "Austrian", in fact, was first used by members of the 
German Historical School as a derogatory brand. It stuck, however. Most 
Austrian economists today are not Austrian by nationality. 
3. For discussions of pre-Mengerian influences see Rothbard (1979c, pp. 
45-51; 1976, pp. 69-71) and Kirzner (1976a, pp. 152-159). 
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theories that are predictive and rest ultimately on empirical sensory data 
(Friedman, 1953, pp. 3-43). 
However, most Austrians ground their methodology on a very 
different form of "empiricism", or even on apparently non-empirical 
grounds. As a result they have often been woefully misunderstood by 
mainstream critics.4 Arguably, some parts of the Austrian's own criticisms of 
modern empiricism have been superseded by advancements in the study of 
epistemology (Butler, 1988, pp. 319-321) .  Yet, their fundamental critique 
remains and, likewise, "praxeology"--the method for understanding human 
action--remains a viable alternative to present frameworks of knowledge 
discovery. Therefore, it is necessary to outline the methodological and 
epistemological underpinnings of Austrian praxeology, focusing on its main 
architect (and Rothbard's mentor), von Mises . Ignoring a small (though 
fundamental) epistemological difference, there are only minor 
methodological differences between Mises and Rothbard. However, as we 
shall see, there is a more clear dichotomy between Rothbard and a number of 
younger current Austrians concerning more fundamental epistemological 
issues, a debate which we investigate in the subsequent section. 
4. See, for example, Blaug (1980, pp. 91-93). Caldwell (1982, pp. 105-106, 
1 18-1 19, and 134) takes Blaug to task on these misconceptions. He further 
argues in support of an attractive form of "methodological pluralism," 
contending that the application of falsificationist frameworks to the Austrian 
program is improper critique, since it is founded on explicitly different 
grounds. 
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Methodology, Praxeology, and the Study of Human Action 
Praxeology is most thoroughly detailed in the writings of Mises (Mises, 
1963, Chapters 1-7; 1976; 1985) . In developing its foundations Mises clearly 
seeks an epistemological "middle ground" between scientific extremes. 
Rejecting normatively laden holism, he adopts the notion of "value free" 
science in the Wertfreiheit tradition of Weber. However, he also denies both 
the subtle relativism of historicism and the scientism of modern empiricism, 
developing a foundation resting upon what he terms "methodological 
apriorism." 
Fully developed praxeology, Mises contends, transcends the commonly 
conceived confines of economics. By escaping these parameters and avoiding 
the pitfalls of both nihilism and scientism, he grounds social science on a 
thorough theory of subjectivism in human choice and exchange rather than 
on narrow profit maximization. 
For a long time men failed to realize that the 
transition from the classical theory of value to the 
subjective theory of value was much more than the 
substitution of a more satisfactory theory of market 
exchange for a less satisfactory one. The general 
theory of choice and preference goes far beyond the 
horizon which encompassed the scope of economic 
problems as circumscribed by the economists from 
Cantillon, Hume, and Adam Smith down to John 
Stuart Mill. It is much more than merely a theory of 
the "economic side" of human endeavors and of 
man ' s  striving for commodities and an 
improvement of his material well-being. It is the 
science of every kind of human action. Choosing 
determines all human decisions. In making his 
choice man chooses not only between various 
material things and services. All human values are 
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offered for option. All ends and all means, both 
material and ideal issues, the sublime and the base, 
the noble and the ignoble, are ranged in a single 
row and subjected to a decision which picks out one 
thing and sets aside another. Nothing that men aim 
at or want to avoid remains outside this 
arrangement into a unique scale of gradation and 
preference. The modern theory of value widens the 
scientific horizon and enlarges the field of 
economic studies. Out of the political economy of 
the classical school emerges the general theory of 
human action, praxeology (Mises, 1963, p. 3). 
Praxeology studies conscious actions, as contrasted with involuntary 
behavior, which, Mises argues, is not a part of human social science. 
However, neither is praxeology an endeavor into psychology, nor is it aimed 
at the speculative understanding of why individuals act certain ways in 
specific situations. Instead, it focuses upon explaining what occurs in human 
activity--not by providing concrete or specific details, but by providing the 
observer a framework to order and understand reality. 
A universally true science is achievable, Mises concludes. While the 
motivation of action may not be universally understood, the nature of action 
can be discerned. That much--as of now, at least--is all one can know, for man 
faces an "insurmountable" separation of subject and object Mises calls 
"methodological dualism. " 
. . . .  In the present state of our knowledge the 
fundamental statements of positivism, monism, 
and panphysicalism are metaphysical postulates 
devoid of any scientific foundation and both 
meaningless and useless for scientific research. 
Reason and experience show us two separate 
realms: the external world of physicat chemical, 
and physiological phenomena and the internal 
world of tho ught, feeling, valuation, and 
purposeful action. No bridge connects--as far as we 
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can see today--these two spheres . . . .  In the face of this 
state of affairs we cannot help withholding 
judgment on the essential statements of monism 
and materialism . . . .  (We) are bound to acquiesce in a 
methodological dualism. 
Human action is one of the agencies bringing 
about change. It is an element of cosmic activity 
and becoming. Therefore it is a legitimate object of 
scientific investigation. As--at least under present 
conditions--it cannot be traced back to its causes, it 
must be considered as an ultimate given and must 
be studied as such (Mises, 1963, p. 18). 
Praxeology, therefore, studies the category of human action, not 
particular concrete acts. But in studying action categorically, one develops an 
understanding for the "real thing." According to Mises, there is, in fact, no 
alternative to accepting the truth-claim of the primordial category of action. 
Grasping methodological apriorism leads to the realization that one cannot 
imagine categories of knowledge in variance or conceive of logical 
contradictions with these positions. 
The fundamental logical relations are not subject to 
proof or disproof. Every attempt to prove them 
must presuppose their validity. It is impossible to 
explain them to a being who would not possess 
them on his own account. Efforts to define them 
according to the rules of definition must fail. They 
are primary propositions antecedent to any 
nominal or real definition. They are ultimate 
unanalyzable categories. The human mind is 
utterly incapable of imagining categories in 
variance with them .. . .  They are the indispensable 
prerequisite of perception, apperception, and 
experience (Mises, 1963, p. 34). 
These propositions are true, prior to experience, and represent a series of 
"necessary and ineluctable intellectual conditions of thinking, anterior to any 
actual instance of conception and experience" (Mises, 1963, p. 33) . They are 
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laws of thought or a pre-equipped "set of tools for grasping reality" (Mises, 
1963, p. 35). Since the category of action is mind-founded, it cannot be nor 
need be falsified. To challenge its truth-claim is to verify its truthfulness. To 
"test" self-evident truths, Mises concludes, would be ridiculous; it is "idle to 
ask whether things-in-themselves are different from what they appear to us" 
(Mises, 1963, p. 36). 
On these epistemological points, there has been a substantial amount 
of disagreement within the Austrian tradition. In fact, Mises is largely alone 
with his Kantian foundations. For instance, his mentor Menger rests his own 
methodology on Aristotelian metaphysics, seeking the "laws" of economics 
in the essences of human action, i.e., the nature and inter-connections of 
social phenomena (Menger, 1963, p. 37). Mises, while maintaining the core of 
the Mengerian program, redirects it in two distinct ways. First, he discards the 
psychological overtones of early Austrian motivation studies, replacing it 
with the study of the implication and not the motives of action. 
Psychological studies, in other words, are replaced by a pure theory of choice 
founded on the self-evidently true idea of cognitive action. Secondly, he 
denies Menger's broadly empirical epistemology and substitutes Kantian 
rationalism. 
Rothbard, on the other hand, returns to the Mengerian perspective, 
arguing that the "axioms" of action are so broadly based in experience "that 
once enunciated they become self-evident and hence do not meet the 
fashionable criterion of 'falsifiability" ' (Rothbard, 1976g, p. 25) . 
. . . .  Without delving too deeply into the murky 
waters of epistemology, I would deny, as an 
Aristotelian and neo-Thomist, any such alleged 
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'laws of logical structure' that the human mind 
necessarily imposes on the chaotic structure of 
reality. Instead, I would call all such laws 'laws of 
reality,' which the mind comprehends from 
investigating and collating the facts of the real 
world. My view is that the fundamental axiom and 
subsidiary axioms are derived from the experience 
of reality and are therefore in the broadest sense 
empirical. I would agree with the Aristotelian 
realist view that its doctrine is radically empirical, 
far more so than the post-Humean empiricism 
which is dominant in modern philosophy 
(Rothbard, 1976g, p. 24). 
However, for the purpose of understanding Austrian method, the 
differences between Mises and Rothbard are minor, particularly when they 
are contrasted with mainstream positivism. Whereas Rothbard may argue 
that praxeological axioms are empirical, they are still just as certainly true as 
are Mises' rationally founded ones (Rothbard, 1976g, p. 27) . And this view is 
unquestionably contrary to modern empiricism's constantly open-ended 
conception of truth-claims. 
Since Mengerian empiricism, unlike the post-Humean variety, seeks 
fundamental truths, or essences, it is likely to be dismissed by modern 
empiricists as definitional propositions and, therefore, mere tautologies. A 
deeper understanding of these propositions, however, would lead one to 
recognize that these qualitative relationships and phenomena bundled in 
these axioms are themselves fundamentally true and critical in explaining 
reality. 
It is unlikely any Austrian would deny a role for modern empiricism 
in science. Menger, for example, argues there are two kinds of empirical laws: 
exact (non-falsifiable) and empirical (concrete and contingent on specific 
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human volition) . In fact, T.W. Hutchison contends that Menger's vigorous 
attack on the Historical School was aimed at the distinctive notion of certain 
historicists that they had exclusive ownership of truth (Hutchison, 1973, p. 
37).  This perspective, Austrians argue, is overly restrictive; science must 
further grasp the understanding of the essences of phenomena, a type of 
knowledge that "transcends" particular events but is all the while just as true. 
This broadly empirical notion focuses on an additional part of reality, one 
discovered by introspection, or by the understanding of universal inner 
experience. Experience includes the "reflective" as well as the "physical" 
(Rothbard, 1976g, p. 25) .  Modern empiricists would obviously frown upon 
such a view, since introspection fails to be "operationally meaningful" and, 
thus, is untestable. 
For Mises, the "test" for correct praxeology does not come from 
comparing it with external experience, since these propositions precede 
history. It is impossible to discern meaning without these axioms. The 
proposition is "tested" and true if it is grounded in correct epistemological 
foundations and properly arrived at through a deductive chain of logic. 
Rothbard, on the other hand, views introspective experiences as antecedent 
to extrospective ones, and argues that praxeological axioms are "a posteriori 
to the universal observations of the logical structures of the human mind 
and human action" (Rothbard, 1951, p. 181) .  Yet, they are both empirical and 
non-falsifiable; once stated these propositions are obviously true, even if they 
are not subject to extrospective verification to justify their truthfulness. 
Therefore, these claims are not mere tautologies; by beginning with a broader 
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notion of experience, methodological apriorism avoids the tentativeness of 
positivistic verification and the trap of circular definitional argumentation. 
Moreover, Austrian methodology escapes positivism's division of the 
a priori (and "unreal") and the empirical (and uncertain) . By expanding into 
the introspective realm of purposes, praxeology, as Austrian Israel Kirzner 
notes, avoids the limitations imposed by modern social science . 
.... I t  is the task of science to describe and explain 
reality. If reality consists of more than the external 
world, then a science that is confined to the facts of 
the external world is simply incomplete. It does not 
account for everything that is there. The Austrian 
approach insists that there is something besides the 
facts of the external world and the relationships 
that may be postulated between these bare facts. 
What is that something else? It is the realm of 
reality that Knight pointed to, the realm of 
purposes. And even if one were able to explain the 
facts of the external world in terms of similar facts, 
without regard to the human purposes underlying 
these facts, one would not have explained 
everything there is to be explained, not have set 
forth everything there is to set forth. One would 
have failed to make the world intelligible in terms 
of human action, that is, in terms of human 
purposes . . . .  There is a realm of reality called 
purposes. It is there, and if we fail to point it out, 
then we fail in the task of making the world 
intelligible in terms of human action (Kirzner, 
1976c, pp. 44-45). 
The study of human action depends on the idea that there is an essence 
to human conduct, accompanied by the "consciousness of volition" (Kirzner, 
1976a, p .  151) .  Hence, it is the introspective factor that makes "human" 
science, i.e., the ability to make choices. Praxeology does not propose to have 
knowledge of the content of specific determinations of anyone's particular 
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will, but only that all individuals share this ability to act willfully. While 
praxeology may provide some predictive ability qualitatively, its main 
purpose is to explain the chaotic social world, assisted by the understanding of 
the essence of volition. This understanding results not from generalizing 
about certain series of particular past events but from an essentialist 
understanding of humans "from within. " 
Since the knowledge of internal experience or mind-founded 
categories is required in the study of human action, it  is  quite illogical to 
utilize exclusively methodologies aimed only at external sensory data. 
Austrians, therefore, are highly critical of the use of natural science methods 
in the social· sciences. Fundamental differences in the phenomena studied 
may lead to woefully incomplete or even misguided research. Whereas the 
natural world may be objectively verifiable, observable, and suitable to 
commonly applied deterministic methodologies, human action is the 
product of an individual's elective and creative faculties (which themselves 
give the social world its meaning) and require an alternative approach. 
Thus, the appropriate methodology in the social s ciences i s  
fundamentally reversed from that of  the natural sciences (assuming a 
deterministic method is appropriate for the natural sciences) . The latter 
ideally begins with or is at least verified by observation, as one tests 
hypotheses against collected data. On the other hand, praxeology begins with 
true axioms and carries this knowledge into the realm of human action. In a 
sense, as Rothbard argues, these axioms are more firmly empirical than any 
natural science observation, for "since the ultimate causes are known as true, 
their consequents are also true" (Rothbard, 1979c, p. 21) .  
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These axioms are derived from the "subjective" imprint on all social 
events. Praxeology studies person and meaning, not things, which necessarily 
introduces the notions of perception and subject-valuation. Nevertheless, 
while the focus is subject-oriented, the science--at least for traditional 
Austrians such as Rothbard--is still objective and untainted by personal 
values. 
Objective praxeological theory in the social sciences may be compared 
to a second branch of social reality, history, or the "concrete content of human 
action" (Mises, 1963, p. 30). Epistemologically, theory alone is a reliable source 
for universal truth-claims, for history may provide neither universal 
understanding nor predictive capabilities of future actions. Instead, theory is 
used to envelope specific events, providing a "roadmap" to allow 
understanding. 
This distinction of theory and history corresponds to the position that 
the social and natural sciences are fundamentally (or at least extremely) 
different. Since the concrete social world is indeterminate and its meaning is 
subject-given, historical events cannot be used to ultimately prove or 
disprove specific hypotheses. Likewise, the historian will never be truly 
objective, for he deals with unique events and necessarily invokes his own 
subjective meanings. 
For the Austrian, these overtly uncertain themes are critical to the 
formation of a social science. Each historical act is unique--no more fixed for 
repetition than any other conceivable act. The social world is both incredibly 
complex and indeterminate. Even if science could somehow solve the former 
concern of a practically infinite number of causal variables, no degree of 
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understanding causality may solve the inherently unpredictable nature of 
human motivations and actions. Thus, praxeology is severely limited in the 
sense it is "accurate and irrefutable but it is not precise" (Reekie, 1984, p. 32) . 
The understanding of particular historical events relies on the theories one 
applies to these actions, or what Mises terms the "non-historical" means . 
. . . .  Praxeology is a theoretical and systematic, not a 
historical, science. Its scope is human action as 
such, irrespective of all environmental, accidental, 
and individual circumstances of the concrete acts. 
Its cognition is purely formal and general without 
reference to the material content and the particular 
features of the actual case. It aims at knowledge 
valid for all instances in which the conditions 
actual correspond to those implied in its 
assumptions and inferences . Its statements and 
propositions are not derived from experience . . . .  
They are not subject to verification or falsification 
on the grounds of experience and facts. They are 
both logically and temporally antecedent to any 
comprehension of historical facts. They are a 
necessary requirement of any intellectual grasp of 
historical events. Without them we should not be 
able to see in the course of events anything else 
than kaleidoscopic change and chaotic muddle 
(Mises, 1963, p. 32). 
One "brings" praxeology to the study of history. It is a process more of 
locating the proper theory than testing it. That an axiom fails to "fit" a 
particular set of events makes it only inapplicable, not falsified. Still, theory is 
not completely severed from the concrete world; its usefulness is dependent 
on its application to historical events. Hence, there is a sort of intertwining of 
the two realms but with always a clear distinction. For example, in 
developing praxeological axioms, the economist must delve into history to 
demonstrate the meaning of his propositions or to explain specific world 
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events. Contrarily, the historian explains unique circumstances using all 
available insights (including praxeology). The mental tool of the former is the 
conception of universals or essences; the mental tool of the latter is the 
understanding of the uniqueness of events as developed through the "eyes" 
of the historian. Viewed from an Aristotelean perspective, the "form" of 
human action precedes the "matter" of action. Or, facts illustrate rather than 
prove propositions (Rothbard, 1951 ,  p. 944) . As Rothbard notes, this 
understanding allows the Austrian program a far richer view of human 
history. 
. . . .  The praxeologist contrasts, on the one hand, the 
body of qualitative, nomothetic laws developed by 
economic theory, and on the other, a myriad of 
unique, complex historical facts of both the past and 
the future. It is ironic that while the praxeologist is 
generally denounced by the positivist as an 
'extreme apriorist,' he actually has a far more 
empirical attitude toward the facts of history. For 
the positivist is always attempting to compress 
complex historical facts into artificial molds, 
regarding them as homogeneous and therefore 
manipulable and predictable by mechanical, 
statistical, and quantitative operations in the 
attempt to find leads, lags, correlations,  
econometric relations, and the 'laws of history. '  
This procrustean distortion is undertaken in the 
belief that the events of human history can be 
treated in the same mechanistic way as the 
movements of atoms and molecules--simple, 
unmotiv ated,  homogeneous elements . The 
positivist thereby ignores the fact that while atoms 
and stones have no history, man, by virtue of his 
acts of conscious choice, creates a history. The 
praxeologist, in contrast, holds that each historical 
event is the highly complex result of a large 
number of causal forces, and, further, that it is 
unique and cannot be considered homogeneous to 
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any other event. Obviously, there are similarities 
between events ,  but there is no perfect 
homogeneity and therefore no room for historical 
'laws' similar to the exact laws of physical science 
(Rothbard, 1979c, pp. 41-42). 
The Austrian avoids the criticism of arbitrariness by grounding his 
deduced axioms in firm, epistemological foundations which, in turn, serve as 
an ordering framework that is applied to external experience yet is itself also 
true. The modern empiricist, on the other hand, attempts to formulate a body 
of science in a specialized and fragmented manner, failing to recognize any 
explicit systematic framework. From an Austrian perspective such an effort 
resembles an attempt to escape a maze in blind darkness. 
Once the praxeologist establishes the a priori existence of human 
purposeful action, deduced true implications necessarily follow. In turn, 
these thereoms may then be applied to specific areas of human activity.S The 
statement "individuals act" establishes two necessary foundations of 
praxeological research. First, all action is reducible to single actors; social 
"wholes" derive any meaning they possess from the actions /meanings of 
specific individuals. In no way does this deny that individuals are influenced 
by their external worlds or by other individuals . 
. . . .  Individualism has always been charged by its 
critics--and always incorrectly--with the assumption 
that each individual is a hermetically sealed 'atom', 
cut off from, and uninfluenced by, other 
persons . . . .  Economic theory is not based on the 
absurd assumption that each individual arrives at 
5. Austrians have largely focused upon economics within praxeological 
theory. Nevertheless, apparently nothing prevents applications into other 
realms of social theory. See Rothbard (1951 , pp. 945-946). 
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his values and choices in a vacuum, sealed off from 
human influence . Obviously, indiv iduals are 
continually learning from and influencing each 
other (Rothbard, 1976g, pp. 30-31) .  
There is no denying persons may act differently when under the influence of 
"groups," for example. But the difference lies in the meaning attached to the 
event by the actor, not the fact that something other than the individual 
acted. As Mises quips, it is the hangman, not the "State," that executes the 
criminal (Mises, 1963, p. 42) . The fundamental Austrian criticism is that 
unless one proceeds back to the foundation of human science--the human 
actor--he faces the dangers of falling prey to any number of the unscientific 
forms of holism (common in modern macro-economics) . Collective units 
simply do not "act" apart from or not reducible to individuals as the core unit 
of analysis. Beginning comprehension elsewhere, as Menger notes, may lead 
the researcher far afield. 
Whoever wants to understand theoretically the 
phenomena of a 'national economy' and those 
complicated human phenomena which we are 
accustomed to designate with this expression, must 
for this reason attempt to go back to their t r ue 
elements, to the individual  economies in  the 
nation, and to investigate the laws by which the 
former are built up from the latter. But whoever 
takes the opposite road fails to recognize the nature 
of 'national economy. ' He starts off on the 
foundation of a fiction, but at the same time he fails 
to recognize the most important problem of the 
exact orientation of theoretical research, the 
problem of reducing complicated phenomena to 
their elements (Menger, 1963, p. 93). 
From these arguments follows the intense Austrian critique of 
"scientism". Rothbard, for instance, argues that this type of foundation may 
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ultimately result in either misguided mechanicalistic or organismic 
analogies. The first produces a false faith in measurement, mathematical 
formalism, model-building, and a propensity for misused metaphors, such as 
"equilibrium." The second leads to "grossly unscientific" concepts such as the 
"public good" and an inclination to bring abstract labels (such as "market") to 
life (Rothbard, 1979c, p. 15; Chapters 3-4). 
Nothing within the Austrian program denies the worthiness of 
studying institutional arrangements--so long as they are properly rooted. In 
fact, a major emphasis of Austrianism has always been the study of 
unintended institutional consequences of individual action. But institutions 
are consequences, not formulators, of reality. Reality is an unceasing sequence 
of solitary actions which may occur in non-isolation but that all the while 
happen because an indiv idual thinks and acts. Within the constraints of 
methodological individualism, it is only the individual that generates the 
real-stuff of the social world. 
Hence, the second component of the initial axiom relates to individual 
action.  Mises argues that action both results from and demonstrates an 
uneasiness about one's state of affairs. To act implies, first, the image of a 
better state and, second, the expectation that action can alleviate the 
uneasiness. To fail to act (which is self-evidently impossible) would signify 
either a perceived perfect state of affairs or no perceived aptitude to achieve 
success. Thus, action implies that individuals believe some level of order 
exists in the world and that they may benefit from acting upon this 
knowledge. 
In seeking to relieve uneasiness, Mises contends that individuals aim 
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to achieve a broadly defined concept of happiness .  However, happiness is 
purely subjective; the scientist may make absolutely no judgment on 
individual valuation.6 Therefore, human volition requires only a meager 
notion of rationality in this subjectivist framework. The nature of rationality 
is perhaps the most misunderstood of all Austrian tenets. As with other true 
structuring propositions, rationality is both a non-falsifiable and fruitful idea. 
As Kirzner explains, it demonstrates that individuals' actions are "not 
haphazard but are expressions of a necessity for bringing means into 
harmony with ends," allowing a "range of explanations of social 
phenomena" (Kirzner, 1976a, p. 172). 
The misunderstanding of Austrian rationality (beyond the positivist 
criticism that it is a tautology) results from the different meaning praxeology 
and subjectivism attach to rational acts . The notion that it is used as a 
substantive concept, ie., an act is rational if the manipulated means are 
consistent with chosen preferences aimed at a hiearchy of ends, makes no 
sense in the Austrian program. Instead, rationality is "in the transference . . .  of 
those features in behavior that accompany the direct pursuit of ends" 
(Kirzner, 1976a, p. 166). In this sense, rational and action are the same thing. 
All action involves choice, and the act reveals or demonstrates true 
valuations. To speak of concrete thoughts about preferences in particular 
circumstances exits the realm of praxeology. Rationality obviously cannot 
6. Almost all Austrians have been staunch proponents of free markets. 
But to maintain such a perspective requires one to "leap" into the realm of 
ethics. On the impossibility of grounding the market in non-ethical ways, see 
Rothbard (1973c, pp. 35-39). 
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speak of what should be acted upon. But nor can it judge qualitatively the 
consequences of actions, since both the notions of human error and 
uncertainty, as well as the unlocked mysteries of subjective thought patterns, 
are always present. And these notions do not affect the Austrian notion of 
rationality. All this definition requires is that individuals do not act purely 
reflexively. Thus, the contrast is not between rationality and irrationality but 
rather between voluntary (human volition responding to specific 
circumstances) versus involuntary actions. There is human volition and 
there are physiological reactive responses. The former must always 
encompass the Austrian idea of rationality; the latter is not part of a human 
science (Mises, 1963, pp. 20-21) .  
To alleviate uneasiness, persons seek ends (either intermediate or 
ultimate) . To achieve ends, means are utilized. The social world is given 
meaning by the actions of persons; or, in shaping their worlds, individuals 
transform things into means . This understanding of action is much more 
than the common economic notion of allocation of resources, as Kirzner 
recognizes: 
. . . .  But a really unique criterion for the definition of 
economics is not to be found in the idea of 
allocating scarce resources, nor can this concept 
serve as an adequate foundation on which that 
science can be constructed. The key point is not that 
acting man ponders the comparative efficacy in 
different uses of certain given 'means,' but that he 
behaves under the constraint that he himself has 
imposed, i.e., the necessity of acting in order to 
achieve what he wants to achieve, so that his 
behavior tends to conform to the pattern implied by 
his scale of ends. 'Means' exist as such for acting 
man only after he has turned them to his purpose; 
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acting is not apportioning, but doing --doing what 
seems likely to further one's purposes (Kirzner, 
1976a, p. 162). 
The means-ends framework, as Mises argues, is therefore "not about 
things .. .it is about men, their meanings and actions" (Mises, 1963, p. 92) . 
To act implies a teleological, means to ends, framework. Means must 
always be scarce; otherwise, no uneasiness would be felt. Moreover, action 
implies the perceived ability to discover causal relationships. Without this 
category of causality, persons would not aim to act, since all things would be 
purely random. So, to intervene with the world requires at least the 
perception of some degree of regularity and the ability to manipulate causal 
relations. 
To act within these constraints implies the notion of choice and 
preference-making. The reality of scarcity requires that choices must be made, 
which implies valuation. Value equates to the importance an actor attaches 
to an end as demonstrated by actual conduct. Means are valued according to 
the perception/ expectation one has in their ability to attain such ends. Value, 
therefore, is not intrinsic in the thing valued, but is subject to the reactions 
each human has toward it, within their own "world" (Mises, 1963, p. 96). For 
example, to define a nation or individuals as "wealthy" because they possess 
large quantities of oil would be inappropriate from an Austrian perspective-­
for the same reasons tallying all the country's rocks or mud would be 
unfruitful. There are no ways to impose "value" on these things outside the 
subjective valuation of individuals and the specific time of the valuation. 
The focus of economic science, then, is not the measurement and/ or the 
efficient allocation of predetermined "means", but the process of actors in an 
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economy conceiving of and implementing plans to define or convert things 
into means to respond to changing realities. 
Mises calls this process of reconstituting one's state of affairs exchange. 
The abandoned state is called costs; profit is the difference between the two 
states. These generally viewed economic terms are thus much more 
expansive. Value is a "psychic" phenomeneon, purely determined within 
each acting subject and intersubjectively unmeasurable. 
The notion of a change to alleviate existing uneasiness m states of 
affairs also implies a temporal sequence. Action occurs through time and is 
always aimed at the future. It becomes evident to the actor through his efforts 
at change. The concepts of time and change clarify Austrian notions of 
rationality. One can speak only of demonstrated preference. In combination, 
Austrian temporality and rationality require: 
If A>B, and B>C, atT:l ,  then A>C, at T:l 
However, at T:2, one faces a new set of constraints. The acts at T:l cannot 
serve as a universal guide. If, for instance, C>A at T:2, praxeological axioms 
remain as true as before. Concretely, an observer simply knows for whatever 
reasons preferences have changed. Rational action is, in other words, always 
consistent but not always constant. 
Finally, the notion of action implies uncertainty. Mises, in fact, 
considers them "two different modes of establishing one thing" (Mises, 1963, 
p. 105) . The volatility that results from acting in an uncertain social world 
serves as the foundation for the Austrian criticism of probability studies and, 
more generally, quantitative methodology in the social sciences. Since no 
constant relations of any kind exist across time, any effort to track 
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quantitative relationships must continually be reevaluated. Prediction for 
obvious reasons is, accordingly, severely downplayed. Perhaps certain 
qualitative "mental experiments" might be useful. But these exercises, by 
necessarily holding numerous "variables" constant, are extremely limited 
because of the indeterminate and complex nature of reality. Or, no variables 
in the real world ever stay constant! 
Because of these problems, Austrians focus on process rather than 
social statics. In a world that gives the notion of time real meaning, the value 
of mathematics becomes exceedingly limited, for there is no thing resembling 
what one might call the "frozen present. " In explaining human action in a 
complex and uncertain model, the English language is much richer than a 
mathematical or symbolic one. Creative and unpredictable actors require a 
constant recapitulation of any empiricist model. As Duncan Reekie points 
out, quantification is an unfruitful exercise. 
More important . .  .is the Austrian emphasis on the 
study of the competitive process through time . The 
nature of changes in time, their degree and 
intensity, and even their direction cannot be 
deduced from initial axioms .  If they could then 
mathematical economics would be of value as a 
concise reasoning tool. But human action is not 
'preprogrammed. ' Learning occurs, tastes and 
technologies change, exogenous variables are 
continuously imparting new shocks to the system. 
Only if these variables could be perfectly foreseen 
would mathematics be of value for conciseness . 
Since they are not, even if they are tractable by 
mathematics, the symbols and their relationships 
would have to be continually respecified . . .  .It is the 
presence of time and uncertainty that makes 
mathematics of little value to Austrians rather than 
its inability to handle their economic data. And 
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time and uncertainty, learning and expectation 
revisions are elements which are inherent in 
human action but which cannot be treated by 
abstract mathematical symbolism before, and 
during the ever changing events (Reekie, 1984, p. 
33) 
More fundamentally, while drawing quantifiable correlations may 
mysteriously link sets of variables, the explanatory concern--the nature of the 
linkage--is left unknown. Austrians, by focusing on a verbal method, are able 
to transcend the limitations of static studies, i.e., equilibrium models. Such 
models are restricted in usefulness by the social world's overwhelming 
complexity, the lack of anything remotely resembling pure "laboratories," the 
indeterminate nature of subjective volition, and the subsequent lack of 
human constancy. Rather than assuming these pitfalls away, Austrians focus 
upon these "variables. "  However, it is more than merely a debate over focus; 
by viewing human action as an ongoing process of human discovery, error, 
or creativity and not as series of static end-states, Austrianism redirects the 
nature of human sciences.? 
This notion of (radical) uncertainty reveals a potentially serious 
problem in the Austrian program, however. In a certain sense, its divergence 
from neo-classical economics, for example, rests upon the question of how 
much uncertainty actually exists in the social realm. Kirzner, in fact, argues 
there are two distinctive strands that define Austrianism. First, human action 
is purposeful, a notion derived introspectively. The second strand concludes 
there is an unpredictability inherent in human choices and expectations 
7. For a strong defense of the usuage of words rather than symbols, see 
Egger (1978, pp. 27-31). 
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(Kirzner, 1976c, p. 42). The degree that the second tenet is true is a narrowly 
empirical question, however. While praxeological deduction may imply 
some level of uncertainty, it cannot imply how much. 
This issue creates a particularly important dilemma for economics. In 
the balance hangs the nature of order in a complex market arena. Following 
Hayek's concerns, Kirzner asserts: 
. . .  [W]hen postulating a tendency toward 
equilibrium, we do have to resort to a particular 
empirical proposition. Moreover, the empirical 
proposition in question would seem to contradict 
the other idea that there are an inherent 
unpredictability and an indeterminancy abo ut 
human preferences and human knowledge. If we 
are to be able to say anything about the process of 
equilibration, especially if we are to say something 
about the course by which human decisions lead to 
unintended consequences, we shall have to rely 
upon the particular empirical proposition that men 
learn from market experience in a systematic 
manner. This is inconsistent with the second tenet 
underlying Austrian economics that there is an 
inherent indeterminancy in the way by which 
human knowledge changes (Kirzner, 1976c, pp. 48-
49) . 
Accepting a broad and inherent notion of uncertainty means that the 
nature of a market order and any systematic understanding of unintended 
consequences becomes problematic. If the world is inherently unpredictable, 
science seems left with nothing but the implications of individual purposeful 
action. Yet, would even these implications remain? A notion of 
purposefulness would seem to require some level of predictability. In other 
words, to act at all would require actors to be correct at least part of the time. 
On the other hand, if the world is truly unpredictable, can science even 
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postulate universal truth-claims? This dilemma, as will be evidenced in the 
next section, threatens to generate a deep divergency in the Austrian School. 
Modern Debates in Austrianism: Growing Emphasis on Inherent 
Unpredictability? 
An increasing amount of Austrian research in recent years has focused 
on these themes of uncertainty. In fact, the entire idea of value-free science 
has been subject to internal criticism, a challenge that may ultimately reform 
the traditional understanding of praxeology as being universally true. 
The tensions of a scientific methodology founded heavily on radical 
subjectivism has produced an epistemological dichotomy in the recent 
Austrian revival. Misesian-Rothbardian praxeology, which may be defined as 
a formal and universally true logic of choice, has found opposition from a 
growing number of younger Austrians. Perhaps the two most outspoken 
critics of "classical formalism" are Don Lavoie (1985a; 1986, pp. 192-210) and 
Richard Eberling (1985; 1986, pp. 39-55), who argue for a "hermeneutical" 
study of human action. By briefly examining these ideas we can ascertain a 
more clear understanding of Rothbard's own perspective. 
These hermeneutical Austrians rely heavily on the "growth of 
knowledge" literature to repudiate modern positivism for failing to include 
the "subjectivist" (Eberling) or the "interpretative" (Lavoie) elements of 
knowledge. Lavoie defines this element as the "historical (both history proper 
and history of ideas), linguistic, narrative, dialogical, perspectivistic, tacit, and 
sociological aspects of economic explanation" (Lavoie, 1985a, p .  3). He 
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contends that through a bias toward the predictive and quantitative aspects of 
science over the interpretive and qualitative ones, economics, rather than 
immunizing itself, opens the discipline to the criticisms of the "anti­
microeconomic hoards" (Marxists, Supply-Siders, Institutionalists,etc.).8 
Building on the arguments of Richard Berstein (1983), Lavoie 
interprets the growth of knowledge not as a skeptical weakening of science 
but as a "liberation" from both objectivism (positivism) and relativism. The 
idea of truth is broadened, found not in "explicit rules known by any single 
mind, but in the partly tacit judgments of, and the processes of interaction 
among, the members of the scientific community" (Lavoie, 1985a, p. 14). 
This epistemological perspective has a definitive common thread with 
the Austrian program. Science is seen as a competitive discovery process akin 
to a market, from which a complex order emerges . Acceptance of one 
" theory" over another is never discernible in advance but emerges or is 
unmasked by the continual rivalry and interaction of scientists trained in a 
specific discipline. Thus, science is less rationalistic rule-following and more 
tacit judgment, intuitive sense, and personal choices by persons trained 
within the dialogue of a particular context. Or, science is not the "efficient 
allocation" of pre-determined contexts and criteria, but the process of 
discovering these factors. 
8. See particularly Lakatos and Musgrave (1970); Lakatos (1978); Kuhn 
(1970);Feyerabend (1975); and, for an excellent summary of the growth of 
knowledge literature, Caldwell (1982). 
For an intriguing application of Lakatosian science to Austrian methodology, 
investigate Rizzo (1982, pp. 53-74) . 
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Yet, Lavoie argues, rejecting objectivism does not necessarily create a 
relativistic abyss. 
But to say the scientist's trained intuition is what 
ultimately guides his or her search for truth, is not 
to say 'Anything Goes. '  Rejecting objectivism does 
not entail embracing relativism. While alternative 
paradigms cannot be objectivistically translated into 
a neutral language and measured against a common 
set of standards, this does not mean that rivals 
should give up their vain search for one truth and 
all go their own relativistic ways. On the contrary 
our only path to truth is in their engaging in the 
process of contention. It is out of the confrontation 
between two incommensurable theories, their  
mutual attempts to re-interpret and criticize one 
a n o th e r ,  that we hope to construct effective 
comparisons between them. Where we cannot 
disprove our opponent's theory by finding clearcut 
cases of falsification of its predictions, we can still try 
to persuade him that our interpretation is more 
compelling than his (Lavoie, 1985a, p. 15). 
The criteria for choosing one theory over another becomes the plausibility of 
the specific interpretive framework. Scientific explanation rests on two 
dimensions: a predictive dimension that is falsifiable but as of yet unfalsified 
by "facts," and an interpretive dimension. But all facts are necessarily theory­
laden, as all interpretive undertakings by an observer begin in a hermeneutic 
"circle." In other words, there is no external source outside the subjective 
interpretation of the person doing the observing that could arbitrate in a 
detached manner. Always, some prior perspective must "make sense" of facts, 
for the circle is closed, i.e., one is a part of the observation being made 
(Eberling, 1985, pp. 6-8). Hence, the criterion for what is scientifically valuable 
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is whatever interpretations scientists find convincing in this open-ended and 
ideally free-spirited "conversation." 
Therefore, the context for evaluation is not "a theory vs. the facts, but 
two (or more) theories explaining the selected-as-relevant 'facts'" (Eberling, 
1985, p. 1 2) .  Facts represent "disguised theories," so that any notion of 
"evidence" is problematic; to ask for facts presupposes a framework that 
defines which stuff is and is not relevant. 
And so fails objectivism and its acceptance of "foundationalism," the 
view that one must ground all knowledge in a specific philosophical route 
which makes it immune from criticism. In economics, Lavoie notes, one 
finds this viewpoint as either Euclideanism (as rigorously deductive models) 
or as Falsificationism (as rigorously inductive frameworks) . Either one of 
these perspectives, alone, leaves out too much of reality and thus evades the 
problem of theory choice by simplistically ignoring circumstances where 
alternative interpretive frameworks exist. By being overly narrow in focus, 
these techniques beg the issue. 
Starting with the subjectivist notion of introspection, Lavoie and 
Eberling turn to hermeneutics and reject both Kantian and Aristotelian 
metaphysics, replacing them with a thoroughly subjectivist epistemology. 
Still, knowledge is not exclusively private; these introspective propositions 
refer to, as Alfred Schutz explains, the "one and unitary life-world common 
to us all" (In Lavoie, 1985a, pp. 28-29) . And this knowledge produces a richer 
science, an "unarticulated" sociological process by which scientists and their 
interpretations interact. The interpretive act requires the scientist to explore 
the "other," but not as a detached observer but as one who is mutually 
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connected to the observation and dependent on other scientists in this never-
ending dialogue. 
Yet, if detachment is unachievable, one might argue that 
hermeneutical science cannot be subjected to any means of criticism or 
"testing. " Lavoie responds: 
What we find ourselves doing in the social sciences 
is not so much the testing of ex ante predictions but 
is more of the nature of an ex post explanation of 
principles. The only 'test' any theory can receive is 
in the form of a qualitative judgment of the 
plausibility of the sequence of the events that have 
been strung together by narrative. Theoretical 
sciences like economics can supply the principles of 
explanation but only the historical narrative can 
put these principle to work and establish their 
applicability and significance in some specific 
circumstances under investigation. But elevating 
the role of history and tradition in science does not 
imply a denigration of reason. On the contrary, 
these writers charge their critics with having caused 
an improverishment (sic) of reason by divorcing it 
from practical reasoning and equating it instead 
with a 'strictly formal scientific methodology' . . . .  [I]f  
we seek to trace the sources of our prejudices, both 
those that distort our vision of reality and those 
that enable it, 'then we must turn to the past, to 
tradition, and to the proper authority (based on 
knowledge) which 'implants ' these prejudices 
(Lavoie, 1985a, p. 38). 
The source of knowledge is thus shared understanding, or the domain of 
intersubjective agreement resting upon, in Eberling's words, "explanatory 
plausibility" of historical circumstances (Eberling, 1985, p. 12) .  Based on 
traditional interpretations of praxeology, these critics have redirected the 
debate over Austrian epistemological foundations . Science becomes "more 
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dialogical than logical, more a matter of a back and forth interplay of partly 
implicit perspectives than a linear accumulation of explicit facts, more a 
dynamic process among scientists in which meaning unfolds spontaneously 
than a static body of data deliberately acquired" (Lavoie, 1985a, p. 41). 
However, Lavoie further argues that this perspective does not 
represent a radical departure from the Misesian tradition, contending there 
has always been a strong hermeneutical component in Austrianism. Hayek's 
work, for example, may be rather easily fit into the growth of knowledge and 
hermeneutical literatures. His emphasis on subjects transforming inarticulate 
and tacit bits of information unintentionally into the unambiguous price 
structure of a complex market order seems quite similar to the more 
fundamental epistemological subjectivism of Lavoie and Eberling. 
Moreover, Hayek drifted away from the strict Misesian praxeology after 
coming under the influence of Karl Popper's falsificationism. His mentor 
Mises, though, has generally always been interpreted as an "extreme 
apriorist", fully cloaked in an "apodictically certain" foundationalism. 
Construed in this manner, praxeology is not open-ended; it is universally 
true. To subject these propositions to any manner of skepticism would be 
ridiculous. Yet, the insights of the growth of knowledge literature require 
open-endness and a rivalry of competing research programs. Dogmatism 
would apparently have no place in such a scientific order. 
Lavoie, however, reinterprets Mises' writings by replacing the apodictic 
notion of universally true theory with a view that sees theory as a "scheme of 
interpretation" that both illuminates and is shaped by historical factors 
(Lavoie, 1985a, p. 45) . Eberling calls the thereoms "transparent overlays" to be 
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"lowered on to the historical terrain," allowing understanding (Eberling, 1985, 
p. 40) . In an important sense, this interpretation still strongly resembles 
traditional praxeology: It is knowledge that is "within" humans--an argument 
Mises made using a great deal of Kantian language. 
However--and this interpretation is crucial to the new critique--Mises, 
according to Lavoie, never meant apriorism to be metaphysical but merely 
methodological. In other words, the "apriori" is a pragmatic kind, 
tantamount to the intersubjective life-world one takes for granted. Through 
theory, one captures this sameness; praxeology provides the schemes that 
give human action meaning. 
The practical ramifications of Misesian praxeology are retained while 
the commonly construed (dogmatic) foundations are dismissed. The "apriori" 
is not a "list of explicit, self-evident intrasubjective axioms" from which we 
deduce true science, but a "level of pregiven intersubjectivity, of common 
understanding which precedes and sustains science. " (Lavoie, 1986, p. 204) . 
And, so, praxeology becomes open to dialogue and challenge. 
Likewise, the common notion of Mises' separation of theory and 
history requires reinterpretation. Lavoie contends that Mises viewed the two 
realms as only different and not disconnected--merely "two complimentary 
aspects of cognition" (Lavoie, 1986, p. 53) . That history is dependent on 
presuppositions that base historical "facts" seems uncontroversial in the 
Misesian program. That theory is somehow dependent on history is a quite 
bit more debatable proposition from a reading of Mises. It is apparent that the 
development of a specific theory is likely reliant upon the problems posed by 
an a priori understanding of history. But Lavoie also argues that the 
43 
acceptance of a specific theory depends on its usefulness in interpreting 
history. 
On the second point Mises is less clear,but he can be 
read as endorsing the position that the reason that 
we accept an interpretive framework is that we 
believe we 'see' history better through it than 
through alternative frameworks. Mises held the 
whole purpose of theory is to 'render useful 
services for the comprehension of reality' . . . .  For 
Mises then, the value of theory is a derived 
demand. What a theory is worth depends on how 
well it 'works,' that is, how good a grasp on the 
events of reality it enables its user to attain. In the 
weighing of the usefulness of a theory for 
interpreting history that theory is 'tested' in the 
only way a theory ever is (Lavoie, 1986, p. 55).9 
And, apparently, the justification must be a pragmatic one. Thus, it 
appears that Hayek's prediction about the (Austrian's) twentieth century 
advance toward subjectivism includes even the realm of epistemology. 
Science itself becomes ultimately subjectively intrinsic (although somehow 
defined in epistemologically collectivist terminology) . There is, as Eberling 
concludes, "no textbook of rules to tell us whether [an interpretation] really is 
the correct or best one" (Eberling, 1985, p. 41) .  Yet, the link to the Misesian 
tradition remains arguably intact; Mises' contentions are 
similar to those of hermeneutics: "[T]hat all social theorists in practice and 
each of usin our everyday lives view social phenomena as already 
interpreted, or from within" (Lavoie, 1985a, p. 56). 
9. Eberling is even more clear on this relationship, stating that history 
provides the selection among and modification of  specific theoretical 
constructs. See Eberling (1985, p. 40). 
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Setting aside what Mises really meant (which is, in many ways, a moot 
point), this new epistemological approach is more consistent with the 
Austrian research program in certain ways. Eberling, for example, explicitly 
notes the similarity of traditional Austrian economics and hermeneutical 
science, comparing the "entrepeneurial interpretations" of the businessman 
and the scholar, who are both in an open-ended process of discovery, 
speculation of meaning, and interpretation (Eberling, 1985, pp. 28-29) . 
Despite these similarities, a number of Austrians remain quite 
unconvinced. Rothbard is a particularly harsh critic of hermeneutics, 
branding it a "fuzzy-minded Continentia! horror," "a fetid bog, a miasma of 
jargon-ridden incoherence," and an "incomprehensible thicket" (Rothbard, 
1986, p. 12) .  Namecalling aside, there are concerns among a number of 
Austrians over the apparent "slippery slope" to historicism faced by 
hermeneuticians (Gordon, 1986). Rothbard also argues that the removal of 
universal truth-claims in economics and ethics leaves one devoid of any 
ammunition against statism--or, for that matter, any position--a consequence 
which he clearly will not accept. It may be more than coincidence, for 
instance, that most hermeneuticians are political collectivists as well as 
epistemological ones. It is unclear how or if this perspective somehow 
threatens individualism within the Austrian framework. Furthermore, to 
borrow an example from economic theory: Would individuals act to achieve 
ends if there were no predictability, i.e., stable conditions? If science in a 
similar regard is no more than open dialogue without "stable" foundations, 
what incentive is there for the scientist to act, i.e., to research and participate 
in the community's conversation. Rothbard is concerned with the dangers of 
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endless dialogue, or perhaps no dialogue, since truth-claims appear to 
originate purely subjectively. 
Yet, the traditionalist arguments leave one with a sort of 
uncomfortable "dualism"--an "objective" science of subjectivism. While 
there is nothing necessarily inconsistent in such a perspective, it is very easy 
to see the logic of the direction hermeneutics seeks to move the Austrian 
program. Moreover, the debate ultimately boils down to whether scientific 
claims are eternally true or rather only fundamentally stable. The 
hermeneutical position places a great deal of responsibility and faith in the 
scientist who acts outside the assurances that absolute truth may be 
forthcoming, perhaps ironically in a manner quite similar to the faith 
Austrians in general have in entrepeneurs in generating an efficient market 
order through the discovery and exploitation of profit possibilities. 
Conclusion 
Where the hermeneutical-traditionalist debate will lead is highly 
unclear at present. In responding to neo-classical economics, many younger 
Austrians are apparently focusing on the features that most separate them 
from mainstream economics, namely, the consequences of uncertainty in the 
social world and the nature of a thoroughly applied subjectivism. It is quite 
possible that the attraction to hermeneutics is at least in part due to the 
dogmatic nature of modern positivism, i.e., its dogmatism toward Austrian 
dogmatism! As a result, certain Austrians have intuitively moved towards 
epistemologies and methodologies which focus upon openness and dialogue, 
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weary of merely "talking to themselves."  Adopting the growth of knowledge 
literature's notion of theory choosing may then be viewed as much a practical 
response as a philosophical one. 
Because of this pragmatism, it is unlikely one will witness a drastic 
overhaul of the Austrian program, despite the traditionalist cries of 
relativism. The epistemological debate will surely continue between the more 
and less relativistic camps--drawing attention away from more substantive 
concerns. And, ironically, these debates may themselves fuel the flames of 
hermeneutical sentiments. In at least one regard, this "attitude" for open 
dialogue is a blessing. Setting aside the question of whether praxeology 
represents universal truth-claims or merely schemes of interpretation, the 
way in which science is carried out is a critical issue. In other words, that a 
scientist believes certain positions are universally true does not enjoin him to 
retain a dogmatic approach to the art of scientific dialogue. (Although it does, 
of course, make dialogue either more difficult or more foundational, i.e., to 
debate, one is forced back to original principles.) While such a perspective 
may not be "pure," it may be the only avenue to providing a fuller idea of 
science in the social theory. Only by moving towards a methodologically 
pluralistic position--by Austrians and positivists alike--and breaking from the 
notion of "one true method" will fruitful conversation and subsequently 
scientific advancement occur. How much that requires Austrians to slip 
down the "slippery slope" remains uncertain. If praxeological propositions 
are, however, self-evident and eternally true, they would seem to be able to 
pass any plausibility test. Accepting this point, the entire debate loses some of 
its controversy. 
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But the purpose of this chapter is not to delve deeply and critically into 
the finer points of epistemology but only to provide an understanding of 
Rothbard ' s  methodological foundations and furnish a means to 
comprehending his substantive social theory. Apriorism is the base for both 
Rothbard's economics and ethics. But debate over methodology is a very 
small portion of either Austrianism or Rothbard's own program; moreover, 
these differences are generally minute in comparison to other systems 
(Caldwell, 1982, p. 133). Within these confines, Rothbard is clearly a leading 
proponent of traditional interpretations of Misesian praxeology, maintaining 
a thorough notion of subjectivism that is, nevertheless, within the 
parameters of a universally true deductive science of purposeful human 
action. With this discussion of foundations completed, we may move to the 
more substantive issues of Rothbard's economic and political writings . 
Chapter III examines the first of these two areas. 
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CHAPTER III 
ROTHBARD AND THE AUSTRIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS: 
THEORY AND POLICY 
Introduction 
Austrian application of the praxeological method has been aimed 
overwhelmingly at the science of economics. Moreover, the largest portion of 
Rothbard's own writings are in this field. However, the majority of these 
writings are firmly built on the works of the earlier Austrians. To attempt to 
examine these contributions thoroughly would require a treatise itself. 
Therefore, in Chapter III, we explore this part of Rothbard's work by dividing 
our discussion into two parts: 1 .) the general themes of the Austrian School, 
and 2.) Rothbard's unique contributions to the tradition. We conclude our 
discussion by examining Rothbard's  rather original application of 
praxeological reasoning to the area of non-voluntary exchange which, in his 
view, is predominately the policy of government involvement in the 
economy. 
Austrian Themes in the Study of Economic Phenomena 
Duncan Reekie argues that one may divide modern Austrianism into 
three distinctive historical collections of theorists (Reekie, 1984, pp. 1-5). The 
first set includes the founder of the Austrian School Menger and his 
49 
followers Bohm-Bawerk and Wieser. The second set were students of the 
first, and included namely Mises and later Hayek. 
Unfortunately, the school fell into almost complete anonymity 
following the Great Depression. First, Hayek's scholarly interests shifted 
elsewhere. Second, and more importantly, the advent of the depression along 
with the publication of J.M. Keynes' The General Theory and the subsequent 
"Keynesian" emphasis on macro-economics with its study and application of 
aggregates in the economy redirected the focus of modern economics (Reekie, 
1984, p. 4) . Thus, from the depression until the 1970's there was little work in 
the Austrian tradition, with the only substantial exceptions being the writings 
of Israel Kirzner and Rothbard. 
However, the awarding of the Nobel Prize to Hayek in 1974 coupled 
with the serious practical and theoretical problems in the Keynesian 
mainstream has spurred a revival of interest in the Austrian School and, 
hence, a third collection of economists . From mainly the writings of 
Rothbard, Kirzner, and Ludwig Lachmann the Austrian School has expanded 
greatly in the contemporary setting, assisted now by a number of graduate 
programs with special emphases in Austrian economics. I 
A substantial portion of what makes Austrianism distinctive is, as 
noted in Chapter II, methodologically derived. A central tenet of the Austrian 
program is its thoroughly consistent application of a subjective theory of 
value (Taylor, 1983, pp. 32-40). In fact, White argues that subjectivism is the 
1 .  For a partial and somewhat dated list of contemporary Austrian 
economists, see White (1984, p. 31) .  For a useful bibliography of Austrian 
writings (although also dated) see Eberling (1979, pp. 227-230). 
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"distinctive method of the Austrian School" (White, 1984, p.  4) . One of the 
crucial components of the marginalist revolution concerned the view that 
value is a relationship of the evaluator and the thing evaluated rather than 
something which is inherent in the evaluated item. This realization solved 
the dilemmas that haunted the different cost of production and objective 
value theories of the clsssical economists. This orientation, for a number of 
reasons, leads Austrians to be highly critical of the entire "welfare economics" 
tradition. First, statements of social welfare may have meaning only if they 
can "be unambiguously translated into statements concerning the 
individuals in society. " Secondly, Austrians will not accept statements which 
"measure" social welfare in terms that are not related to the actions and 
perceptions of particular individuals. Thirdly, any evaluation of welfare must 
include not only levels of economic well-being but also an evaluation of the 
economic institutions in the market process which provides for its continual 
success (Kirzner, 1988, p. 78). 
In very important ways, only the Austrians have carried through the 
ramifications of subjectivism--exemplified by these criticisms of welfare 
economics. Through these applications, the Austrian School has taken a path 
especially divergent from the neoclassical model. In fact, Hayek goes so far as 
to argue that every important advancement in economics in the past century 
has been no more than an additional application of thorough-going 
subjectivism (Hayek, 1979, pp. 41-60). According to Littlechild, subjectivism 
for the Austrian means "the idea that actions depend upon perceptions and 
also the idea that different people will generally have different perceptions" 
(Littlechild, 1978, p. 81) .  Humans, then, create their economic worlds through 
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their perceptions, expectations, and valuations . Moreover, both their costs 
and their benefits are subjective. They cannot be transferred to others nor 
measured by others, as they exist only in the mind of the evaluator. These 
subjective factors are always forward-looking and anticipatory (Littlechild, 
1978, pp. 82-83) . The only means by which costs and benefits may be 
demonstrated is through the actions of the individuals and only in a limited 
and ordinal fashion (and, then, only if the decision is voluntary, i.e., on a free 
market) .2 The entire idea that social costs, e.g., public goods, can be ascertained 
rests upon an implicit objective value theory which requires at least the 
intersubjective measurement of individual utility (Rothbard, 1956, pp. 224-
262) . Welfare economics never explains how the inherent conflicts among 
persons' plans, expectations, preferences, etc. may be aggregated to form 
anything resembling a valid social welfare function (Littlechild, 1979a, p. 14) .  
A second important difference in Austrian economics which arises 
from its methodology relates to the role of mathematics in economics.3 The 
distrust of  the tools arises not from any technical reason but from the 
Austrians' distinctive understanding of the nature of economics. Rather 
than focus upon the formal and static dictates of the equilibrium mentality, 
Austrians see the economy as a process. In other words, whereas often 
2. The grounding of all social science in the actions of individuals is 
very evident in Rothbard's economic treatise (1962c), in which he begins with 
"Robinson Crusoe" alone in nature and proceeds to introduce, first, direct 
one-on-one exchange and, finally, indirect exchanges in a market economy. 
3. In fact, Littlechild (1982, pp. 85-102) argues that a number of Austrian 
insights are being recognized by proponents of mathematical models. 
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equilibrium models assume perfect knowledge, for instance, the Austrian 
views the discovery of information as the central issue in the study of 
economics. For the Austrian the market is, as Lachmann says, a "continuous 
process without beginning or end, and should be studied as such," rather 
than a set of beginnings and endings of market activity, such as is 
representative of a Walrasian "auctioneer" (Lachmann, 1977a, p. 39) . As 
Kirzner points out, by ignoring the fact that all activity in the economy occurs 
in disequilibrium--where participants do not have information concerning 
what the market-clearing price is--equilibrium theory "takes too much for 
granted" (Kirzner, 1976b, p. 117). 
And this distinction is quite fundamental. Equilibrium theory cannot 
relieve these differences by merely adding a stunted notion of time devoid of 
the uncertainty of the Austrian model (O'Driscoll and Rizzo, 1985) . As 
Lachmann argues, "macroequilibrium in motion" cannot replace the insights 
of the market process approach (Lachmann, 1976c, p. 156).4 The former still 
fails to grasp the existence of the inevitable divergence in the plans and 
expectations of persons which will always leave the economy outside 
equilibrium. One might conclude that whereas neoclassical economics 
imposes a reality on economic activity (and one that is usually highly 
4. This concern has led some Austrians to question all forms of 
equilibrium models--even its use as a mental tool. At a point, consistently 
applied subjectivism approaches nihilism--a criticism often leveled in regard 
to Lachmann's writings, which is even more applicable to G.L. S. Shackle 
(who shares a number of Austrian traits) . For this debate see Littlechild (1986, 
pp. 1-15) and Shackle (1986, pp. 19-31) .  
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unrealistic) the Austrian School seeks to understand the process of reality­
being-generated and to explain the order that subsequently arises. 
This focus on coordination through time emerges in part because of a 
less constrained notion of economic man. The ability to predict individual 
action is severely limited. And, accordingly, the order that permeates the neo­
classical model is replaced by inherent uncertainty and its consequences 
(ignorance and error, for instance) in the Austrian process. The problem of 
economics is not, then, to borrow Lord Robbins' famous definition, how to 
technically guarantee the most efficient application of given means to ends in 
a society. This notion treats resources as known, to merely be plugged into a 
given hierarchy of ends. As such, it ignores that many, even most, decisions 
are unattainable on the market, due to the inherent divergence of plans and 
actions which flows through the distinctive and separated minds of the 
different actors. Expectations are going to be incorrect, and new expectations 
and plans must be formulated continually (Lachmann, 1977e, pp. 65-80) . Each 
set of changed plans reconstitutes the "given" resources and the demands for 
those goods. Instead of the formal Robbinsean calculus, then, it is the 
continual efficient application of resources where ends and means are only 
known by the distinctive individuals and where these items are in continual 
reformulation because they do not match with those of other market 
participants (Reekie, 1984, p. 34; Kirzner, 1976b, pp. 1 18-1 19; Hayek, 1948a, pp. 
181-208). 
The process of social coordination for the Austrian neither equates to 
the equilibrium model nor to pure chaos. While the equilibrium model is 
not useful at the macro-economic level, Lachmann argues, there is a 
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remaining form of equilibrium in Austrianism, understood through the 
rational action of individuals (Lachmann, 1976b, p. 131) .  Through market 
processes, signals are sent via the instrument of prices to direct the actions of 
the particular persons involved. Through the incentive of rewards and the 
disincentives of losses, the actor is driven to correct errors in the use or the 
misallocation of resources. Obviously, this coordination is an ongoing 
process, what Mises calls "equilibration," and is never actually achieved in 
the form presented in the actual equilibrium model. Competition, one might 
say, is for the Austrian a verb, a process of trial and error in an everchanging 
economy. As Lachmann notes, differences in expectations entail plans for the 
future that are "incoherent" (Lachmann, 1976b, p. 128). Any other notion of 
this process demands exceedingly ridiculous assumptions in which no 
conflicting notions of the future exist and all plans are compatiable between 
individuals (Hayek, 1948a, pp. 77-91; 1948b) . In reality, plans are never 
completely compatiable, and each new moment brings forth a new set of facts. 
However, there is still in the Austrian program a strong coordinating 
component, or what Hayek calls the spontaneous order. O'Driscoll considers 
this process to be the "first principle of economics" (O'Driscoll, 1978, p. 1 16). 
Nevertheless, as he points out, a substantial portion of this century's 
economic theory has been a reaction against the notion that an order may 
evolve without centrally planned direction. Austrians, on the other hand, 
represent the "inheritors of the Smithian system" (O'Driscoll, 1978, p. 1 18) . 
Their central focus is the understanding of the institutional arrangements, 
such as the price system, which arise to provide an economic order of 
individuals based on separate human actions but devoid of central human 
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plan or design. Hayek goes so far as to argue that the study of unintended 
consequences is the most important task in economic theory (Littlechild, 
1979a, p. 15). Therefore, Austrianism is essentially a view which finds a 
middle ground between the idea that the market represents an "anarchy of 
production" and thus requires some form of central planning, and the 
equally non-empirical notions of equilibrium theory in which the notions of 
error and uncertainty are washed away under the assumptions of perfect 
competition. 
It is through voluntary exchange that this "discovery process" both 
satisfies individual demands at increasingly more effective means and 
coordinates the overall activity of the market. The critical component in both 
these actions is the entrepreneur, as actor. Profit and loss are both the 
instruments and the guideposts of action (Kirzner, 1976b, pp. 120-1 24; 
Rothbard, 1962c, pp. 463-501 ) .  This is not the common definition of an 
entrepreneur, who is often associated with the business owner or the 
capitalist in general. In Austrian theory, it is functional rather than specific to 
person (Reekie, 1984, p. 48). Its benefit arises, according to Kirzner, from a 
"rarefied, abstract type of knowledge--the knowledge of where to obtain 
information (or other resources) and how to deploy it" (Kirzner, 1976b, p. 
120). Its function arises due to the uncertainty of the future, as persons plan to 
encounter what they expect to be the most likely set of events. In an actual 
equilibrium, there would be no role for this entrepreneurial activity 
(Rothbard, 1962c, p. 297). Spotting opportunities to gain through exchange is, 
then, the definition of this activity. It is a result of alertness that serves a 
valuable function in the satisfaction of individual utility through the 
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generation of profits--a consequence of meeting previously unsatisfied 
demand. But the action also facilitates the coordination of the economy by 
removing "ignorance" and relocating resources in more demanded and/ or 
more efficient areas. Yet, entrepreneurs exist in the same uncertain world as 
all other actors; their skill is a form of speculation and their reward comes 
from being correct. Through the signals of profit and loss, the success or 
failure of the action by the individual is rewarded or punished, while 
simultaneously sucessful actions are diminishing the disorder of an 
uncertain future. 
These insights on the coordinating roles of a market permeate the 
Austrian criticism of central planning, which are once again finding 
intellectual favor in light of the crumbling of the socialist economies of the 
world (Mises, 1981 ; Hayek, 1935; Lavoie, 1985b). The economic problem is not 
how to most efficiently allocate resources, as the early economic socialists 
presumed, but instead how to continually collect this information, both in 
regard to consumer demand (if individual freedom is on that particular 
socialist agenda) and how to ably chose between resources to best provide 
these final goods, over time. Yet, since the appropriate information rests with 
the smallest component, the individual--in fact, in some cases only the 
individual may have this knowledge--the more decentralized the planning 
process, the more adaptive and, therefore, more efficient it will be. Hence, 
central planning fails for at least two reasons: First, technologically, it cannot 
collect all the information at any given moment necessary to make efficient 
decisions; and secondly, (and far more importantly) this information does not 
exist until persons "create" it by their actions. The market is the means by 
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which this information arises; the chore is not so simple as to merely apply 
available resources to the current needs. This information is dispersed and 
continually being newly created. Action, in other words, is originative and 
based upon the actors' expectations and own imaginations (Loasby, 1982, p. 
128). Ignorance is inherent in the system whether the economy is centrally 
planned or market based. However, when the decisions and resources are left 
at the most localized levels, the flexibility and corrective processes may be 
carried through more efficiently. The economic world is a process and each 
new moment brings changes from the moment preceding it. The knowledge 
only makes itself known in the action which occurs in the particular time 
and place. And through the price system, this information can be efficiently 
transmitted to the entire economy--without particular individuals having to 
collect all the relevant data. 
The Austrian focus on individual action and economic process also 
provides for a clear dichotomy between it and what generally is the focus of 
modern "macro" economics (Lachmann, 1976c, pp. 152-159). On one level, the 
Austrian program has no place for macro analysis: All action originates from 
purposive actions of individuals and is (in this terminology) "micro" in 
origin. However, this focus upon individualism does not mean that the 
Austrians do not investigate the broader concerns of indirect exchange, but 
only that it is studied "from the ground up" (Reekie, 1984, p. 56). 
An example of this difference in approach concerns the use of 
aggregates in economic analysis. In this process of aggregation, all too often 
the crucial component of the discovery process for the Austrians, particular 
information, is diminished or even effectively washed away. In other words, 
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the economics of a specific time and place is lost and the point where 
coordination is actually implemented is replaced by a vague and often 
misleading set of aggregate figures that purports to "measure" items. But 
taken from their "local" context, the items are unmeasurable since they 
represent heterogeneous and subjectively derived stocks of goods. 
An example of how Austrian "macro" notions emerge from micro 
foundations relates to their perspectives on interest and, subsequently, 
capital. For the Austrian, interest rates are directly a consequence of a the 
micro phenomenon of individual time preferences: Persons value items 
more today than they will in the future. The degree of relativity between the 
two time periods for any person represents his own individual interest rate 
level.  The same coordination process applicable for other goods applies in 
this case also; time's "price" is demonstrated by the economy's interest rate. 
Similarly, capital only has meaning/valuation at the individual level. 
Physical heterogeneity denies one the ability to add up a "stock" of capital. 
Lachmann argues, for instance, that "it is useless to treat capital change as 
quantitative change in one factor under ceteris paribus conditions, when it is 
plain that at least some cetera will not remain paria" (Lachmann, 1977b, p. 
210). If the quantity of the stock is based on past sacrifice, one still begs the 
question: Historical sacrifices are equally unmeasureable (Kirzner, 1976d, p. 
139). Instead, persons apply their resources in ways they think will maximize 
future returns, using prices as imperfect guides. It is this perceived expected 
return that is important in defining capital: "[C]apital goods should be 
regarded as an accounting concept for forward looking decisions . . .  at the 
micro, acting level, rather than a heterogeneous macro aggregation" (Reekie, 
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1984, p. 65). Individuals in the confines of a complex economy make use of 
their stocks in different ways--often mutually exclusive ways. Consequently, 
it is meaningless to add these stocks together in a quantified form (Kirzner, 
1976d, p. 141) .  At best, one may understand capital structures through 
something akin to a "sequence analysis" which outlines the chain of changes 
that result from reforms in the market process (Lachmann, 1977b, p. 210). 
From this analysis, the economist may be able to get some idea of the kinds of 
expectations persons possess in regard to the future. 
A focus on process also produces differing interpretations concerning 
the nature of the business cycle (Rothbard, 1962c, pp. 854-871; Lachmann, 
1977d, pp. 276-282). According to the Austrians, these cycles are caused by an 
overwhelming misallocation of resources produced by the simultaneous 
cluster of economic errors which are the result of falsely sent information 
throughout the economy in the form of monetary upheavals. Particular 
individuals make errors all the time in the economy, and when these 
mistakes are made, certain persons suffer the consequences of providing 
products that cannot bear the costs of their production in the market . 
However, with the subtle inflation of the currency by a government, as 
through the manipulation of the credit markets, these mistakes are not 
recognized immediately. First, the real price lags behind the changes in 
apparent purchasing power due to the inflation. Second, the interest rate is 
affected by this additional influx of money. However, the critical point is that 
these influxes are misread: Entrepreneurs cannot distinguish these 
government induced money increases from real changes in the saving­
consumption rates of the actors in the market (Taylor, 1980, p. 72). Ergo, what 
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appears to be a boom ensues. However, as the effects of inflation become 
apparent, truer signals emerge. Laborers, for example, are no longer willing to 
work at the previous wages. As the effects of the inflation begin to spread 
throughout the economy, the misallocations become evident, and the bust 
necessarily follows. Inflation creates a set of misleading and broadly inclusive 
signals that generates a general cyclical pattern, due to the cluster of errors 
caused by the redefinition of the the very important money supply. 
As money increases, time preferences change and more resources are 
devoted to higher order processes of production, as interest rates fall and 
signal that these ventures appear to be potentially profitable. But these 
changes in the money supply do not affect the entire economy in similar 
fashion; they are not neutral (O'Driscoll and Shenoy, 1976, pp. 194-195) . 
Money enters into an economy at a particular place, and it consequently spins 
out its effects from this point outward. 
If the points of entrance are in the investment sectors (through the 
typical credit expansion), resource allocation shifts ever backward as demand 
for higher order products increases. Endeavors that use these resources are 
expanded or started on the indication that they now are profitable. But 
eventually the falseness of the shift emerges as finally consumers recognize 
the spurious nature of the boom. Hence, credit expansion suffers from the 
misinvested resources. The process reverses itself; prices rise in the later 
stages relative to the farther stages and resources begin to be drawn back into 
their "true" stages closer to ultimate consumption. The result is  a 
readaptation to the pre-inflationary boost, with the losses and unemployment 
that follows from misapplication. The only "solution" that will prevent the 
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bust, and it obviously can be only temporary, is further dosages of inflation 
which will, in turn, produce further malinvestment and stricter medicine on 
"judgment" day. Unemployment and depression, especially in the higher 
order goods, are inevitable. 
The Austrian theory also accounts for "stagflation", a problem that, for 
lack of theory, deeply injured the Keynesian policy paradigm in the 1970's 
(O'Driscoll and Shenoy, 1976, pp. 201 -202 and 204-207) . If government 
manipulation of the economy continues, actors eventually come to expect the 
inflationary pressure, but only after the initial damages are done. To continue 
to falsely create the idea that these firms are profitable, government must 
continue to raise the "ante" to fool the factors involved. Reflation, however, 
only produces further maladjustments and the recessionary pressures grow 
in force. To some degree, individual expectations eventually shift to partially 
take into account these government efforts to manipulate economic 
"variables". But at this point the consequence becomes both distortion 
(recession) and inflation. The limitations on this action, if the policy is 
allowed to continue, is ultimately the death of the money as the medium of 
exchange. 
Probably the most important historical application of the Austrian 
business cycle theory is Rothbard's extensive examination of the Great 
Depression (Rothbard, 1963a) . In a bit of revisionist history, he heaps 
substantial blame for the severity of the depression on the policies of Herbert 
Hoover, contrary to traditional interpretations of Hoover as one who 
championed laissez faire and stood idle as the depression struck. In 
Rothbard's view, Hoover took many of the exact wrong measures to lessen 
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the recessionist tensions. However, what are the correct measures? In solving 
this boom-bust dilemma, all Austrians proposals have at least one similarity: 
Remove the control governments have to freely manipulate the supply of 
money.s Rothbard, for example, presents several things that should not be 
done: 1 .) the prevention or delay of liquidation or the further use of 
inflationary tactics, since both only heighten malinvestments; 2.) the 
stimulation of consumption; 3.) the artificial propping up of wages at current 
rates, since in deflationary periods this creates a real wage increase and 
subsequent labor surpluses (unemployment); and 4.) the subsidization 
(compensation) of unemployment, since this policy postpones labor 
adjustments and further increases the distortion and subsequent costs of the 
adjustment period. As other Austrians, he concludes that the prevention of 
the cycles depends on the removal of manipulations in the monetary system 
(Rothbard, 1963a, pp. 26-33) . 
Austrians, then, differ substantially in their orientation to the study of 
economics when compared to other scientific approaches. Focused on a 
methodological individualism and a thorough subjective value theory which 
views economics as an active process full of uncertainty and its consequences, 
the Austrian program travels down avenues of economic theory that much 
of the discipline does not proceed. Grounded in the reality of individual 
actors in the actual market process, the Austrian School provides a much 
5. Hayek (1984), for example, supports the denationalization of money, 
leaving the definition of what constitutes a currency to the dictates of the 
spontaneous order. 
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more useful orientation to human action than the formalism of the 
neoclassical schools or the aggregation of traditional macro economics. 
Rothbard's Unique Contributions 
Rothbard has made substantial contributions to Austrian economics. 
We focus upon three areas which stand out in particular: 1 .) his additions to 
Austrian monetary theory, particularly in the area of institutional reform; 2.) 
his writings on monopoly theory; and 3.)  his extensive and basically 
unchartered work on the praxeology of violent exchange. We examine the 
first two of these contributions in this section. The final area is discussed in 
the following section. 
Rothbard's monetary theory follows closely the earlier Austrians, 
especially Mises (Mises, 1963, pp. 398-478; 1980 in general; Rothbard, 1962c, pp. 
661-764; 1983b). Money has no unique meaning in the economy except that it 
serves as the common medium of exchange. In the free market i t  is a 
commodity, although one that is of "peculiar importance" due to its exchange 
purposes (Rothbard, 1962c, p. 662). Persons "buy" money by exchanging other 
goods and services on the market, in other words. Having once purchased 
money, they may then consume, invest, or hoard particular amounts of it. 
Changes in the relative value of it will lead to readjustments of these 
balances. Its purchasing power is, thus, determined by the total demand for 
money to hold and the total stock of money existing (Rothbard, 1962c, p. 667). 
Rothbard argues that the utility of money depends, except in limited 
cases such as nonmonetary uses of metals, "solely on its prospective use as 
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the general medium of exchange" (Rothbard, 1962c, p. 669). The utility of 
money relies on the actual exchange value of it. What are the consequences 
of this point? 
. . . .  For other goods, demand in the market is the 
means of routing commodities into the hands of 
their consumers. For money, on the other hand, the 
'price' of money is precisely the variable on which 
the demand schedule depends and to which almost 
the whole of the demand for money is keyed. To 
put it in another way: without a price, or an 
objective exchange-value, any other good would be 
snapped up as a welcome free gift; but money, 
without a price, would not be used at all, since its 
entire use consists in its command of other goods 
on the market. The sole use of money is to be 
exchanged for goods, and if it had no price and 
therefore no exchange-value, it could not be 
exchanged and would no longer be used (Rothbard, 
1962c, pp. 669-670). 
Rothbard proceeds to distinguish money from other goods: The latter's 
increase always represents social benefits, whereas the former's increase is of 
no benefit, representing "dead stock" (Rothbard, 1962c, p.  670). In a free 
market, there is no "correct" stock of money, since whatever the stock, it will 
be used to maximize social benefit. This, however, does not mean that non-
m arket changes in the supply of money will not potentially generate 
distortion, as with the activities involved in the business cycle. 
It is unclear why Rothbard must make this convoluted distinction for 
money. First, it separates money from its formation in the spontaneous 
order. Money is a commodity like all other commodities, as Mises 
demonstrated in his famous "regression theorem" (Rothbard, 1976a, pp. 168-
169). It serves a rather uniform use--the facilitation of exchange--but so do 
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many other valued commodities. Likewise, the increase in its production 
affects the demand for it, decreasing its value relative to other goods. Yet, it 
cannot be separated from the commodity foundations: Its original means of 
utility still apply. 
It seems fallacious, then, to separate the uses of money into categories 
and distinguish one use, exchange, so as to argue that changes in the stock of 
money confer no social benefit. How can one say that increases in the supply 
of the good does not confer a social benefit? If it is a commodity like all other 
commodities, then it would seem that the making of exceptions is 
unnecessary. If the medium actually is the free market solution (and not the 
legally forced tender of fiat currency which is not a good to begin with, 
evidenced by the fact it cannot and would not exist without the force of the 
State) , then there would seem to be alternative uses for the product if it 
increased in quantity--like every other good. For example, if gold were the 
chosen commodity as the medium of exchange and there were substantial 
increases in the good, then the uses of the product would likely expand into 
the areas of its more profitable uses, still conferring social benefits. It is 
unclear why it is necessary to separate money in regard to exchange and 
money as to its other uses (Rothbard, 1962c, p. 671). Money is like every other 
good in a free economy, except it is the one most used in exchanges as a 
medium and, thus, the one in the conversion that is likely to serve as a 
common language and "determine" relative values of other products 
(Rothbard, 1962c, p. 699). In a very real sense, then, a free market which 
possesses monetary exchange is merely a highly evolved barter economy. 
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In either case, money generally is used in the modern economy as a 
medium of exchange. But one must also factor temporal components into the 
discussion of money. This understanding of time implies that persons may 
not spend their currency immediately. Every person will hold back certain 
amounts of money for future use, which mirrors his future plans and 
demands. In a state of uncertainty, these resources serve a very important 
function of meeting these future expectations. 
This recognition of a social function for cash balances in the 
stabilization of speculative demand separates the Austrians from the 
Keynesian program.6 Since individuals live in uncertainty, they retain cash 
balances relative to their perceptions of future needs. What Keynes disdainly 
referred to as "hoarding" is to the Austrian merely a demand for retaining 
cash balances. Keynesians might, for example, argue that involuntary 
unemployment results from a hoarding of social expenditures depressing the 
stimulating effects of these purchases. But, as Rothbard points out, this makes 
sense only if wage rates are frozen; otherwise increased cash balances would 
6. However, Rothbard (1962c, p. 678) argues money and interest rates 
are unconnected: 
If the demand for money increases, there is no 
reason why a change in the demand for money 
should affect the interest rate one iota. There is no 
necessity at all for an increase in the demand for 
money to raise the interest rate, or a decline to 
lower it--no more than the opposite. In fact, there is 
no causal connection between the two; one is 
determined by the valuations for money, and the 
other by valuations for time preferences. 
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merely result in decreasing prices as a consequence of increased demands for 
money. And this is  not, as Keynesians might contend, involuntary 
unemployment. This joblessness only occurs involuntarily if minimumwage 
requirements are enforced, either through union contracts or government 
policy. 
These attempts by government to separate individuals from their 
hoarded monies only misdirects economic activity. To alleviate these 
distortive effects Rothbard argues favorably for private money and private 
banking. In a market order persons are attracted to specific attributes relative 
to the function of the good. Money is no different. 7 If the demands are 
diverse, then a number of monetary forms are likely to evolve. Conversely, if 
standardization is at a premium, then denominations will become more 
uniform. Banks would simply be warehouses for money (Rothbard, 1962c, pp. 
700-703). In most cases, then, receipts for the exchangeable commodity would 
serve in actual practice as "money". 
But there is an important nature to these certificates or receipts. For 
Rothbard, these receipts are not future claims on money on the time market, 
but "evidence of ownership of a present good" (Rothbard, 1962c, p. 700). In 
other words, property rights are retained fully by the certificate holder; the 
warehouse is only "storing" the resource. However, owners of the warehouse 
soon recognize that at any given time a substantial amount of the actual 
goods will lay dormant in the warehouse. As a result, the opportunity to 
7. As Rothbard (1985b, pp. 9-10) notes, Gresham's Law, i.e., "bad money 
drives out good currency," only applies in fiat systems. In a free economy, 
consumers will only bank with the most reputable suppliers. 
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lend these resources to other persons arises, allowing a extra return to the 
bank. Or, to take it  one step further, these warehouses might simply produce 
false notes; since they resemble the actual notes, no one is likely to recognize 
the fraud. According to Rothbard, both of these cases represent fraud. They 
are not borrowed funds since no interest payment agreement exists between 
the actual owner and the user. The homogeneity of the good--gold, for 
example--allows the warehouse the opportunity to secretly operate these 
activities. In a free market, he concludes, banks must be required to keep 
resources equal to the money-substitute certificates outstanding, i.e., 100 per 
cent reserves. 
Uncovered money-substitutes produce an influx of additional supplies 
of "money" in the economy. Each increase in the fractional reserve system, 
for instance, brings additional "profits" to the banks. But the consequence is 
inflation. But how may the warehouse make an income? Why would it 
provide this service? First, Rothbard points out, it may operate as any other 
warehouse, collecting storage servicing fees. Secondly, there may still be a 
lending function: Banks merely borrow funds from other individuals and 
relend at higher rates, serving as a sort of broker for the parties. 
While Rothbard's contentions have merit, they seem to impose an 
order on the market that ultimately may guarantee only inflexibility. Not 
maintaining 1 00 per cent reserve requirements would seem to be fraud only 
if  the bank misleads the customer to believe it meets these requirements. 
Why might not the "market" rate for actual reserves be something far less 
than 100 per cent? By allowing persons to place their resources where they 
please, and defining fraud as the misleading of the customer and the failure 
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to carry out the advertised business practices, it seems the fractional banking 
system is perfectly legitimate, as long as the money is backed accordingly. 
Moreover, it seems odd that Rothbard would support such a legally 
mandated rule, although he views it as a "general legal prohibition of force 
and fraud" rather than a "form of administrative government intervention 
in the monetary system" (Rothbard, 1962a, p. 1 19). The same criticism might 
be leveled against the idea that gold must be the chosen currency, although 
Rothbard is ambiguous as to whether this uniformity is required. For 
example, how does one know whether gold is now or always will be the most 
effective standard for currency? It seems the only way to guarantee its 
effectiveness is to continually subject it to the forces of an open market. But 
could not the same argument be posited concerning fractional-reserve 
banking? 
Of course, in a purely free system the customer might demand 100 per 
cent reserves. Or, perhaps, the actual practice of banking might parallel 
Rothbard's system, as borrowed funds and kept funds simply become 
intermingled to represent what amounts to "fractional" reserves. And, once 
the market rates for the reserves are established, it would seem that the 
consequences of uncovered money substitutes would diminish. 
In the inflation-inducing economies of the modern world, there is real 
pressures for upwardly spirraling influxes of uncovered money substitutes. 
An important Austrian contribution to economics is the nature of these 
influxes. Prices, as the Austrian School demonstrates, do not move in 
uniform and simultaneous fashion. Certain parties will benefit from the 
change while others are injured; accordingly, the changes occur in distinctive 
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parts of the market separately. Through the answering of signals sent out in 
the change, different individuals will respond in dissimilar ways at diverse 
times. Where the new money enters provides advantages for those persons 
in those locations; those in sectors last touched by the influx conversely suffer 
the greatest losses. 
Therefore, inflationary effects are not likely to be proportionate to the 
level of the increase in total supply of money. Again, money is not a neutral 
good. These incremental effects which emerge piece by piece across the 
economy distort economic activity and produce new outlooks concerning the 
economy among individuals (for example, time preferences are likely 
reformulated), and these changes will not be uniform (Rothbard, 1962c, p. 
712) .  If, for example, persons' cash balances simply kept pace with the 
increase in money, there would be no overall price increase. Of course, there 
may be huge upheavals in specific sectors .  These disruptions are the 
foundation for the entire business cycle theory: Through the "fraudulent" 
increase of the money supply, distinctive parts of the market are led to make 
a cluster of economic errors. 
Inflation also poses a second potential problem, namely, the 
destruction of the monetary system (Rothbard, 1976a, pp. 175-178) . Initially, 
with the advent of government sponsored inflation, individuals' cash 
balances probably will increase, which means that prices will lag behind the 
monetary growth. This result leads officials to conclude they have found a 
"magical panacea",  and further increases ensue. However, the citizenry 
ultimately reformulates their expectations: With each new dose of money, 
they come to anticipate even larger supplies. Consequently, demand for cash 
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balances dwindles as the purchasing power of the money drops and prices 
outstrip the growing supply of money. At this point all is lost. The economy 
faces an apparent "liquidity crunch" demanding even further increases in the 
supplies of currency, and the result is  a vicious cycle of hyper-inflation and 
destruction of the currency as persons seek to rid themselves of cash for other 
commodities as rapidly as possible. 
Clearly, money represents the "nerve center" of any developed 
economy (Rothbard, 1964, p. 138).8 In Rothbard's view, the last item that 
ought to be outside the coordinating processes of the market is money. Yet, 
through legal tender laws, the monopoly on minting, the establishment of 
exchange rates, and the formation of central banking the monetary system in 
the United States has always been under some form of political controL He 
contends that rather than being stabilizing institutions, government agencies 
operate to produce the subtle taxation that inflation coupled with our tax 
structures allow. His solutions are very straightforward: 1 .) a 100 per cent gold 
dollar through deflation of the existing dollar or revaluation of the dollar 
concurrent with the existing money supply; 2.) the end of the Federal Reserve 
System, with 1 00 per cent requirements for all demands for gold; 3.) the Fed 
and the treasury relinquishment of all note-issuing powers, transferred to 
private institutions; 4.) the removal of any fixed relative rates of gold to 
8. It is rather ironic that among even the most ardent defenders of the 
free market economy there is general support of government control of the 
money supply (for example, Milton Friedman) . Many of these theorists 
eloquently demonstrate the advantages of the market and the failures of 
central planning, yet are not willing to subject the most important 
commodity to the same logic. 
72 
other commodities that are backing currency; and 5.) the provision for 
private coinage (Rothbard, 1962a, pp. 133-134). Essentially, Rothbard demands 
a gold-backed free banking system. 
The same kinds of libertarian, free market themes are found in 
another area in which Rothbard has made significant contributions, Austrian 
monopoly theory. In his view, producers on a free market make money by 
serving consumers. As long as these exchanges occur on a voluntary basis, 
both the producer and consumer are satisfied ex ante, no matter whether the 
producer decides to limit production or not. The fact that demand curves are 
"inelastic" and appear to be at a "monopoly" price does not change this 
situation. Nothing prevents consumers, for example, from reforming their 
demand, i.e., boycotting the product, to reduce the price (Rothbard, 1962c, pp. 
564-565). 
To argue otherwise is to establish some form of socially objective 
standards founded normally on a solid dosage of hindsight. But in a real 
market error is unavoidable. Moreover, producers always seek to increase 
their returns. The withholding of resources, e.g., as with a cartel, must be 
viewed as a single action within a larger economy. By correcting errors, i.e., 
exploiting a profitable opportunity, these producers satisfy consumer 
demands and increase social utility whereas otherwise these wants would 
have gone unheeded (Rothbard, 1962c, p. 569). It is important to keep in 
mind that the supply which is provided is done so voluntarily and amounts 
to exactly that much more than would have existed had individuals acted 
differently. Why, then, ought one to blame the producers who are alert to a 
unsatisfied demand and are rewarded accordingly? That they are able to profit 
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is not their doing so much as it is instead the inaction of everyone else not 
realizing the circumstances subject to exploitation! The same logic applies 
when producers withhold their product, as in the case of property destruction 
by the producers so as to diminish supply (as with farmers burning their 
crops). Nothing prevents the consumers from changing their demand 
schedules out of "philanthropic dismay" to prevent the destroying of the 
good (Rothbard, 1962c, p. 570). 
Rothbard's arguments are quite topical in today's "collusion-phobia". 
In his view, cartels and/or merger activities are no different in kind from the 
ordinary activities of the firm. There is no secret optimal size of a firm: All 
one can depend upon is that over time a free market's competitive process 
will tend toward the optimal satisfaction of the consumers. Moreover, there 
is no way to distinguish between acts aimed to "restrict" production and those 
oriented to increase efficiency (Rothbard, 1962c, p. 575). 
If the consequences of a "monopoly" activity does "restrict" production 
to the point of leaving opportunity for additional profit, one is likely to find 
entrepreneurial activity seeking to exploit these resources, forcing the cartel/ 
firm to compete. On the other hand, if the costs (and prices) continue to fall 
for a firm as it grows in market share, then the "monopoly" is obviously 
serving the consumer with a lower priced product. There are no rules as to 
the optimal number of firms in any market. 
However, cartels are generally highly unstable organizations (unless, of 
course, mergers result) . The control of production requires the permanent 
unanimous support of the members. But the more efficent members have a 
constant incentive to break out of agreements in which they are held back by 
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the less efficient producers. Furthermore, even if the cartel might somehow 
successfully hold itself together, this success merely means that outside 
entrepreneurial actions become profitable (if profits, in reality, do remain) .9 
There is one additional criticism: Could it not be possible for there to 
emerge the "one big cartel"? On this point, Rothbard argues that economic 
science may provide one conclusion on the size of firms: Any firm must be 
limited by the needs of calculability, the necessity to refer its own operations 
to relative ones to gauge its own efficiencies. Just as pure socialism is 
impossible, the one firm is also unachievable since there would be no way to 
rationally allocate all the factors of production. Similarly, as these limits are 
approached by any industry, the efficiency of the firm diminishes (Rothbard, 
1962c, p. 585). 
Rothbard's critique of monopoly theory does not stop with a defense of 
the market processes, however. On a more theoretical level, he contends that 
the concept of monopoly has no practical meaning. Price, he argues, is a 
"mutual phenomenon": To argue that a firm could have "control" over its 
price is clearly a misnomer (Rothbard, 1 962c, p. 587) . Producers provide 
products at certain prices; consumers may or may not purchase them. 
Through this exchange, a market order emerges and no producers have any 
extra-market powers. 
9. See Rothbard (1962c, p. 583) . As he points out, critics of this 
competitive process who argue that the market is somehow different in the 
modern setting because of the huge firms (which presumably makes it 
impossible to raise the capital to compete with them) fail to realize that the 
same economy which allows such developed industry equally provides one 
the ability to compete against it. 
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. . .  [I]t is completely false to say that the [small] farmer 
and [Henry] Ford differ in their control over price. 
Both have exactly the same degree of control and of 
noncontrol: i.e., both have absolute control over the 
quantity they produce and the price which they 
attempt to get; and absolute noncontrol over the 
price-and-quantity transaction that finally takes 
place. The farmer is free to ask any price he wants, 
just as Ford is, and is free to look for a buyer at such 
a price . . . .  Naturally, every seller . . .  will attempt to sell 
his produce for the highest possible price; similarly, 
every buyer will attempt to purchase goods at the 
lowest price possible . . . .  'Charging whatever the 
market will bear' is simply a rather emotive 
synonym for charging as high a price as can be freely 
obtained (Rothbard, 1962c, pp. 588-589). 
Rothbard completely rejects the neo-classical definition of monopoly 
price and, consequently, the idea of monopoly. Its terminology, derived from 
its static analysis of the economy, misconstrues the nature of profits and 
losses (Rothbard, 1962c, p. 597). Incomes are made and lost in economic 
actions which take place in an uncertain world. Hence, the consequences of a 
specific supply of a product upon the economy is unknown until the good 
faces the tests of newly emerging market forces. If the result is profits for the 
producer, certain signals are transmitted to other entrepreneurs who move 
into this particular less than perfectly competitive arena. Thus, consumer 
preference alone limits competition. But all of these points lead to a second 
fundamentally more damning criticism in Rothbard's view: 
. . . .  [T] here has been a great deficiency in the 
economic literature on this whole [monopoly] 
issue: a failure to realize the illusion in the entire 
concept of monopoly price . . .  [W]e find that there is 
assumed to be a 'competitive price', to which a 
higher 'monopoly price'--an outcome of restrictive 
action--is contrasted . . . .  [But] in the market, there is 
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no discernible, identifiable competitive price, and 
therefore there is no way of distinguishing, even 
conceptually, any given price as a 'monopoly price'. 
The alledged 'competitive price' can be identified 
neither by the producer himself nor by the 
disinterested observer (Rothbard, 1962c, p. 605). 
In the real world, demand curves and supply curves are not known. 
Instead, a producer will estimate costs and benefits and try to maximize 
profits, wages, rents, etc. Competition is an ongoing activity, yet the neo­
classical model views it as static and assumes away the very points of 
observation concerning competitive practices (Armentano, 1978, p. 96) . One 
may not merely assume that a cut in production represents monopolistic 
restriction. Neither the economist nor the producer knows the consequences 
of any action beforehand. There is, then, in Rothbard's  view, neither 
anything wrong with "monopolies" nor anything useful in the discussion of 
them in theory! 
Nevertheless, there is one circumstance where monopolies may be said 
to exist, according to Rothbard. He proposes three possible defintions for 
monopoly: 1 .) Producers who have achieved monopoly prices; 2.) the single 
seller of a good; and 3.)  a producer holding a special grant from the State 
(Rothbard, 1962c, pp. 590-593). The first of these definitions, as we have seen, 
is unfounded since these prices cannot be known in a real market process. 
The second interpretation might be legitimate in a sense, but, obviously, it is 
so inclusive as to be meaningless. To a certain degree, all  goods are 
heterogeneous; each actor is a monopolist alone in his narrow market. 
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Therefore, only the third choice makes sense in the market order: 
Governments create the only kind of discernible monopolies.lO 
It seems there are no flaws in this application of Austrian economics 
on monopoly theory, although it differs substantially from other 
contributions on the subject by even Austrian economists (Armentano, 1 978, 
pp. 99-101 and 104-108). Armentano, in fact, argues that these principles could 
be effectively applied in contemporary public policy through a "radically 
different theoretical perspective,"which goes well beyond most "free-market" 
advocates in recent antitrust debates (Armentano, 1988, p. 4) . Whereas these 
proponents of reform rely on equilibrium models, Rothbard's  Austrian 
competitive model fundamentally redefines the issue by focusing on process 
and institutional arrangements. Rather than attempting a case-by-case 
analysis of firms in a boundless and undefineable market arena, based on 
fundamentally spurious data, the market process approach seeks to provide 
the guarantees for a competitive environment. In Rothbard's view, this 
solution would eliminate government interference in the economy. 
These alternatives seem to provide a potentially rewarding direction in 
antitrust policy focused less on specific cases or even particular markets and 
more on the economic environment's rules and processes. However, it must 
be noted that these reforms would also represent a radical transformation of 
the existing policy arena, demanding nothing short of the complete 
elimination of all existing antitrust laws. Rather than being judge of whether 
10.  Armentano (1978, pp. 1 08-109) accepts the Rothbardian definition of 
"monopoly" as the only correct one. 
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"adequate" competition exists in a certain market, the State's role becomes 
one aimed at simply removing legal and/ or political impediments to a free 
economy. 
Monetary intervention and State-granted monopoly priviledges are 
two excellent examples of how, according to Rothbard, the market is 
prevented from carrying out its coordination functions. He develops his 
theory of exchange to not only entail free market actions but also to 
encompass the study of involuntary behavior. This perspective vastly 
expands the uses of the praxeological method. In the final section of Chapter 
III, we examine these writings in detail. 
Involuntary Exchange: The Effects of Government on the Economy 
Throughout all of Rothbard's writings there is a distinctive "dualism" 
which serves as the base for his anarchist views. (See Chapters IV and V for 
further development of these perspectives.) On the one hand, there are the 
voluntary actions which take place in the free market. On the other hand, 
there are the involuntary or violent activities of forced or coercive exchange. 
To Rothbard, the State represents an organized manifestation of the latter 
activity. Therefore, in his praxeological analysis, the market and the 
government represent voluntary and involuntary acts, respectively. 
The foundation for this dualism originates in the writings of the 
German sociologist Franz Oppenheimer. Oppenheimer argues that the State 
is built upon conquest. But more important for our present discussion is his 
argument that humanity satisfies its desires in one of two opposite ways. One 
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he calls the "political means" (or "robbery"): the "unrequited appropriation of 
the labor of others. "  The other he terms the "economic means" (or "work"). 
The latter activity relies on one's own labor or the voluntary exchange of the 
consequences of such labor for survival (Oppenheimer, 1975, p. 12) .  All of 
human history, Oppenheimer concludes, has been a "contest between the 
economic and the political means" (Oppenheimer, 1975, p. 13) .  
The division of Rothbard's study of  economics (as well as  his theories 
on ethics presented in Chapters IV and V) follows the Oppenheimer 
distinction. Like Oppenheimer, he argues there are two kinds of exchanges: 
violent "hegemonic" (or exploitative) acts and voluntary contractual acts 
(Rothbard, 1962c, pp. 67 and 71) .  However, Rothbard apparently extends these 
dual acts further to equate economic and political means always with markets 
and governments, respectively--linking specific structures to particular 
means. 
This fundamental division may be found throughout Rothbard' s  
discussion of  economics. In his economics per se, he constructs the market 
order devoid of any violent interaction. Conversely, he goes to great lengths 
to demonstrate the non-voluntary nature of actions in which government is 
involved (Rothbard, 1 977a, pp. 16-17  and 203-247) . While we will not 
continually repeat the same criticism, there is in this context a potentially 
serious problem. This dualism sets up a sort of "evil-good" or, better stated, a 
"efficient-inefficient" dichotomy which is observable at two levels.  First, free 
exchange promotes efficiency; coerced activity is inefficient. Of course, this is 
the foundation of all of Austrian economics. But in Rothbard's work there is 
a second set of definitions that many critics might challenge: The market is Qy: 
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definition and observation directed always by free exchange, whereas the State 
represents Oppenheimer's  "political means".  In Rothbard's  arguments, 
institutional processes (markets and governments) and the means they 
represent (exchange and conquest) become simultaneous. In other words, 
there may be no involuntary act in the "free" market. Ultimately, Rothbard's 
"science" rests upon Oppenheimer's and others' conquest theories of the 
State, rejecting a priori the idea of "political consent" (and, subsequently, any 
contractarian or consensus theories of government). 
These distinctions are best found in Rothbard's most original 
contributions to praxeology concerning the "economics of violent 
intervention" (Rothbard, 1977a, p. 1 1 ) .  Whereas his economics assumes that 
no government exists (or, that all actions resemble Oppenheimer 's  
"economic means" rather than "political means") the praxeology of  
hegemonic relations introduces government and violence into the network 
of exchange. Rothbard argues that any exchange that occurs on the free 
market signifies the ex ante maximization of utilities among individuals. In 
other words, freely choosing individuals decide for themselves what their 
actions and ends are to be. However, coercive intervention forces persons to 
commit acts they would have not otherwise done. Subsequently, there is a 
necessary loss of utility by the person intervened upon, to the gain of the 
invader. One may distinguish the two actions, accordingly: Voluntary acts are 
those exchanges where, ex ante, both parties receive increases in their 
utilities, whereas interventionist acts are those where one person or set of 
persons gain at the expense of another or others. Or, exploitation is only 
possible in the interventionist setting (Rothbard, 1977a, p. 14) .  
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Interventionist actions may be undertaken through any public or 
private institution. However, Rothbard concludes that "the vast bulk" of 
invasions are performed through the State, since it alone is "legally equipped 
to use violence and since it is the only agency that legally derives its revenue 
from a compulsory levy" (Rothbard, 1962c, p. 766) . Therefore, he confines his 
criticisms to only government intervention. Unfortunately, though, he never 
demonstrates praxeologically how one possesses the ability to infer that every 
action by the State is involuntarily imposed. As we shall see, this 
dogmatically imposed dualism sheds doubts on the entire praxeological 
nature of Rothbard's discussion. 
Even if one accepts the argument that allowing voluntary exchange 
increases individual utility, it only supports utility maximization ex ante. The 
larger concern is likely to be ex post considerations. Rothbard argues that the 
market also holds the advantage relative to its consequences, as it is able to 
reduce economic errors in judgment and action with the least amount of 
suffering. The alternative to these market corrective devices is the use of 
government and, as he notes, this option is absent the structural dynamics 
that a market possesses which works to diminish inefficiencies and shorten 
the lengths of any distortive effects (Rothbard, 1977a, pp. 19-23) . 
In order to prove his argument, Rothbard examines the ex post effects 
of government and/ or violent forms of intervention on the free market. In 
developing the science of intervention, he divides "invasion" into three 
categories: 1 .) autistic intervention; 2.) binary intervention; and 3.) triangular 
intervention. We discuss each separately, examining some of the 
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government policies which fit each category and the consequences they 
generate in society. 
Autistic Intervention 
The simpliest form of intervention Rothbard calls autistic 
intervention: "[W)hen the invader coerces a subject without receiving any 
good or service in return" (Rothbard, 1977a, p. 11) .  These include actions such 
as murder, assault, slavery, force religious observance, etc. The distinguishing 
factor is that the person is required to follow commands that involve his 
property alone; there is no regulated exchange between persons . The 
intervener receives no goods or services for his actions but does limit the 
parameters of the other's activities. Rothbard, however, does not detail the 
economic effects of autistic intervention, since there is no observable 
exchange. 
Binary Intervention 
Binary intervention are acts that force persons to make concessions to 
other individuals by either requiring or denying an exchange between 
persons. The relationship features two persons in the economic situation. 
Rothbard argues this type of intervention has received scant attention from 
economists concerned with the effects of government intervention, as almost 
all research has been focused on triangular intervention. Yet, he argues, these 
forms of intervention are equally important. He divides these activities into 
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two general subsets: government revenues ( taxation) and government 
expenditures. 
Governments gain revenues either directly through taxes levied on 
individuals or indirectly through the use of inflation of the money supply. 
Praxeologically, Rothbard concludes, there is no difference between these 
activities, on the one hand, and robbery and counterfeiting, on the other 
(Rothbard, 1977a, pp . 83-84) . In both cases, resources are transferred in 
arrangements not agreed upon by the coerced parties involved. 
Two distinct groups arise from these activities: the "tax consumers" 
and the "taxpayers". Rothbard includes as tax consumers the "full-time 
rulers", whose livelihoods depend on these resources (politicians and 
bureaucrats, for example), and the "part-time rulers ", who benefit from 
subsidies that are provided by the government. Taxpayers are those 
individuals who are on balance providing the resources to support the rulers. 
In reality, these types are often extremely difficult to define because of the 
dispersion of costs and benefits that accompany a complex and actively 
intervening government. This diffusion, though, does not make the shifting 
of resources any less real. Essentially, these transfers represent consumption 
expenditures by those officials having the authorities to make the re-routing 
decisions, not because they actually consume the shifted resources but because 
their wishes redirect the economy's patterns of production (Rothbard, 1977a, 
p. 86) . These actions distort an economy's  resource allocation, transmitting 
information that does not originate from the consumers in the market and 
refocusing resources on items that do not effectively satisfy true consumer 
demand. As such, social utility, defined through individual satisfaction, is 
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diminished. And this distortion is inevitable no matter what kind of 
"revenue enhancement" is applied. Rothbard completely rejects the notion of 
"neutral taxation" (Rothbard, 1 977a, p. 87; 1981c, pp. 519-564) . The critical 
question relative to the distortion imposed upon the economy is not the � 
but the amount of the tax. Increases in the level of taxes heightens economic 
damage. 
What are the ways in which specific taxes affect the economy? The focal 
point, of course, is who pays and who benefits from the tax. Rothbard 
contends that taxes can never be "shifted forward', i.e., from the seller to the 
buyer, or through the stages of production to the ultimate consumer 
(Rothbard, 1977a, p.  88). This argument goes against a substantial portion of 
economic theory. Yet, if one is truly maintaining a thoroughly subjectivist 
value theory, there appears to be no other possible conclusion . 
. . . .  It is generally considered that any tax on 
production or sales increases the costs of 
production and therefore is passed on as an 
increase in price to the consumer. Prices, however, 
are never determined by costs of production, but 
rather the reverse is true. The price of a good is 
determined by its total stock in existence and the 
demand schedule for it on the market. But the 
demand schedule is not affected at all by the tax . . . .  A 
tax, therefore, cannot be passed on to the consumer 
(Rothbard, 1977a, pp. 88-89). 
Rather, the effects of taxation fall upon the production side of the exchange. 
Otherwise, why had the producer not already passed the "costs" along prior to 
the tax in the form of higher prices? The reason is, of course, that individual 
demand schedules are unaffected by these outside influences. 
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Arguments that such levies as sales and excise taxes may be passed 
along the stages of production are false, Rothbard concludes. Instead, they are 
constantly shifted backwards to each good's original factors of production and, 
subsequently, dictate the decisions of whether to utilize those resources in a 
specific manner. What occurs is a shift from the goods adversely affected by 
the tax toward the resources that the government purchases and /  or 
subsidizes with the collected revenues. Certain original factors valued in a 
free economy might fall into disuse; others may be refocused on the newly 
preferred goods and services of the now-consuming government. And these 
changes will spill over into the complex network of exchanges in which these 
products are attached. 
Whereas a sales tax is generally applied across the board proportionally 
on almost all final goods, excise taxes are aimed at particular goods and 
services. As a consequence, the costs of the tax are imposed directly on a 
selected subset of the economy, which drives these factors into other less 
taxed industries. Still, Rothbard argues, everyone suffers because of these 
taxes. Obviously, the specifically affected persons are most injured, as they 
must shift into less lucrative areas. But consumers also suffer from the 
distortion and loss of a portion of a product they demanded (which drives the 
price of the remaining factors in that area up) . 
All taxes in reality are "income" taxes, of course, but what unique 
effects does the "official" income tax have on the economic process? Rothbard 
argues that it is, first, a levy that cannot be shifted forward or backward in the 
stages of production. Second, it will decrease the payer's standard of living: 
The costs of working increase and conversely the costs of leisure diminish 
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(Rothbard, 1977a, pp. 96-97) . Hence, the bulk of the distortion in this case 
occurs within the preferences of particular individuals. Work for money 
relative to work for barter is also penalized. As a result, income taxes work to 
"bring about a reduction in specialization and a breakdown of the market, 
and hence a retrogression in living standards" (Rothbard, 1977a, p. 96). The 
advantages of a monetary economy are diminished. These losses, he 
contends, also lower the taxpayer's real income and his valuation of 
monetary assets. In turn, as assets diminish, time preferences increase--and 
proportionally more of these resources go toward consumption. This 
disincentive for saving is only doubled by the imposition of additional 
income taxes upon interest returns on investments and/ or saving, which 
serves to drive the interest rates below the rates that time preferences would 
bear on a free market. 
On this point, Rothbard follows the correct neutral Austrian position 
on the question of what kinds of taxes ought to be applied in government 
fiscal policy. Many conservatives, such as a number of the recently popular 
"Supply-Side" economists argue for a fiscal policy that creates disincentives 
for consumption and conversely incentives for savings. Traditional 
Keynesians, on the other hand, support a "demand-side" solution. The 
presumption of both these policy prescriptions is that a given savings-to­
consumption ratio is somehow "incorrect", and may be corrected with certain 
fiscal policies. Rothbard argues: 
[There is] a curious tendency among economists 
generally devoted to the free market to be 
unwilling to consider its ratio of consumption to 
investment allocations as optimal. The economic 
case for the free market allocations tend at all 
87 
points to be optimal with respect to consumer 
desires . . . .  [P]eople voluntarily choose between 
present and future consumption in accordance 
with their time preferences, and this voluntary 
choice is their optimal choice. Any tax levied 
particu larly on their consumption, therefore, is just 
as much a distortion and invasion of the free 
market as a tax on their savings . . . . (Rothbard, 1977a, 
pp. 99-100) . 
However, Rothbard's conclusions concerning the social effects of 
income taxes on time preferences is more difficult to prove--at least from a 
praxeological perspective. Although it is true that the time preferences of 
taxpayers will increase, it would seem that the tax consumers' preferences 
would decrease as they rake in the benefits of the subsidy. Rothbard's 
response to this argument is less than satisfactory: 
. . . .  Government expenditures, however, constitute 
diversion of resources from private to government 
purposes. Since the government, by definition, 
desires this diversion, this is a consumption 
expenditure by the government. The reduction in 
income (and therefore in consumption and saving­
investment) imposed on the taxpayers will 
therefore be counterbalanced by government 
consumption-expenditure. As for the transfer 
expenditures made by the government (including 
the salaries of bureaucrats and subsidies to 
priviledged groups), it is true that some of this will 
be saved and invested.  These investments, 
however, will not represent the voluntary desires 
of consumers, but rather investments in the fields 
of production not desired by the producing 
consumers. They represent the desires, not of the 
producing consumers on the free market, but of 
exploiting consumers fed by the the unilateral 
coercion of the State (Rothbard, 1977a, p. 98). 
He is correct to point out the existence of these "malinvestments". Moreover, 
these mistakes will cause distortions within the market. However, it remains 
88 
unclear why time preferences must increase socially. Depending on the 
preference sets of the winners and losers in these "exchanges", it would seem 
possible, though perhaps impractical, that they may stay the same or even 
increase. It seems unlikely that the economist could make any predictions in 
regard to these circumstance beyond those of particular individuals. 
Corporate taxes are similar to other income taxes, although they 
represent "double taxes" expropriating from "corporation" and owner's 
income. As a double tax, these levies direct persons into other forms of 
economic organizations. Moreover, because of the second rung of taxation, 
upon income, the incentive in the corporate system is to leave earnings tied 
up in capital at rates much higher than would have occurred on the free 
market. Rather than encouraging efficient investment, the tax only benefits a 
rigid form of investment, preventing would-be dividends from being utilized 
elsewhere (Rothbard, 1977a, p. 102) . 
Windfall profit taxes distort for similar reasons: They lead persons to 
make economic decisions which hamper or prevent the adjustments the 
price sys tem produces in the market . By penalizing the successful 
entrepreneur, the tax prevents the market from "knowing" the true 
consumer demands. Furthermore, it lessens the incentives the investors 
have in exploiting possible lucrative circumstances .  Rather than 
congratulating the person who has discovered new i tems or services which 
fill a previously unfulfilled demand, these taxes punish successful 
entrepreneurship. 
Whereas these forms of "income" taxes are detrimental to the market 
process, Rothbard finds taxes on accumulated capital to have a "far more 
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devastating, distorting, and impoverishing effect" (Rothbard, 1977a, p. 1 12) . 
These taxes, he recognizes, go well past mere taxation on present income; 
they plunge into an economy's existing capital stock. Obviously, there is only 
so long that this kind of activity may continue, for these actions ultimately 
lower the standard of living for everyone, taxpayers and tax consumers alike. 
Take, for example, a gift tax. Gifts are generally defined as income. But, in 
reality, all they represent is a transfer of previously created wealth. To tax 
these goods creates heavy disincentives both for the particular transfer and, 
most importantly, for the initial production of these products. These 
exchanges are a significant portion of any economy, as Rothbard points out, 
since every bit of property that exists changes hands every two to three 
generations, through inheritance. The effects concern not only narrowly 
defined economic outcomes, but spill over negatively into sociological and 
cultural issues concerning, for example, the family.ll  
These kinds of taxes represent taxes on wealth (the property tax would 
fit neatly into this category, also) . But to tax wealth is to create incentives to 
relieve one's self from such wealth and, consequently, to reduce the amount 
of capital in the economy. As Rothbard realizes, it is this capital accumulation 
that "differentiates our civilization and living standards from those of 
primitive man" (Rothbard, 1977a, p. 1 1 7) .  
1 1 .  Similar arguments would apply to property taxes. See Rothbard 
(1977a, p. 113-116). 
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The progressive tax structure provides a similar although less severe 
form of wealth drainage. Rothbard argues that the progressive tax 
. . .  acts as a penalty on service to the consumer, on 
merit in the market. Incomes in the market are 
determined by service to the consumer in 
producing and allocating factors of  production and 
vary directly according to the extent of such 
services. To impose penalties on the very people 
who have served the consumers most is to injure 
not only them, but the consumers as welL A 
progressive tax is  therefore bound to cripple 
incentives, impair mobility of occupation, and 
greatly hamper the flexibility of the market in 
serving the consumers . . . . (Rothbard, 1977a, p.  1 1 8) .  
Despite these damning points, Rothbard sees the entire debate over the 
progressive tax as being overblown. First, the same kinds of criticisms which 
may be applied to progressivism can also be applied to proportional taxation. 
In both cases, the higher the income, the greater the tax. In either 
circumstance, incentives for both work and savings are diminished and 
distorted. The more pressing concern for Rothbard is, again, not the structure 
of the tax, but the degree of the levy (Rothbard, 1977a, p. 1 22) . 
Rothbard critiques many of the possible "canons" postulated in the 
defense of specific means of taxation. He finds it ironic that these kinds of 
issues even arise in the modern age: Why, for instance, did the debates over 
"just taxation" not go the way of the notion of "just price" in the post 1870's 
(Rothbard, 1 977a, p. 137)? Rothbard's similarly criticizes the implicit ethical 
positions which sneak into the supposively "value-free" discussions of the 
economics of public finance. There are no maxims of just taxation, he 
concludes . Take, for example, the traditional canons of the father of 
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economics, Adam Smith, which are generally accepted without a second 
thought by modern economists . 
. . . .  Perhaps the most 'obvious '  was Smith 's  
injunction that costs of  collection be kept to a 
'minimum' and that taxes be levied with this 
principle in mind. 
An obvious and harmless maxim? Certainly 
not; this 'canon of justice' is not obvious at all. For 
the bureaucrat employed in tax collection will tend 
to favor a tax with high administrative costs, 
thereby necessitating more extensive bureaucratic 
employment. Why should we call the bureaucrat 
obviously wrong? The answer is that he is not, and 
that to call him 'wrong' it is necessary to engage in 
an ethical analysis that no economist has bothered 
to undertake (Rothbard, 1977a, p. 137). 
Without this ethical foundation, no one can really talk about the proper kind 
of taxation. Economics alone cannot determiJ],e the rightness of any of them. 
Another of these canons is the demand for tax uniformity, i.e., the tax 
code should be devoid of exemptions and apply to all persons equally. 
Rothbard points out an implicit flaw in the logic of equal treatment: 
. . . . [I]t seems clear that the justice of equality of 
treatment depends first of all on the justice of the 
treatment itself . . . .  Are we to maintain that 'justice' 
requires that [persons] be enslaved equally? And 
suppose that someone has the good fortune to 
escape . . . .  [H]e who maintains that a tax be imposed 
equally on all must first establish the justice of the 
tax itself (Rothbard, 1977a, p. 139) . 
In other words, without ethical foundations which are not to be found in the 
science of economics, one person's chastisements for tax evaders is another 
person's idea of escaping the criminality of the tax collector! Uniformity 
within the tax structure is unachievable, according to Rothbard, for two 
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reasons. The first reason concerns the nature of the State: If there were not 
income transfers, there would be no need or demand for a government. In 
fact, one could argue that the essence of a State is redistribution, since every 
act it performs in some way redistributes wealth from a set of losers to a set of 
winners. 
While Rothbard clearly distinguishes by definition tax consumers and 
taxpayers, it seems these distiguishing factors are nearly impossible to discern 
in practice. In the political complexity of contemporary society, the network of 
these persons is incredibly confusing, complicated, and overlapping. It might 
be argued that the continuance of transfers does not result from the benefits 
of tax consumers so much as from the fact that almost all parties have a 
perceived vested interest in its maintenance. This (false) perception results 
from a comparision of one's concentrated government benefits and his 
dispersed and often partially hidden costs. In other words, citizens clearly 
perceive the benefits of tax consumption, but often face vague and /  or 
diffused tax payments. Of course, there are still some clear examples of both 
sets of persons; as Rothbard notes, we may be generally secure in assuming 
that bureaucrats are tax consumers, for instance (Rothbard, 1977a, p. 142) . 
Another reason Rothbard contends there cannot be uniformity relates 
to the subjective nature of valuation. There really is no way to determine 
non-arbitrarily what ought to be included as income. And, moreover, if non­
monetary items are included, how does one determine the "values"? 
Uniformity, therefore, demands additional principles, i .e., uniformity i n  
relation to other principles (Rothbard, 1977a, pp. 143-144). As might be 
expected, none of the possible criteria meet the standards of Rothbard's 
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praxeology. For example, one's ability to pay is "highly ambiguous" and 
allows "no sure guide for practical application" (Rothbard, 1977a, p. 144) . 
Likewise, other "sacrifice" theories fail for similar reasons . 
. . . .  The many variants of the 'sacrifice' approach are 
akin to a subjective version of the 'ability to pay' 
principle. They all rest on three general premises: 
(a) that the utility of a unit of money to an 
individual diminishes as his stock of money 
increases; (b) that these can be compared 
interpersonally and thus can be summed up, 
subtracted, etc.; and (c) that everyone has the same 
utility-of-money schedule. The first premise is 
valid (but only in an ordinal sense), but the second 
and third are nonsensical. The marginal utility of 
money does diminish, but it is impossible to 
compare one person's utilities with another, let 
alone believe that everyone's  valuations are 
identical. Utilities are not quantities, but are 
subjective orders of preference . . . .  (Rothbard, 1977a, 
p. 150) . 
This thorough subjectivism produces the same conclusions in the critique of 
regressive "benefit" theories of taxation, i.e., levies in accordance to the 
benefits the taxpayer receives. In discerning the benefits of exchanges on a 
voluntary market, all one may demonstrate is that a benefit ex ante has 
occured; he cannot measure the degree of that benefit. Benefits are no more 
defineable than costs. 
Binary activities include not only the consequences of differing tax 
structures but also the economics of expenditures .  Rothbard divides this 
category into two additional subsets: transfer activities and resource-using 
expenditures (Rothbard, 1977a, p. 168) . 
Transfer expenditures redirect transfer resources as "pure subsidy­
granting activities" (Rothbard, 1977a, 169). Rothbard concludes that they also 
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create a distinction that does not exist in the market: They separate the 
production of resources from their distribution. Consequently, resources are 
taken from where the market actors allocate them as efficient servants of the 
consumer, to be placed in the hands of others who are presumably inefficient. 
The economic consequences of subsidies are well established. 
Resources are misallocated, mobility of capital and other factors are 
hampered, and consumers foot the bill. However, as Rothbard points out, 
there is an additional problem which is often overlooked . 
. . . .  Where government intervenes . . .  caste conflict is 
thereby created, for one man benefits at the expense 
of another. This is most clearly seen in the case of 
government transfer subsidies paid from tax or 
inflation funds-an obvious taking from Peter to 
give to Paul. Let the subsidy method become 
general, then, and everyone will rush to gain 
control of the government. People will be more and 
more neglected, as people divert their energies to 
the political struggles, to the scramble for loot. . . . .  The 
inefficient achieve a legal claim to ride herd on the 
efficient. This is all the more true since those who 
succeed in any occupation will inevitably tend to be 
those who are best at it . . . .  (Rothbard, 1977a, pp. 1 70-
171). 
In the present political situation, this point seems quite important. While 
many writers have bemoaned the evils of "interest group liberalism" or 
"hyper-pluralism", there are few who have recognized that the root of this 
problem stems from the artificial dichotomy of human production and 
distribution. By distinguishing existing bodies of wealth from the productive 
capacities which created the wealth, a society, first, punishes the creators (and 
likely diminishes their effort and number) and, secondly, practically 
guarantees that a struggle over the "pile" of goods and services will ensue. In 
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this environment, a political economy's focus shifts toward distributional 
conflicts and, as a result, both the existing stock of resources and, much more 
importantly, the "attitude" of the economy is transformed, imbalanced 
toward higher time preferences and consumption. To postpone enjoyment or 
focus upon productive acts in this distributive process is to miss the division 
of the "pie". As one may imagine, the long-term consequences of this 
behavior are severe. 
These actions have similar effects regardless of whom they are 
intended to affect. As Rothbard notes, relief for the poor, for example, 
increases the marginal utility of leisure relative to work. This entitlement 
(which distinguishes public "charity" from the private strands), in turn, 
exhausts the resources of other non-governmental organizations aimed at 
the removal of poverty. 
Resource-using expenditures, the second category of binary 
expenditures, also redirect goods in ways not chosen by the market toward 
ends chosen by governments. These services are provided as either "free" or 
with attached user fees. In the former circumstance, the receipt and payment 
of the service are "split" and, since it is provided freely to the citizen, the 
demand for the service exceeds the market's demand. The result, Rothbard 
concludes, is an inevitable overuse of the product. Therefore, it is another 
form of subsidy with users gaining at the expense of non-users, as in the 
example of public schools or state highways. Since no pricing scheme exists 
for the allocation of the given good, a government cannot rationally 
determine the proper levels of the activities. Rather than having prices to 
determine where to allocate the resources it possesses, the State must rely on 
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the narrow dictates of the specific agency personnel or government planner. 
But in this case, it is the single person making the "consuming" decisions 
rather than actual consumers, as articulated through the whole body of 
information provided by market prices. 
Might this dilemma be eliminated by the implementation of user-fees? 
According to Rothbard, this solution, while perhaps preferable to free 
services, suffers from the same fundamental and "fatal flaw" . 
. . . .  It is . . . that government can obtain virtually 
unlimited resources by means of its coercive tax 
power. Private businesses must obtain their funds 
from investors. It is this allocation of funds by 
investors on the basis of time preferences and 
foresight that rations funds and resources to the 
most profitable and therefore the most serviceable 
uses . . . .  In short, payment and service are . . .  
indissolubly linked on the market. Government, on 
the other hand, can get as much money as it 
likes . . . .  Government . . .  has no checkrein on itself, 
i.e., no requirement for meeting a profit-and-loss 
test of valued service to consumers, to enable it to 
obtain funds . . . .  (Rothbard, 1977a, pp. 175-176) . 
Consequently, the rhetoric that permeates allocative decision-making within 
the governmental organization is consistently dominated by demands for 
more resources as the rational action. From this perspective, this is the 
rational choice, in fact, since the cost side of the decision-making is severely 
limited or non-existent. One faces the ultimate negative externality problem, 
since costs may be almost completely avoided by the "producer". As Rothbard 
notes, within the voluntariness of the market (with presumably clearly 
defined property rights), the increase of such resources in one arena may only 
come at the expense of some other activity, and the action is judged according 
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to its ability to satisfy consumer demands through the signals of profit and 
loss. 
Furthermore, when government creates enterprises, these businesses 
have inherent advantages over any remotely related market alternative, since 
the State plays by a wholly distinctive set of rules in their capital formation. 
Ultimately, the result is the destruction of these market industries, since 
investment flows away from these unfortunate competitors who obviously 
cannot compete against the public industry. 
Therefore, criticisms that governments ought to run themselves "as a 
business" entirely miss the point. To be operated as a business demands the 
strict discipline of the marketplace. First, the lack of market-accountable 
organizational discipline makes this demand extremely problematic. Second, 
the skills that individuals develop in this environment tend to be politically 
effective rather than economically efficient (Rothbard, 1977a, p. 1 78) . To 
borrow terminology from Public Choice theory, actors become increasingly 
efficient at "rent-seeking" rather than "profit-seeking" . The same drains on 
the economy faced in the capital markets occur similarly in the labor areas, as 
potentially productive persons are drawn by higher than market wage rates 
and / or heightened job security into government employment. From 
Rothbard's perspective, these distortions begin with the first government 
involvement; "for each governmental firm introduces its own island of 
chaos into the economy" (Rothbard, 1977a, p. 180). In his view, the removal of 
these governmental interventions can only lead to better service, lower costs, 
less distortion of consumer demand and resource allocation, and, finally, 
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greater social harmony, avoiding the mad rushes to live off the distibutive 
State. 
While this discussion is interesting, and Rothbard's application of 
subjectivism is correctly administered, it all seems to be beside the point. If, in 
his severe dualism, only markets can guarantee the rational allocation of 
resources, why even discuss distinctive modes of taxation, for example? 
Under his absolutist logic, there really is no way to distinguish one form from 
another. 
The crux of Rothbard's contention is that it is the voluntary nature of 
exchanges which allow a true reading of demonstrated preferences. If 
elements of force dictate the patterns of choices made by an individual, there 
are unreliable actions to be observed and, subsequently, to be misunderstood. 
But might there be voluntary forms of taxation and/ or expenditures which 
could be distinguished? For example, are there not political actions, in a 
democracy at least, that are voluntarily accepted by the persons involved? 
According to Rothbard, there are none. First, "nonvoters" may not be said to 
have consented. But suppose that all taxes were, in fact, provided 
"voluntarily"? For once, at least, he recognizes the possibility of a free riding 
problem, arguing that under a gift system, services such as defense would 
suffer since the benefit is garnered regardless of one's payment--resulting in 
excessive demands and overly limited supplies (Rothbard, 1977a, p. 163). 
A democracy could provide a "fee" for "voting", i.e., a poll tax, so as to 
rest upon a voluntary foundation. Of course, this payment is, therefore, not a 
tax at all but rather is more akin to representing dues. If these taxes existed, 
the voting turnouts would likely drop substantially, as Rothbard argues. 
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Accordingly, our current democracy does not represent a voluntarily 
conceived system of decisionmaking. And democratic participation alone fails 
to meet his criteria for voluntariness. First, voting "is a highly marginal 
activity"; the voter receives "no direct benefits from his act of voting" and 
"his aliquot power over the final decision" approaches zero (Rothbard, 1977a, 
p. 164). Second, voting in a collective setting produces a "disjunction between 
voting and payment, on the one hand, and benefit on the other" (Rothbard, 
1977a, pp. 164-165). This "collectivization" of political resources is quite 
similar to the diffusion of distribution and production in a State-infested 
economy. 
This discussion, however, is a perfect example of the way in which 
Rothbard allows value-laden arguments to spill over into his praxeology. If 
one is truly to maintain a subjectivist value theory, how may praxeology tell 
us whether, for a given individual, voting is a "highly marginal act"? In fact, 
it is rather obvious that for many persons the opposite is true. One might 
argue that objectively these actions represent a form of wasted effort, but it is 
unclear how one might reach this conclusion without something more than 
praxeology may provide. Rothbard dismisses democracy--or for that matter, 
all political activity--rather arbitrarily. The reason, of course, is that he 
implicitly assumes that all political acts are equivalent to coercion. 
His second reason for rejecting democracy's voluntariness is 
problematical for similar reasons. Disjunctions between payment and the act 
of exchange--whether they are voting or investing in some other person's 
project-and the receipt of benefit, occur constantly. If we assume, for example, 
that a specific government action is consented to by those affected by it, why 
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would the action, praxeologically speaking, be any different from an 
agreement between a company and a group of stockholders? Simple empirical 
observations of the historical atrocities of the State cannot alone eliminate the 
potential of an act that is both "political" and voluntary. Therefore, it seems 
that Rothbard slips into these critiques, under the guise of "value-free" 
science, a set of implicit ethics of his own. These actions may be seen as 
distortive or impoverishing only if they do not represent the demonstrated 
preferences of the consumers.  But praxeology does not provide the tools to 
deny the possibility of democratic contractualism; only a system of anti-statist 
ethics can accomplish this task. 
Triangular Intervention 
Triangular intervention involves an invasion which interferes with 
an exchange between persons by a third person who either forces or prohibits 
the exchange. One may sub-divide this category into two parts: price control 
and product control. As we noted above, it is this category that tends to 
receive the overwhelming bulk of attention from economists concerned with 
the effects of government interference. 
Price controls, if effective as a means of regulation (i.e., if they have 
have a real effect upon the product), create artificial shortages or surpluses, 
depending upon whether the edict establishes maximum or minimum 
prices. In both cases, resources are either shifted into or out of these markets 
in distortive manners. Entrepreneurs are sent false signals, in other words. 
The same kind of controls may be applied with similar consequences to 
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saving and investment markets through the institution of usury laws. In 
these cases, persons' time preferences remain unchanged, so application of 
maximum rates removes a portion of available funds. Paradoxically, then, the 
individual supposedly benefitting from the dictum, the more risky borrower, 
is locked out of the market by the shortage of available resources, since the 
higher rates are denied (Rothbard, 1977a, p. 33). While the stated aim of such 
controls is usually to benefit persons who seemingly cannot borrow funds at 
the "market" rate, the result is to do just the opposite, preventing numerous 
persons from the product at all, while also spilling over and distorting other 
parts of the economy. Probably the only consistently sure "winner" in this 
triangular arrangement is the person who creates and administers the 
regulations (Rothbard, 1977a, p. 34) . Another likely beneficiary is the 
individual with a long and successful credit rating and substantial equity. 
Since the policy creates an artificial shortage of borrowed funds, only those in 
least need of assistance will be able to garner loans. 
Often, rather than interfering with the pnce of an item, the 
intervening force might control the product directly. As a result, a demand in 
the economy either is prevented from being fulfilled or is at least altered by 
the force involved. Subsequently, opportunities for both capital and labor 
resources are driven from their best opportunities, or driven into the less 
efficient, more monopolistic, and more risky black market. 
Rothbard distinguishes two forms of product prohibition: absolute 
prohibition and partial prohibition (Rothbard, 1977a, p. 35) . Absolute 
prohibition eliminates the product entirely, whereas partial prohibition 
"rations" the product in some way (amount, style, formula, etc.) .  Control 
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essentially represents a form of monopoly grant, so as to either provide or 
deny certain activities. Since freedom of entry is denied by government edict, 
the consumer is forced to deal with the grantee of monopoly priviledge. But 
as is pointed out in the discussion of monopoly theory, with open entry there 
can be no monopoly over time since profits are "ephemeral". The same logic 
applies to "quasi-monopolies":  As long as a specially enforced priviledge 
remains, gains are made through coercive measures. Rothbard argues that 
while one may not draw a distinction between "competitive" and 
"monopoly" price, one can distinguish "free market" and "monopoly" price. 
The difference, he argues, is that the second set has "conceptually identifiable 
and defineable" attributes, whereas competitive price has no meaning in the 
economy since value is subjective. The critical feature is the voluntariness of 
the arrangement; to speak, therefore, of government monopolies is to 
Rothbard a redundant exercise. 
Rather than repeat the similar lines of logic of earlier discussions, the 
following section outlines briefly a number of Rothbard's applications of 
praxeology to particular public policies representing forms of special 
government grants of priviledge: l 2 
1 .) Compulsory cartels. By forcing all industries within a certain sector 
to accept imposed production quotas, government arbitrarily sets levels 
which over time increasingly distort the economy because of the rigidities in 
12. The proceeding discussions are drawn from Rothbard (1977a, pp. 41-
80). 
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production. As a consequence, quality and efficiency levels at best stay 
unchanged; more likely, efficiency falls because of the removal of new entry 
pressures. 
2.) Licensing. An occupational license prevents many possible entrants 
into a particular labor sector from actual entry, since they cannot afford the 
requirements. Because this process is often heavily influenced by the industry 
itself, the result is the maintenance of special priviledge status . This practice is 
especially oriented toward monopolistic practices in labor markets, where 
l icenses (as with the restrictions gained by government-sponsored union 
contracting) always restrict entry, driving up wages for those with jobs but 
increasing overall unemployment. 
3.) Safety and Quality Standards. On a free market, these concerns are 
left to the voluntary demands of the consumer. These qualifications 
eliminate the buyer's freedom to determine quality standards and restrict 
competition. As long as actual fraud has not occurred there is no reason to 
involve any other participant other than the parties involved in the 
exchange. (For a discussion of fraud, see Chapter IV.) If the parties involved 
in the exchange consent, ex ante utility is increased. 
4.) Tariffs . Tariffs are merely product monopoly controls applied 
internationally. The loser is the consumer and the general standard of living, 
since resources are required to be utilized in less than optimally efficient ways 
by paying for the protection of the priviledged industry. The rhetoric of 
unfavorable balances of trade is without any foundation: If exchange is 
voluntary all trade is favorable ex ante, no matter which side of the debtor­
creditor relationship one finds himself. The only saving grace of the tariff, 
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ironically, is that in the long term, it is likely to have less potentially 
damaging effects than other monopoly grants. With tariffs, there is at least 
still free trade within a region. 
5.) Immigration Restrictions. These amount to "geographical grants of 
oligarchy" in the labor markets . If an internationally free economy existed, 
one would witness a flow of labor resources, i.e., individuals, toward the 
higher wage areas. With restrictions on movement, however, current job­
holders in the labor market benefit from the limitations at the expense of 
those unemployed and/ or prevented territorial entry. The greatest benefits 
fall upon those laborers in the particular markets of the potential emigrants. 
And these are the markets most in need of unrestricted entry. As a further 
distortion, the artificially high wages boomerang back around, as capital flows 
out into those areas where restictions abroad hold wage rates low. As a result, 
there is inefficiency in the world markets due to the imbalance caused by 
restrictions on immigration, exemplified by distorted divisions from country 
to country of the overall population. 
6 . )  Child Labor Laws . These normally considered bits of 
humanitarianism represent, in fact, labor restrictions on a substantial sector 
of the population, to the benefit of the other portions. Childless families gain 
at the expense of those with children. Also, since a large portion of potentially 
productive labor is restricted by law from working (but who are still 
consuming), the overall standard of living diminishes. 
7.) Conscription.  Actions such as a forced military draft remove 
persons from their chosen economic advantages and require them to work at 
wages below the market levels; essentially, then, conscription is a form of 
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taxation. Furthermore, this activity shifts resources away from the demands 
of consumers toward those of the government. Finally, like other labor 
limitations, conscription removes a substantial portion of the labor force, 
increasing the benefits for those remaining. 
8.) Minimum Wage Laws. Persons whose productive capabilities are 
below the set rate find themselves unemployed. Those persons in most need 
of employment--namely, those at the margin--are locked out. Those 
employees above this rate benefit from the artificial reduction in the labor 
force. (This would explain union lobbying efforts to increase minimum wage 
limits, despite the fact their own wages are substantially higher than the 
legislated rates.) 
9.) Unemployment Benefits. After these other restrictions aid to create 
unemployment, this compensation subsidizes the loss, diminishing the 
potential disdain of the kinds of restrictions the unemployed worker might 
face. These subsidies especially immunize those individuals/  groups 
organized and active in developing the original restrictions, such as unions. 
1 0.) Antitrust Laws . Ironically, these acts, according to Rothbard, 
diminish rather than facilitate competition. Since the only monopoly is a 
government monopoly, it is impossible for any policy to reduce them. 
Antitrust laws in reality are vague dictates that produce capricious and 
arbitrary interferences in the market. Competition is a process, not a quantity: 
As long as the market processes are carried out without fraud there is no 
reason for any involvement. Politicos substituting their judgments for those 
of the market can only create woefully misinformed policy which upsets the 
critical risk components in the system, since participants, fearful of the 
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interpretive edges of vague (and, therefore, highly discretionary) policy, play 
close to the cuff. 
1 1 .)  Patents. Rothbard views patents as monopoly grants similar to 
those listed above. Granting patents restricts the independent discoveries of 
others for the same or very similar idea or invention. However, this seems to 
be a rather curious position. 
Patents, like any monopoly grant, confer a 
priviledge on one and restrict the entry of others, 
thereby distorting the freely competitive pattern of 
industry. If the product is sufficiently demanded by 
the public, the patentee will be able to achieve a 
monopoly price . . . .  (Rothbard, 1977a, p. 74). 
Before we examine this puzzling conclusion, let us examine one additional 
area that unfortunately creates even more confusion. 
12.) Rights of Eminent Domain. The granting of a license of eminent 
domain for an industry represents a "license for theft. "  The consequence is 
the distortion that potential "takings" create. Moreover, the benefactors of 
the grant receive an increase in investment above the market levels at the 
expense of the initial property holders. 
Throughout these discussions, Rothbard points out the nature of 
monopoly, namely, the granting of a special priviledge upon a certain sect in 
the economy. Furthermore, he concludes, these grants may only exist 
through the State's interference. But he raises an additional concern: Are not 
corporations themselves a grant of special priviledge? Rothbard argues they 
are not, but are "free associations of individuals pooling their capital" 
(Rothbard, 1977a, p. 79) . Since the issue of limited liability is open to all 
transactors prior to doing business, no priviledge exists. Would not this point 
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be contrary to his discussion of fractional banking, though? It is difficult to 
discern any critical theoretical distinction between the idea of pre-accepted 
limited liability and pre-consented fractional reserves. In both cases, 
producers and suppliers enter "contracts" which seem to be voluntary. 
Likewise, in both cases, the value/usefulness of the institutional arrangement 
is determined through the competitive processes of the market. 
Unfortunately, though, this entire discussion leaves one haunted by 
what is not discussed. Why, for example, are not the existence of property 
rights themselves a grant of priviledge? Whereas Rothbard may be able to 
answer this question in Chapter IV in his discussion of ethics, there appears 
to be no way to gain these answers praxeologically. Furthermore, it is unclear 
how praxeology may link the existence of property rights to the consequences 
of "voluntary" exchange. Is Rothbard's own "value-free" science implicitly 
sliding values in the side-door? 
Conclusion: Caught in His Own Praxeological Web 
Throughout his discussion of economics, Rothbard stresses his 
adherence to scientific objectivity. Yet, as we have seen, there are reasons to 
conclude that his science is a tainted value-freedom. It seems that he is as 
guilty of the inclusion of his own brand of ethics as are the systems he 
critiques. While praxeology may be able to argue that the consequences of 
voluntary action will produce certain results, it cannot draw distinctions 
between what Rothbard calls market and government actions. To accomplish 
this goal, a number of concepts demand definitions. But it would appear these 
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definitions transport us into the realm of ethics. This point seems especially 
true concerning what criteria establish voluntary activity. Otherwise, 
Rothbard cannot use subjectivist value theory in order to make his points. 
While we may accept the maxim that individuals making voluntary 
decisions will maximize their own utility, we cannot accept, praxeologically at 
least, that market actions are always voluntary. 
With regard to the praxeology of violent intervention, Rothbard 
distinguishes the "free" and "hampered" markets (Rothbard, 1977a, p. 256) . In 
the free society, he argues, the economist's function is educational and, thus, 
he may not establish the existence of ethical rules. On these points, he is 
correct, for science can neither determine the proper rates or structures of 
taxation, nor can it implicitly accept community standards without these 
representing ethical positions. 
Rothbard asks the essential question: "If the economist qua economist 
must be Wer tfr e i ,  does this leave him any room for significant 
pronouncements on questions of public policy" (Rothbard, 1977a, p. 260)? He 
concludes that the praxeologist may, first, uncover the implicit and 
inconsistent ethics of tainted perspectives and, secondly, may demonstrate the 
consequences of different forms of government interference. On the first 
point, there is no debate. However, the latter function is troublesome. Before 
one can discuss the effects of "violent", i.e., political, action, he must define 
what is and is not violence. Praxeology, founded on the "truth" of 
subjectivism, may not rely on anything but the demonstrated preferences of 
the actors involved . Under subjective value theory, who is to say all 
government action is coercive and all market activity voluntary? Under 
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consistent subjectivism, do the concepts "artificial shortage", or "real market 
conditions" have any meaning, for example? What allows us to conclude that 
the present level of a product is optimal or sub-optimal without some 
baseline upon which to gauge these terms? It is clear that Rothbard's baseline 
is the voluntariness of the decision of the actor. Unfortunately, he then leaps, 
willy nilly, to associate his dual bases of voluntary and involuntary action 
completely with the existing social institutions of market and State. In other 
words, market decisions are never involuntary. 
Rothbard slips a set of ordering ideas into his theory which allows him 
to create an ethically founded dualism between the two forms of activities. 
There is nothing necessarily incorrect about this dualism (in fact, without 
imposing these empirical and ethical observations the concepts of 
political /hegemonic means and economic/ contractual means would be 
meaningless), but its rightness is not founded praxeologically. Furthermore, 
one may even be able to convince persons that they would prefer what 
Rothbard calls the "market" principle over the "hegemonic" principles. But 
these principles only receive meaning through the provision of ethical 
ordering, followed by an observation of reality. The institution of 
Oppenheimer's economic means, defined as the non-existence of coercion, 
may produce· these consequences, but we cannot assume nor can praxeology 
provide us the knowledge that the institution of these peaceful means 
correlates a priori with markets, without bringing other components into the 
discussion. Could there not be "economic means" that are politically initiated, 
and vice-versa? The choice is not as simple as following out the premises of 
praxeological reasoning and merely choosing between the "society of 
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contract" and the "society of status" (Rothbard, 1977a, p. 266) . The decision 
over whether one chooses the consequences of the market or the results of 
State intervention is not where the ethical questions begin and Rothbard's 
praxeology ends; they are inherently intertwined with his entire discussion. 
While this is a perhaps a damning criticism of Rothbard's praxeological 
critique of politics (although they do not take away from the power of the 
ideas themselves), his own criticisms has led him to indeed explicitly 
establish this system of ethics which he implicitly applies to the praxeology of 
violent intervention. In Chapter IV, the ethics underlying Rothbard's 
scientific inquiry are defined in the examination of his libertarian system of 
political ethics. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE POLITICAL THEORY OF ROTHBARD 
Introduction: The Establishment of Political Ethics 
Praxeology alone cannot generate any specific kind of ethical system. In 
order to justify libertarianism, therefore, Rothbard turns to the establishment 
of a system of objective ethics based on natural law. As political theorist 
Norman Barry recognizes, this formulation of a set of objective ethics is one 
of the major characteristics separating Rothbard and anarcho-capitalism from 
most forms of "minimalist" classical liberal systems. This natural law 
foundation is, he notes, "more or less explicit rationalism of the kind 
condemned by Hume and Smith in the eighteenth century and Hayek in 
this," producing a "resolutely unhistorical methodology" (Barry, 1986, p. 166). 
Rather than accepting the ethical framework of uncertainty or ignorance in 
the evolutionary system of Hayek, for instance, Rothbard postulates a 
rationally conceived and axiomatic system of ethics . Nevertheless, as an 
Austrian economist, he is also thoroughly versed in the economics and 
sociology of the spontaneous order and the invisible hand. While there are 
times when in his writings the two distinctive ideas are used interchangeably, 
it  is very clear that the ethical system of natural law always takes precedence 
over any form of consequentialism. 
However, Rothbard admittedly never attempts to establish the 
ontological foundations of his natural law libertarianism. In fact, his claims of 
objective law amount to little more than the assertion that they exist. Instead, 
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he follows the natural law arguments of Thomas Aquinas in contending that 
natural law exists, is discernible by reason, and is separate of any question of 
faith-bound theology or question of God's existence. Hence, ethical laws, like 
physical laws, are discoverable through reason. All things, Rothbard argues, 
have specific natures; humans, like all other entities, are open to observation 
and reflection as to their true natures. In other words, objective reason "can 
be employed by all men to yield truths about the world" (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 
1 0) .  The good and the natural are, thus, synomonous; the achievement of 
human nature is the fulfillment of the natural law. To violate these natures 
is to fail to achieve human potential. 
. . .  .Since men can think, feel, evaluate, and act only 
as individuals, it becomes vitally necessary for each 
man's survival and prosperity that he be free to 
learn, choose, develop his faculties, and act upon 
his knowledge and values. This is the necessary 
path of human nature; to interfere with and cripple 
this process by using violence goes profound! y 
against what is necessary by man's nature for his 
life and prosperity. Violent interference with a 
man's learning and choices is therefore profoundly 
'antihuman'; it violates the natural law of man's 
needs (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 28) . 
Rothbard tries to bridge the infamous is-ought gulf through the use of 
a teleological ethics which concludes that humans are naturally bound to do 
the moral action. Ultimately, the survival of the human depends upon 
following these principles. However, there are reasons to believe that there 
remains an exceptional gap between these ideas. Presently, it takes only a 
cursory observation of society to realize the problematical nature of this 
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argument. It may be argued that on several occasions, Rothbard is overly 
optimistic in narrowing this gulf. 
Let us assume for the sake of the argument, however, that these are 
not crippling concerns. Ethics for Rothbard is a realm wholly separate from 
praxeology, for praxeology builds upon a subjective value theory and ignores 
the fundamental values of the decisions made by actors in the social world. 
Praxeological "happiness", then, is defined in a purely formal sense, based 
upon individual preferences, without making judgments on those 
preferences . This definition says nothing of the objective nature of the 
choices made, whereas natural law, in fact, seeks to make statements as to the 
ethics of the preference. One might argue intuitively, for example, that 
Austrian praxeology leads to the support of a free market system. In reality it 
may not; it can only support a market order on the condition that one accepts 
the values the market is founded upon or the consequences it creates. 
Obviously, this is a subtle distinction due to the deeply rooted support of a 
freely functioning economic system which seems to follow from the 
consequences of the Austrian research program. Rothbard, therefore, 
embraces the rather unusual (though not necessarily inconsistent) 
perspective of being an objectivist in ethics and a subjectivist in other realms. 
This dictotomy leads Rothbard to be highly critical of the more popular 
economist's utilitarian political ethics. First, his challenges the ultimate 
foundations of an ethics based quantitatively, i.e., the "greatest good for the 
greatest number" and the implicit recognition of individual equality. 
Utilitarianism, he argues, is further trapped in a contradiction . 
. . . .  [U] tilitarianism implicitly ass umes these 
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subjective desires [of individuals] to be absolute 
givens which the social technician is somehow 
duty-bound to try to satisfy. But it is common 
human experience that individual desires are no t  
absolute and unchanging . . . .  But how could that be 
so if all individuals' values and desires are givens 
and therefore not subject to alteration by the inter­
subjective persuasion of others? But if these 
desires . . .  are changeable by the persuasion of moral 
argument, it would then appear that inter­
subjective moral principles do exist that can be 
argued and can have an impact on others. 
Oddly enough, while utilitarianism assumes 
that morality, the good, is purely subjective to each 
individual, it assumes on the other hand that these 
subjective desires can be added, subtracted, and 
weighed across the various individuals in society . . .  
(Rothbard, 1982a, p .  202). 
While this may be a damning criticism of utilitarianism, it is difficult to grasp 
how this argument in any way establishes the existence of "inter-subjective 
moral principles . "  And Rothbard never clearly justifies how that in the 
science of economics all benefits and costs are individually subjective, 
whereas in ethics there exists an objective standard. 
Nor does he explain the common problem of natural law theory, 
namely the notorious disagreement over what actually are the laws of nature. 
The followers of Thomas Aquinas were generally Catholic communitarians 
and would have been unsympathetic of Rothbard's radical individualism, for 
example (Barry, 1986, p. 176). While Rothbard might respond that philosophy 
has evolved since the time of Aquinas, this foundational void still fails to 
satisfy present-day natural law theorists, practically none of whom would 
accept Rothbard's system of ethics. One might conclude that Rothbard, failing 
to prove the existence of the roots of libertarian ethics, is guilty of the same 
crime often attributed to fellow libertarian Robert Nozick--a libertarianism 
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devoid of foundations) He simply accepts the ontological existence of these 
truths. Moreover, he clearly distinguishes this natural law from positive law. 
The former provides an objective set of rules that are eternal and immutable 
by definition and are founded upon the fixed nature of humans. The latter, 
on the other hand, contains numerous non-rational components, including 
the dependence on tradition and the use of force as he defines it .  In 
Rothbard's view, reason alone is the only appropriate means to establishing a 
politically ethical system. Accepting this method's primacy, natural law is 
constantly a radical component in politics, threatening these non-rational 
parts of the status quo. 
This is an important point, for in modern interpretation natural law is 
quite often seen as a distinctly conservative phenomenon. Yet, for Rothbard, 
it becomes that which has been as of yet unachieved in the fulfillment of the 
natural, and rational, society. Its realization requires a radical makeover of the 
present world. His assumption, however, is that these natural laws may 
objectively be established through rational discourse. 
Rothbard also provides an additional twist to his understanding of 
natural law by arguing that many natural law philosophers (especially the 
ancients) failed to correctly enunciate true maxims. The failure arises for 
these theorists because they rooted their political philosophy in the State 
rather than centering it on the individual. They missed the mark by not 
establishing the correct principles of justice in the source of moral and 
1 .  For a discussion of the requirements of demonstrating the existence 
of natural law, particularly from a libertarian perspective, see Flew (1982, pp. 
278-279). 
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immoral action, the single actor. There is, then, a clear consistency between 
Rothbard's system of ethics and the criticisms he and other Austrians within 
the tradition of methodological individualism make concerning the study of 
"macro-economics" :  the "leap" these studies make from the real component 
in action (the individual) to a misleading form of holism (the State) . 
Thus, from Aristotle's correct dictum that man is a 
'social animal,' that his nature is best fitted for 
social  cooperation, the classicists leaped 
illegitimately to the virtual identification of 
'society' and the 'State,' and thence to the State as 
the major focus of virtuous action (Rothbard, 1982a, 
p. 21). 
Instead, Rothbard founds his natural law on a more recent political 
philosopher, John Locke. From this merging of natural law and 
individualism comes the framework of natural rights. One might view this 
fusion as a synthesis both theoretically and historically of objective universal 
law and subjective fulfillment of human interests. Thus, by "individualism" 
Rothbard does not mean atomism. That interpretation, he argues, is an 
"authoritarian straw man" (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 28) . Universal moral laws 
transcend individual interests. In fact, it is the social nature of mankind that 
encompasses the most basic natural facts: Cooperation, exchange, learning, 
and interaction are critical both for the economic and ethical survival of 
mankind. Nevertheless, these principles are derived from and mediate the 
acts of individuals and they exist to "serve" the individual. It is the State that 
is the "anti- social instrument, crippling voluntary interchange, individual 
creativity and the division of labor" (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 187). 
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Political Philosophy and Individual Morality 
In his political philosophy, Rothbard focuses upon the concept of 
rights, which ultimately are social or political notions, i.e., boundaries within 
which individuals may act in relation to others .  Therefore, one must 
distinguish personal ethics (how one leads his own life) and political 
philosophy (how one interacts with other individuals) .  
[There is a] crucial distinction we shall 
make . . .  between a man's right and the morality or 
immorality of his exercise of that right. We will 
contend that it is a man's right to do whatever he 
wishes with his person; it is his right not to be 
molested or interfered with by violence from 
exercising that right. But what may be the moral or 
immoral ways of exercising that right is a question 
of personal ethics rather than political philosophy-­
which is concerned solely with matters of right, and 
of the proper or improper exercise of physical 
violence in human relations (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 
24). 
Thus, Rothbard seeks to formulate a "political philosophy of liberty"--a 
"social ethic of liberty"--not a personal set of morals for individuals 
(Rothbard, 1982a, p. 25) . This is a very important distinction in its application. 
In the discussion of numerous libertarian applications to modern political 
dilemmas, he defends positions that will most definitely offend the personal 
moralities of many individuals. However, it is important to realize that 
libertarian political philosophy is simply the specification of what legitimate 
functions (if any) the State may entertain, or what certain persons may 
impose upon other persons . Where activities are undertaken that do not 
violently cross the paths of other persons, Rothbard's ethics are silent. Thus, 
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the system makes no ethical judgments on individual behavior unless 
interaction occurs within a social framework. Unfortunately, he never 
explains how we may create an objective ethic at this level but cannot 
formulate one at the level of personal economic or ethical decision-making. 
(Coming from the Austrian tradition, one might be more likely to conclude 
that an objective ethics may not be formulated.) Presumedly, though, no 
legitimate overarching system of personal morality may contradict the 
principles of libertarian political philosophy. 
Rothbard concludes that political philosophy has failed at its truth­
seeking task in contemporary scholarship in at least two ways. The dominant 
failure emerges from political science's infatuation with "empirical fact­
grubbing" and model-formulation. The fallacy in this case arises from the 
perspective that value-free policy prescriptions may be drawn from scientific 
research. The result is a type of backdoor philosophizing, in which 
"scientists" make implicit value judgments under the guise of objectivism. In 
almost all circumstances, these implicit value prescriptions generate an 
advantage for the existing status quo. The second failure comes from political 
philosophy's contemporary interests--an evasion of true philosophy for 
historical study of "antiquarian descriptions and exegeses of the views of 
other, long gone political philosophers" (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 25). As a result, 
modern political debate proceeds devoid of well-founded systems of ethics 
applicable to modern political questions. For Rothbard, no advocacy of actual 
public policy may legitimately occur without this component (Rothbard, 
1973c, pp. 35-39; 1974c, pp. 101-106). 
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Libertarian Ethics: Humans in Isolation 
The concept of "Robinson Crusoe" appears in Rothbard's political 
philosophy as well as in his economic theory. He distinguishes for the 
purposes of clarification the notion of the individual alone in nature and the 
idea of an actor in society. Through such abstraction one may attain an 
understanding of what occurs in interaction among individuals without 
becoming entangled in the network of society, and losing all clarity. 
The learning process Crusoe encounters is the same for ethical 
understanding as it is for economic survival. Through both introspection and 
extraspection, he learns the "natures" of phenomona. This "fusion of spirit 
and matter," or ideas directing energies, allows the discovery of natural laws, 
as it does for economic laws (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 31).  
But what natural laws of political and/ or social relations may a lonely 
Crusoe realize? First, he discovers the "primordial natural fact of his 
freedom: his freedom to choose, his freedom to use or not use his reason 
about any given subject" (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 31 ) .  In other words, he discovers 
his free will as an individual. From this realization, Crusoe recognizes that 
he possesses and controls his self and his own body--a "natural ownership of 
self" (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 31) .2 Even without any additional ownership, this 
natural "fact" cannot be denied. These realizations are intertwined, for the 
2. Not all libertarians accept the notion of "self-ownership"; see 
Machan (1989, pp. 139-140). Machan argues that self-ownership is impossible, 
since one cannot simultaneously be one's self and own one's self. 
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right of self-ownership provides the human the opportunity to achieve his 
ends and satisfy his human potential. 
Is there not a tension in this connection between free will and natural 
law? If one is bound by the dictates of nature, how can he have free will? 
Rothbard draws a very important distinction between freedom and power. 
Man is free to adopt values and choose his 
actions; but this does not at all mean that he may 
violate natural laws with impunity--that he may 
leap oceans with a single bound. In short, when we 
say that 'man is not 'free' to leap the ocean', we are 
really discussing not his lack of freedom but his 
lack of power to cross the ocean, given the laws of 
his nature and of the nature of the world. Crusoe's 
freedom to adopt ideas, to choose his ends, is 
inviolable and inalienable; on the other hand, 
man, not being omnipoten t as well as not being 
omniscient, always finds his power limited for 
doing all the things that he would like to do. In 
short, his power is necessarily limited by natural 
laws, but not his freedom of will. To put the case 
another way, it is patently absurd to define 
'freedom' of an entity as its power to perform an act 
impossible for its nature (Rothbard, 1982a, pp. 33-
34) ! 
Freedom is defined negatively: It is the absence of interference in person and 
property by other persons. For that reason freedom and power may well be 
antithetical concepts. And, since the abstracted Crusoe exists in total isolation, 
it would be correct to say he is totally free, even though there are surely 
numbers of things beyond his control or possession. 
This distinction is crucial to the Rothbardian system and to 
libertarianism in general. In many modern definitions of "positive" freedom 
the notion becomes hopelessly entangled with the the idea of entitlement, 
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opportunity, or empowerment (Rothbard, 1982a, pp. 215-216) . This 
perspective is unfortunately inconsistent, for in the natural world humans 
are entitled to nothing. We in essence create (or do not create) our "worlds." 
Therefore, in productive society any entitlement comes at the expense of 
some other "creative" person--if it is defined as anything more than the 
principle of non-interference. These truths do not vary in the social world, 
for from a natural law perspective freedoms that do not exist in nature 
cannot emerge outside of it. Rothbard's model of ethics is therefore 
c o n s i s te n t .  Notions of freedom which entail a n  idea of power are 
inconsistent, unachievable, and extremely conflictual, and as rights, cannot 
exist simultaneously in the social world. As an absolutist ethical theory there 
is no (logical) potential for any conflict of rights. Ultimately, the only 
remaining natural freedoms must be negatively-founded, framed upon the 
idea of the non-interference of others. 
However, each "person's freedom of movement, one critic notes, will 
be a function of what he owns" (Barry, 1986, p. 180) . While this assessment is 
correct, it seems to ignore the fact that an individual also owns at least 
himself in this system. And alternatives to this idea of ownership remove 
even this moral imperative by "socializing" the notion of rights to include 
particular forms of interference. In his isolated world, Crusoe has the ability 
to transform . the physical resources available to him. He is free in the only 
sense the term has any meaning--in nature. In this world there is obviously 
no fear of conflicting claims--his "title" goes as far as his reach allows. Of 
course, for the purposes of political philosophy, this isolated state has little 
meaning relative to property rights--except in the foundation of their 
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existence for both the isolated and populated worlds. But these rights need 
not be transformed in society, for in both isolation and interaction Rothbard's 
principles of ethics are the same. Civil society's emergence does nothing to 
change the fundamental laws of nature. 
Libertarian Ethics: The Introduction of Society and Human Interaction 
Interaction changes our discussion in substance but not in principle. 
Through exchange, as Rothbard demonstrates in his discussion of economic 
theory, civilization expands. And through a market order and price system, 
these exchanges can be calculated in extremely efficient manners despite the 
high complexity of the economy. Rothbard calls this world of total voluntary 
exchange a free society or a society of "pure liberty" (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 40) .  
But exchanges require an ethical and legal foundation, namely, the notion of 
ownership and a system of property rights. According to Rothbard, humans 
may ethically acquire wealth through exploitation of virgin resources, 
through voluntary exchange of previously created wealth or one's labor, or 
through the reciept of gifts from someone else's stock of resources attained 
through one of the first two methods. And each of these situations falls back 
ultimately on human self-ownership and the consequences of the mixture of 
one's labor accordingly.3 
3. Certain philosophical traditions, namely the Marxists, reject the idea 
of one's labor representing a commodity. But Rothbard ( 1982a, p. 40) 
disagrees: Since labor is alienable from one's self, it is the productive services 
and not the individual in exchange. 
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As we previously noted, by defining property rights as a consistent 
extension of each person's own self-ownership, there is no inconsistency in 
applying this framework to a complex society. Rousseau's famous paradox of 
freedom and chains need never exist, according to Rothbard! Civilization 
requires no surrendering of human freedom in order to garner the benefits of 
civilized society; in fact, it thrives from the maintenance of pure liberty. And 
pure liberty is the only ethic which is equally applicable to all persons 
simultaneously in the community. All other notions of the ethical society 
violate this requirement of universal application since any other system 
contradicts the idea that all persons must live by a code of equal justice. 
This primacy by libertarians of "property" rights is often 
misunderstood by modern theorists, particularly modern "liberals" who 
create the arbitrary dichotomy between property rights and "human" rights. 
For Rothbard, it is not so much that property rights take precedence, but that 
they are the only kind of rights. In other words, there are no human rights 
that are not property rights, since all rights emerge from the natural fact of 
individual self-ownership. From this perspective, free speech, for example, 
results from the fact we own ourselves and what we say. Contrary to the 
rationales so often heard in modern debate about the non-absoluteness of 
speech (and the subsequent necessity to "balance" rights), speech is totally 
absolute and consistent when thought of in terms of property rights. As 
Rothbard notes, the critical and often ignored issue in the debate over speech 
is where the speech occurs. In other words, to utilize a common example, one 
cannot yell "fire" in a theater because he does not own the theater. (See 
Chapter V for additional discussions of the rights of expression.) The failure 
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of the modern liberal perspective is that it treats humans as "ethereal 
abstractions. "  
. . . .  If a man has the right to self-ownership, to the 
control of his life, then in the real world he must 
also have the right to sustain his life by grappling 
with and transforming resources; he must be able to 
own the ground and the resources on which he 
stands and which he must use. In short, to sustain 
his "human right'--or his property rights in his 
own person--he must also have the property right 
in the material world, in the objects he produces. 
Property rights are human rights, and are essential 
to the human rights which liberals attempt to 
maintain . . . .  (Rothbard, 1978b, pp. 42-43). 
To further illustrate this point, let us borrow a common and extreme 
example often used against strict property rights theorists, namely, the 
"lifeboat" scenario. The prime requirement, of course, is to unsort those who 
may live from those who die in this dire situation. For Rothbard, these 
determinations follow from distinguishing ownership of the boat. In cases 
where the owner is a member of the party, he has sole responsibility to 
determine who lives or dies, based on whatever criteria he values. Hence, 
those persons he asks to leave are trespassers and may be discarded. If the 
owner is not present and has not made his demands for the use of the lifeboat 
known, or if he is dead, then the homesteading principle (discussed below) 
applies. In other words, if the boat holds five persons, and ten persons are 
trying to use it, ownership goes to the first five persons to possess the boat. 
But in seeking to attain the boat, one is not free to aggress against other 
persons seeking to accomplish the same goal. This resolution may appear 
exceedingly harsh, but any conclusion is, by necessity, grim. 
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Thus, all of Rothbard's theory follows from the natural facts of self­
ownership and the homesteading principle. What are the consequences of 
such a strict notion of property rights? Rothbard apparently rejects any notion 
of an end-state (and generally egalitarian) idea of distributive justice, or the 
"Lockean proviso" which compromises a view of property rights that is 
purely historical. For him, it is completely the rule of "first come-first 
served."  
But even Rothbard would surely admit that such an notion of justice 
leaves open the distinct possibility of vast resource inequality due to extreme 
differences in capital and land resources. And will not these vast inequalities 
be utilized to unequally apply unethical means in the social process? This 
problem does not concern Rothbard, who, in fact, maintains a rather extreme 
anti-egalitarian perspective. First, individual freedom is critical both for 
ethical reasons and for the survival of humankind; inequality of wealth and 
control are therefore inevitable. Second, the ethics of egalitarianism represent 
a "revolt against nature", which can only demolish civilization by violating 
both the basic nature of man (largely by rejecting the idea that humans have a 
distinctive nature) and, consequently, the laws of economics (Rothbard, 1973a, 
pp. 348-357; 1971a, 226-245). 
Forms of Interaction: Property Rights and Criminality 
According to Rothbard, there are only two alternatives concerning 
ownership: the libertarian notion of total self-ownership and the idea of 
ownership by others. The latter alternative may be further sub-divided into 
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two additional categories : the "'communist' one of Universal and Equal 
Other-ownership" or the "Partial Ownership of One Group by Another--a 
system of rule by one class over another" (Rothbard, 1 982a, p. 45; 1978b, pp. 29-
30). 
How do these latter two alternatives stand ethically? The partial 
ownership ethic, Rothbard contends, fails for lack of universality by either 
rendering certain entities as non-humans or allowing one group to aggress 
against others. Hence, it fails to meet both moral and impartiality 
requirements. Furthermore, by living off the production of others, certain 
classes violate the natural requirement for life that they be productive in a 
voluntary exchange environment. 
The communist alternative suffers for similar reasons. In complex 
societies, i .e., those composing more than a few persons, communist ethics 
disintegrates into partial rule by others. It is rather easy to understand how 
this breakdown occurs. In the complex economy, there exists a distinction of 
property, either through de facto or de jure means. To fail to provide realistic 
rules concerning possession, i.e., "rights" of property, the system provides a 
vaccuum that is filled by either overt or covert applications of force. Rothbard 
correctly argues that all property is ultimately private property. The important 
issue is how one defines the parameters of ownership/possession and not 
how one might eradicate notions of property. In the real world, then, 
communism is utopian (as is the general category of egalitarianism) and is an 
impractical economic and ethical formula. Since this ethic is essentially self­
destructive, Rothbard argues, movement in the direction of communism 
may also be viewed as contrary to natural law. 
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Since humans are not "floating wraiths", ownership necessarily 
extends to other material properties in society as it does in isolation. 
However, according to Rothbard, natural law extends ownership only to the 
point of actual use. In other words, although certain persons might arrive 
first on Mars, they may not claim actual ownership of the entire planet unless 
they are somehow able to homestead and mix labor with such a large land 
mass. 
What an individual creates by mixing his labor becomes his property so 
long as he has not stolen it from another individual. Can this justification be 
extended to include not only created property, but also the actual existing 
lands? Rothbard argues that land is no different from other tangible 
properties. 
. . .  [T]he justification for the ownership of ground 
land is the same for that of any other property. For 
no man actually ever 'creates' matter: what he does 
is take nature-given matter and transform it by 
means of his ideas and labor energy. But this is 
precisely what the pioneer--the homesteader--does 
when he clears and uses previously unused virgin 
lands and brings it into his private ownership. The 
homesteader--just as the sculptor, or miner--has 
transformed the nature-given soil by his labor and 
his personality. The homesteader is just as much a 
'producer' as the others, and therefore just as 
legitimately the owner of his property (Rothbard, 
1982a, pp. 48-49). 
The land is unowned prior to the homesteading. It is, he argues, valueless 
until it is turned to production in some form. Rothbard rejects the Georgist 
position because it fails to recognize that land, like all other resources, must 
necessarily be controlled by someone. To place ownership in some abstraction 
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called "society" or the State is to beg the question. In reality, no producer 
creates new matter; he merely transforms it. There is no distinction between 
land and other natural resources. 
Wealth, the result of production, may then be obtained in one of two 
ways. Following Oppenheimer's lead again, Rothbard concludes that humans 
may either produce or steal resources (economic or political means) .  Only the 
first alternative, as we stated earlier, is legitimate, for the second one 
contradicts human nature. An aggressor lives parasitically off others, but 
parasites cease to exist in the absence of producers. Therefore, parasitism 
represents acts wholly against the nature of humans: 
Parasitism cannot be a universal ethic, and, in fact, 
the growth of parasitism attacks and diminishes the 
production by which both host and parasite survive. 
Coercive exploitation or parasitism injures the 
production for everyone in the society. Any way 
that it may be considered, parasitic predation and 
robbery violate not only the nature of the victim 
whose self and product are violated; but also the 
nature of the aggressor himself, who abandons the 
natural way of production--of using his mind to 
transform nature and exchange with other 
producers-for the way of parasitic expropriation of 
the work and product of others. In the deepest 
sense, the aggressor injures himself as well as his 
unfortunate victim (Rothbard, 1982a, pp. 49-50) . 
The libertarian "creed", according to Rothbard, rest upon one central 
axiom: "no man or group of men may aggress against the person or property 
of anyone else"--the "non-aggression axiom" (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 23) . This 
concept of aggression or coercion is crucial to the entire libertarian model. 
Unfortunately, there exists an unavoidable ambuiguity with the term. The 
" invasive use of physical violence or the threat thereof" leaves the 
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boundaries hazy. Does "physical" force, for example, exclude psychological 
"force"? Or, might "invasion" be defined so loosely as to include practically 
every minor "externality" (incessant whistling or one's hair color, for 
instance)? 
In his stinging critique of F. A. Hayek's discussion of coercion, we are 
able to gain a bit more understanding of Rothbard's own perspective of what 
constitutes invasion (Rothbard, 1982a, pp. 219-228) . In The Constitution of 
Liberty, Hayek defines coercion as "the control of the environment or 
circumstances of a person by another" that creates the situation where, "in 
order to avoid greater evil, [ the person] is forced to act not according to a 
coherent plan of his own but to serve the ends of another" (Hayek, 1960, pp. 
20-21) .  Rothbard argues this definition opens the floodgates to all manner of 
"non-aggressive" acts being defined as coercion (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 219).  
Furthermore, by contending that in certain cases coercion should be allowed 
to prevent even greater coercion (for example, punishing a nagging wife), 
Hayek grants coercion an "additive quality" that it does not possess 
(Rothbard, 1982a, p. 219) .  This quality results, Rothbard argues, from a failure 
to distinguish qualitative differences between violent acts and peaceful ones. 
As a ethical monist, Rothbard postulates only two alternatives: voluntary and 
aggressive actions. 
How does this monism employ itself in Rothbard's system of ethics? 
To borrow one of Hayek's examples: Would it be coercion for a manager to 
fire an employee in a mining town simply due to his dislike of the man 
(Hayek, 1960, pp. 1 36-137)? To Rothbard, it would not be an illegitimate 
invasion. As manager (acting in the interests and with the support of the 
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owner), one is free to use or not use his property as he sees fit. Obviously, in 
this libertarian system of ethics, there is no natural "right" to employment, 
regardless of how serious the consequences may be because of the dismissal. 
No matter how drastic one formulates the consequences, Rothbard's position 
would not change until the action of the employer could be defined in his 
theory as invasive. Thus, with regard to Hayek's definition, Rothbard 
concludes: 
. . .  [We] are duty-bound to do one of two things : 
either to confine the concept of 'coercion' strictly to 
the invasion of another's person or property by the 
use or threat of physical violence; or to scrap the 
term 'coercion' altogether, and simply define 
'freedom' not as the 'absence of coercion' but as the 
'absence of aggressive physical violence or the 
threat thereof' . . . .  Unfortunately, [Hayek's] middle­
of-the-road failure to confine coercion strictly to 
violence pervasively flaws his entire system of 
political philosophy. He cannot salvage that system 
by attempting to distinguish, merely quantitatively, 
between 'mild ' and 'more severe' forms of 
coercion (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 223) . 
Rothbard is correct to criticize the "quantitative" nature of Hayek's 
coercion, but to accept a qualitative definition burdens him with the demand 
of preciseness. Both the concepts of "physical" and "invasion" require more 
exact and precise definitions in order to be truly meaningful. Otherwise, the 
system provides no parameters of rightful or wrongful actions. In defining 
his terms, Hayek fell into the trap of defining in degrees, whereas Rothbard's 
failure is to beg the question by being overly vague. Until these definitions 
can be established with more clarity, the model's ethical applicabilty is 
diminished. Thus, the individualistic framework remains, but the legal 
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definition of "invasion" may mean practically nothing at all or it may imply 
almost everything. Obviously, Rothbard, as a libertarian, would prefer to rest 
nearer the former end of the continuum. However, nothing prevents the 
extension of morals to include what might be called "quasi-invasive".  
For instance, could the continual racial badgering of a minority person 
be defined as an invasive act? Or, under the Rothbardian notion, would 
"brainwashing" be a physical invasion? Would it be so immediately, or only 
after an observable change, or at some other point in time? To be consistent, 
it would seem that one may select one of two possible alternatives: Either the 
act is immediately invasive or it is never invasive, since, by definition, this is 
or is not a "physical" invasion. The latter answer is obviously more in line 
with Rothbard's perspective, yet it would prove to be highly unsatisfactory to 
many theorists (even some with libertarian tendencies) to ignore these 
common but difficult to define relationships. 
But let us proceed from the assumption that we have at least a partially 
defineable foundation upon which to build. Is aggression always unjustified? 
Rothbard concludes that historical investigation is necessary in any given 
case; thus, property rights may not be extended to properties previously 
expropiated. No one may act aggressively against the legitimate property of 
another. Any given situation, therefore, must define the natural owner and 
aggressor. It goes without saying that in the highly unethical and statist world 
of today, existing legal property rights claims may well have serious ethical 
problems.4 
4. Similarly, Rothbard would reject Public Choice theorist James 
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In this context, a fallicious argument which tries to distinguish private 
property and community property often arises against the libertarian modeL 
The effect is to separate community property from the ethical constraints of 
normal legitimate ownership concerns. But Rothbard makes no distinction 
between a single owner and a group of individuals who happen to call 
themselves a government. 
Thus, the crucial question is n ot ,  as so many 
believe, whether property should be private or 
governmental, but rather whether the necessarily 
' private' owners are legitimate owners or 
criminals.For ultimately, there is  no entity called 
'government'; there are only people forming 
themselves into groups called 'governments' and 
acting in a 'governmental' manner. All property is 
therefore always 'private'; the only and critical 
question is whether it should reside in the hands of 
criminals or in the proper and legitimate owners. 
There is really only one reason for libertarians to 
oppose the formation of governmental property or 
to call for its divestment: The realization that the 
rulers of government are unjust and criminal 
owners of such property (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 55). 
Does this not open a Pandora's box of persons with actual property claims 
challenging specific historical situations? As a consequence, does it not 
produce an extremely disordered society? Rothbard argues to the contrary: 
Unless one can be shown to be a criminal of someone's person or property, 
then the assumption must be that the possessor is the legitimate owner. In 
fact, even if the present possessor is proven to be in control of criminally 
Buchanan's (1975) acceptance of the status quo as an ethical foundation in 
establishing property arrangements. 
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obtained property, there may be circumstances that warrant the status quo. 
For example, if the owner or his ancestors are clearly identifiable, then the 
property returns to the rightful owner(s), even if the property is no longer in 
the ownership of the actual criminal. If the original owners are not 
identifiable, however, it becomes more complicated. If the actual criminal 
still possesses the item, Rothbard argues, he must surrender it. The good 
returns to a state of "no-ownership" and will go to the first "homesteader." 
But, if the present possessor is not the actual thief and the legitimate owners 
are unknown, then the homesteader is obviously the present holder of the 
property. The presumption is that unless there is clear evidence of both 
criminal action and victim(s) , the i tem remains in its status quo 
circumstances, although ill-gotten gains may never remain with the actual 
criminal. (However, the forced return of the items ought to distinguish any 
separable items of value added by the illegitimate possessor.) 
Within this ethical framework, one might argue that the "loser" 
would be those persons who purchase properties that have been gained 
criminally. Rothbard, however, suggests that the use of some form of title 
search and /  or insurance process similar to the types which already exist for 
land sales (where property exchanges represent substantial resources) could 
easily be applied under these circumstances. 
It should be clear by now that Rothbard's system of ethics is built upon 
a set of two alternatives: the theory of the rights of property and the theory of 
criminality. The former idea represents legitimate action: Every person has 
an absolute right of ownership of himself and all unclaimed resources he 
discovers and transforms. Conversely, criminal action is the transgression of 
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these legitimate claims, and in the ethical society, must be invalidated 
(Rothbard, 1982a, p. 59). 
The Problem of the Limited Earth 
One very serious criticism likely to arise against a system of ethics so 
fundamentally based on self-ownership and the extension thereof is that 
certain kinds of property, namely land, is, at least for the foreseeable future, in 
a definitely limited supply. Under Rothbard's homesteading position, is one 
to rely in every case on a simple first come-first served framework? 
Furthermore, how may this seemingly arbitrary principle be justified within 
a natural law system? 
First, Rothbard's  requirement of usuage for the establishment of 
legitimate property claims eliminates a portion of this problem. In other 
words, no person may make mere broad-sweeping claims to land and justly 
establish rightful ownership. Thus, the scarcity of land created by this type of 
claim would not constitute a problem within his system. To demonstrate this 
proposition, Rothbard returns to the Crusoe model: 
. . .  Crusoe, landing upon a large island, may 
grandiosely trumpet to the winds his 'ownership' of 
the entire island. But, in natural fact, he owns only 
the part he settles and transforms into use . . . .  But so 
long as no other person appears on the scene, 
Crusoe's claim is so much empty verbiage and 
fantasy, with no foundation in natural fact. But 
should a newcomer--a Friday--appear on the scene, 
and begin to transform unused land, then any 
enforcemen t of Crusoe's invalid claim would 
consti tute criminal aggression against the 
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newcomer and invasion of the l atter ' s  property 
rights (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 64). 
However, Rothbard does not mean by this requirement that property must be 
in continual use. Rather, it must have been employed at some point in the 
past, so that one may be said to have "imprinted the stamp of his personal 
energy upon the land" (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 64) . Yet, as the world grows more 
populated and the technological advances extend the abilities for persons to 
mix with l arger parcels of property, the potential problem of not having 
enough to go around remains or even increases. In fact, Rothbard's principle 
extends this problem, since once the property has been transformed by a 
person, i t  remains that person's property for perpetuity. Thus, those coming 
later face apparently even more difficult obstacles. 
It is important to note, however, that his position is built upon the 
satisfying of past aggressions against historical property claims--in no way a 
trivial point. In cases where property has been aggressively stolen years ago, it 
must be rightfully returned to present day ancestors. For critics worried about 
the unequal division of property and its effects on one's ability to enjoy the 
homesteading requirements, it is likely that substantial parcels of land would 
need to be legitimately transferred out of the ownership of (presumedly more 
powerful) aggressors.  There would be, at least initially, an equalizing 
tendency. 
Rothbard identifies two forms of illegitimate l and monopolies: forms 
of feudalism and "land-engrossing," or unfounded broad claims to virgin 
property mentioned above. The first of these forms, he argues, is a serious 
problem internationally and one often ignored by even free market 
economists who underestimate the role of property rights in a just society. 
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His libertarian perspective provides a unique twist to the debate concerning 
land reform in less developed countries, since it at once supports a staunch 
property rights scheme and condemns "state capitalism."  For example, the 
leasing of properties to industries by governments would be found to be 
illegitimate, since the claims of ownership by these governments violate 
principles of property rights. If, on the other hand, properly homesteaded 
titles emerge, then investment, development, etc. are quite legitimate. 
Unfortunately, in regions unsupportive of the market, the illegitimate 
activities of "capitalists" and the legitimate actions of a free market have been 
perceived comparably. 
It is possible, even probable, that a large portion of the problem of 
limited land and, more importantly, subsequent concentrations of property, 
would disappear under a truly libertarian framework. Therefore, Rothbard's 
idea of property rights represents radical land reform: The "immediate 
vacating of the title and its transfer to the peasants, with certainly no 
compensation to the aggressors who had wrongly seized control of the land" 
(Rothbard, 1982a, p. 71). Similarly, concerning the slavery issue in America, 
Rothbard argues the moral solution would have been immediate abolition 
with compensation paid not to the "owners" of the slaves, but vice-versa, 
with the plantations going to the former slaves--the true homesteaders. For 
example, these principles would generate extreme anti-capitalist but pro-free 
market consequences simultaneously in less developed nations. 
However, in discerning historical claims, one question arises 
concerning Rothbard's compensatory rights. Why, in the unsorting of 
legitimate and illegitimate historical property claims, do ancestors hold any 
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sort of favored status in the process of readjustment? Of course, Rothbard 
rightfully supports an individual's right to control his inheritance as an 
extension of property rights over one's gifts (Rothbard, 1978b, pp. 40-41) .  But 
in cases where these wishes are not and cannot be known, what natural law 
principles provide a special priviledge to persons merely falling within an 
ancestorial line? 
Let us assume for a moment that ancestors have no special claims. If 
we rely upon Rothbard's argument, the property would presumedly return to 
a state of non-ownership. Following the principles of homesteading, would 
not the property remain with the ancestor of the aggressor (who did not 
commit any criminal acts)? Are we, then, in the case of generational 
aggression, returned in reality to a framework of accepting for the most part 
the legitimacy of the status quo, dismissing historical circumstances? Perhaps 
we can establish an exception in those cases in which present generation 
"victims" can achieve the extremely difficult task of demonstrating past 
aggression. (Perhaps some form of individualistic and l ibertarian 
"affirmative action" extremely different from the present policy?) Without 
these historical connections, there seems to be no a priori rationale to benefit 
the ancestors of invaded persons.S It would seem proper to require claimants 
5. For instance, why should the beneficiaries of an "affirmative action" 
program receive "compensation" from other individuals without having to 
demonstrate injury? If we might for a moment assume that "discrimination" 
is an aggression under libertarian principles, it would appear possible to 
redress these injuries and provide restitution to the injured parties. But the 
claimant must be required to show actual injury to himself, not some long 
past ancestor. Of course, libertarian theory does not normally disallow private 
discrimination, but the point ought to be clear. 
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across generations to directly prove injury from the earlier aggression before 
they may rightfully claim compensation. Of course, this principle need not 
allow the obvious homesteading advantages which go to the thief's 
ancestors. But it removes the incentive to demand the punishment of such 
crimes, since no apparent person has claims against the ancestor. While this 
reformed principle does not go so far as to justify the status quo ethically, it 
s ignificantly diminishes the rather radical compensatory historical 
framework that Rothbard outlines by eliminating most inter-generational 
claims. 
This principle raises a potentially even more complicated issue in the 
management of aggression, namely, the proper punishment of criminals in 
society. Any libertarian model makes as it first principle the non-existence of 
"society" !  Crime is an individual act perpetrated by criminal(s) upon 
victim(s) . Rothbard argues that the libertarian principle of punishment must 
be one of proportionality. As a code, proportionality establishes the 
maximum punishment allowed the victim upon the proven aggressor. To 
advance beyond these limits is to become an aggressor oneself. Of course, 
since the punishment is the victim's decision, he is free to choose less than 
the maximum standard. Rothbard again makes the assumption that the heirs 
have some legal standing in this decisionmaking process (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 
85) . Either the heirs, or the murdered person through a pre-determined will, 
may establish the form of punishment demanded in cases in which the 
victim is deceased. The burden or the relief of satisfying justice falls upon the 
ancestors. 
In Rothbard's  view, the critical component in the theory of 
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punishment is restitution, a factor that has been increasingly ignored as the 
State expands its monopoly in the instigation of punishment.6 If, for 
example, a simple theft occurs, the aggressor is required to restore at least the 
amount or items taken, either through return of the resources or 
enslavement until the resources are redressed. For certain types of crimes, 
restitution may demand more. In cases of aggression, for instance, restitution 
equal to the monetary loss of the victim is insufficient and proportionality 
must be applied in a different form. First, the criminal must lose rights to the 
same extent as he has taken them. In the cases of monetary theft, for example, 
the criminal should pay double the crime, as well as other specifically 
established costs for non-monetary i tems (fear, mental anguish, etc. ) .  
Likewise, in assault cases, the victim would be free to beat the aggressor twice 
as badly, or at least "more than the same extent" (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 88).7 The 
victim is again free to choose a less serious punishment, or to reach a 
contractual agreement with the aggressor to allow some other form of 
punishment. 
Of course, this "two teeth for a tooth" principle tends to run counter to 
modern notions of punishment. Deterrence, for example, a utilitarian notion 
at foundation, creates potentially dangerous and unjust social consequences 
6. On the notion of restitution in a libertarian society, see also Rothbard 
(1980b); Nozick (1974, pp. 59-63); Ferrara (1982); and Barnett and Hagel (1977). 
7. As Rothbard notes, the practice of restitution would produce the 
opposite results of the contmporary punishment model in which the 
taxpayers are required to pay the expenses of arresting, trying, convicting, and 
incarcerating criminals. See also Rothbard (1982a, pp. 86-87). 
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such as the over-punishment of more frequently and less severe petty crimes 
or even the conviction of innocent people to make a social point (Rothbard, 
1982a, p. 91). Neither does the notion of rehabilitation satisfy the principles 
of justice. If implemented in its entirety, the logic of this form of 
"punishment" results in completely indeterminate sentences--a complete 
dismissal of any idea of proportionality. Moreover, it transfers completely the 
dispensal of justice to a third party, the State, which leads to a subsequent 
disintegration of the principle of equality under law. As Rothbard notes, 
"therapy" quite often calls forward much harsher punishment than simple 
proportionality, or, on the other hand, it may produce rapid "rehabilitation" 
for severe crimes. Each of these principles ignores the only person who 
ethically has "standing" in these cases, namely, the victim. 
Several potential criticisms arise from Rothbard's discussion of 
punishment. The first problem, an admittedly minor one perhaps, deals with 
the rather arbitrary nature of his "two teeth for a tooth principle." Rothbard 
himself does not seem overly committed to this perspective, calling it a "fall 
back" position (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 88). Moreover, he is unclear as to the 
proper extent of restitution in specific cases. This understandable lack of 
clarity is not a major shortcoming for the libertarian system. The crucial 
components are unscathed by this unavoidable problem: It removes any sort 
of State 's interest and retains the individualistic nature of crime and 
punishment. · Still, as with the definition of "physical invasion" (though 
obviously not to the same degree) the rudiments of proportionality lack 
adequate clarity. 
Peter Ferrara argues that this principle of double punishment may just 
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as easily be characterized as a combination of both restitution and retribution, 
and still be defined without a State interest. Whereas Rothbard's position is 
defined/ according to Ferrara/ as "a strict lex talionis whereby the victim has 
the right to do to the criminal exactly what the criminal did to the victim," 
there is no apparent reason why this lex talionis cannot be viewed as 
retribution for the aggression (Ferrara/ 1982, pp. 127-128). 
Perhaps a more pressing criticism concerns the potential removal of 
more impartial third parties in implementing the actual punishment. 
Rothbard readily allows persons to " take the law into there own hands," 
although he anticipates that in a free market such activities would be 
handled by those with comparative advantages in those arenas. Otherwise, 
the executor of the punishment may be liable for exaggerating the 
punishment or mistaking the criminal--both for which they themselves 
would become criminals. 
On the other hand/ a criticism might alternatively emerge from an 
opposite kind of problem. It is surely conceivable that individuals might not 
be able or may not be courageous enough to implement punishment against 
an aggressor. By removing the force of the State from the punishment of 
criminals/ one possibly leaves the separate individual in a frightened and 
intimidated position. Rothbard's response seems less than adequate: If the 
victim does not choose to respond, then no rights have been violated. In 
cases where the victim is a pacifist, this argument might carry some weight; 
the "debt" is simply forgiven. It is very easy to imagine, however, how even a 
majority of victims might face unconquerable intimidation from their 
aggressors. Of course, they are free to hire other persons to get their justice, 
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and, as he notes, the present system cannot avoid cases lost through 
intimidation, either. Still, there are times when the State's monopoly of 
force serves as a valuable instrument in the protection of victims' rights. 
Yet, it would seem such active participation by those directly affected 
may produce positive consequences arising from heightened enthusiasm. 
While there obviously exists a greater incentive to capture the aggressors, this 
advantage may be outweighed by the loss of objectivity which comes from 
third party investigations. However, these persons are liable for their actions­
-not only their acts of punishment but also their activities in uncovering 
evidence. Hence, as Rothbard correctly notes, it is quite likely that police and 
judicial work would be left up to those persons trained in those areas. 
How are these rights to punish aggressors woven into libertarian 
ethics? According to Rothbard, rights of punishment emerge from natural 
rights of self-defense. 
If every man has the absolute right to his justly­
held property, it then follows that he has the right 
to keep that property--to defend it by violence 
against violent invasion . . . .  To say that someone has 
the absolute right to a certain property, but yet lacks 
the right to defend against attack or invasion, is also 
to say that he does no t  have total right to that 
property (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 77). 
Similarly, persons have the right to hire contractually persons to carry 
out the same function. The extent of this self-defense is as simple as the 
ancient "nose-fist" analogy, i.e., legitimate self-defense ends at the point 
where another's property rights in person or thing begins. In itself, this rule 
communicates very little information. Retaliation does not, for instance, 
apply to what Rothbard calls "non-violent harm" (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 77) . To 
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adopt one of his examples, while boycotts may have particularly damaging 
effects on a producer, the "injured" party has no right to respond to these 
actions in a violent way. (Of course, nothing would prevent the producer 
from retaliating in other non-aggressive ways, say, by refusing to provide 
other products or perks desired by the boycotters. Likewise, while unions are 
free to peacefully strike, so is an employer free to fire anyone he pleases and 
to replace them accordingly.) 
Thus, the crime must be, according to Rothbard, a violent or 
"invasive" act before retaliation is justified (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 77). Included 
in this category would be at least three acts: actual physical aggression, 
intimidation or threat of violence, and fraud or "implicit theft. " It is not 
exactly clear how these categories parallel with the definition of invasion 
relative to the ethics of aggression. Would, for example, intimidation 
represent "physical" force? These categories are at once minutely narrow and 
infinitely broad. For example, where does one draw the line between hearty 
persuasion and criminal intimidation? Rothbard contends that the threat of 
aggression must be "palpable, immediate, and direct; in short,that it be 
embodied in the initiation of an overt act." Furthermore, we must "bend 
over backwards to require the threat of invasion direct and immediate, and 
therefore to allow people to do whatever they may be doing" (Rothbard, 
1982a, p. 78) . In other words, the "self-defender" maintains the burden of 
proof to show that actual violence occurred or would have surely happened. 
If the violence did occur, the transgressed is warranted to defend against that 
invasion. 
But to what degree may one return aggression? As with the difficult 
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question of punishment, it is often exceedingly difficult to legitimately gauge 
the extent of the response which may be proper. In the case of a threat, the 
danger must be immediate and overt. Once this fact is established, the ethical 
validity of the response retreats again to the notion of proportionality, i.e., 
loss "to the extent that [one man] deprived another man of his [rights]" 
(Rothbard, 1982a, p. 80) . It goes without saying that this principle applies with 
equal force to police or other types of community security personnel. 
Rothbard also defines fraud in contractual agreements as an act of 
violence, either by failure to implement one's obligation after benefitting 
from the other party or by unauthorized adulteration of properties involved 
in the exchange. However, he argues, the failure to carry out a contract is not 
always a fraudulent act. Contracts are only enforceable if actual theft occurs. 
For instance, to borrow one of his examples, one may not be required to 
follow up ori a promise of marriage six months in advance--since no actual 
property has changed hands. If, however, actual property is appropriated, 
then the agreement is enforceable and violent self defense is warranted to 
retrieve the property. He, therefore, veers away from an absolutist position 
on contracts by arguing that these agreements are a derivative of the right of 
property. Only in those contracts where failure to execute would signify 
property theft would there be legitimate means to enforce them. If, on the 
other hand, the property has not been transferred from one party to another, 
no theft has occurred. Property rights are absolute; contract rights, in his view, 
are merely instruments to facilitate the benefits of ownership and a free 
society. 
An important consequence of this "title-transfer" position is the 
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rejection of any notion of a "breach of promise." The fulfillment of a contract 
is not based upon any form of expectation on the part of the as of yet 
unfulfilled recipient, but is founded solely on forms of "implicit theft" where 
title has gone from one party to the other without the latter fulfilling his 
obligation. This issue is a very important and conflictual point in 
libertarianism. Rothbard argues there is no form of property in one's 
promises or expectations. These contracts are, then, unenforceable. In this 
instance we have what Barry calls the "superficially startling view" that any 
contract resting on promise or expectation, rather than being implicit theft, 
may be breached at will (Barry, 1986, p. 183) . 
. . . .  The basic reason is that the only valid transfer of 
title of ownership in the free society is the case 
where the property is, in fact and in the nature of 
man, alienable by man . . . . i .e., in natural fact can be 
given or transferred to the ownership and control 
of another party . . . .  But there are certain vital things 
which, in natural fact and in the nature of man are 
in alienable, i.e., they can not in fact be alienated, 
even voluntarily (Rothbard, 1982a, pp. 134-135). 
These "vital" items include the human will or control of one's self. Likewise, 
these rights are inalienable. Thus, Rothbard argues, it would be inconsistent 
to conceive of a notion of rights--which by their nature are founded on 
"absolute self-ownership"--in concert with alienability. 
Rothbard uses this argument to reject social contract theory as well. 
. . . .  A basic fallacy is endemic to all social contract 
theories of the State, namely, that any  contract 
based on a promise is binding and enforceable. If, 
then, eve ryon e---in itself of course a heroic 
assumption--in a state of nature surrendered all or 
some of his (sic) rights to a State, the social contract 
theorists consider this promise to be binding 
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forevermore . . . .  While, on the contrary o t h e r  
attributes of man: specifically, his self-ownership 
over his own will and body, and the r ights to 
person and property which stem from that self­
ownership, are 'inalienable' and therefore cannot 
be surrendered in a binding contract. If no one, 
then, can surrender his own will, his body, or his 
rights in an enforceable contract, a fortiori he 
cannot surrender the persons or the rights of his 
posterity (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 230). 
This position further explains Rothbard's subordinate role for the right of 
contracts. A "slave contract", for instance, would not be enforceable since no 
person may alienate ultimate control over himself. And since the "slave" is 
not an implicit thief in Rothbard's definition, neither would he owe any 
payment for removing himself from any life-long obligation. 
But is there no property in any form of promise? What of the costs 
borne by the person left "holding the bag"? For Rothbard there is no 
legitimate claim; instead he chalks the loss up to poor entrepreneurship and 
forecasting--an unfortunate learning experience. Therefore, persons ought to 
be free at any time during the course of a job contract, for example, to quit and 
move elsewhere (including military enlistees!) . The only recourse for the 
employer apparently involves blacklisting such individuals, unless, of 
course, some form of conditional property exchange has actually occurred. In 
these cases of exchange, tangible property is involved--and these resources are 
alienable. 
While this perspective may be within the parameters of libertarian 
ethics, it seems to be rather disconcerting once one speculates upon its 
potential consequences. For example, let us again borrow a Rothbard 
example. 
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. . . .  Suppose that a celebrated movie actor agrees to 
appear at a certain movie theater at a certain date. 
For whatever reason, he fails to appear. Should he 
be forced to appear at that or some future date? 
Certainly not, for that would be compulsory 
slavery. Should he be forced, at least, to recompense 
the theater owners for the publicity and other 
expenses incurred by the theater owners in 
anticipation of his appearance? No again, for his 
agreement was a mere promise concerning his 
inalienable will, which he has the right to change at 
any time . . . .  The fact that the theater owners may 
have made considerable plans and investments on 
the expectation that the actor would keep the 
agreement may be unfortunate for the owners, but 
that is their proper risk . . . .  The owners pay the 
penalty for placing too much confidence in the 
actor. It may be considered more moral to keep 
promises than to break them, but any coercive 
enforcement of such a moral code, since it goes 
beyond the prohibition of theft or assault, is itself 
an invasion of the property rights of the movie 
actor and therefore impermissable in the libertarian 
society (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 137). 
One may assume the principle would be the same had the owner 
refused to allow the actor to appear upon arrival . For theorists concerned 
with the consequences of individual actions, this perspective is quite 
troubling. Who, for instance, would be willing to take the heightened risk of 
ever trusting persons with which one would contract? In addition, it might 
increase the likelihood of "pay-backs", which would damage civilized 
exchange and, subsequently, society's standard of living. It is, however, 
unlikely that the results of these principles are all that controversial. First, for 
any reputable person, failure to carry out promises would rather quickly 
diminish one's standing in his profession. Secondly, to avoid these potential 
problems, Rothbard suggests the use of "performance bonds" which would 
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require the promiser to put up a bond that would cover pre-appearance costs. 
As alienable property, this could transfer to the other party.8 Interestingly, 
this process avoids the requirement so common in today's legal system of 
having to bring suit to collect damages after the breach of contract. As a result, 
Rothbards notes, contemporary courts are forced into the difficult role of 
trying to ascertain "fair" levels of compensation, rather than performing their 
proper function of guaranteeing the performance of contracts. 
One existing legal mechanism somewhat related to contracts but 
unavailable to a libertarian society would be the instrument of bankruptcy. 
These actions clearly violate the property rights of the creditor, Rothbard 
contends. If the debtor is simply hiding assets, he is guilty of both theft and 
fraud. If the bankruptcy is due to lack of resources, then the debtor should be 
required to surrender future income, plus interest, until the debt is paid in 
full. Of course, nothing prevents the creditor and debtor from individually 
working out their own arrangements. Or, to borrow a position similar to that 
of the nineteenth century libertarian Lysander Spooner, one may treat the 
debt at its initiation as a form of a partnership (Hall, 1986, pp. 176-177). 
Thus, Rothbard's system of ethics may be rather simply summarized in 
a concise code of action. Humans own themselves and are free to mix 
themselves with the natural environment--homesteading property that is to 
that point in time unused by any other person. Contrarily, violent acts-­
Oppenheimer's "political means"--are acts of criminality and unethical under 
8. Rothbard (1982a, pp. 137-140) explains that these bond arrangements 
were quite common and successful in the Middle Ages, proving to be a 
"remarkably flexible instrument" in diminishing the concerns of critics. 
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the libertarian code. In no cases are these acts of violence ethically justifiable, 
no matter who the actor is. From these principles, what role does the State 
play in Rothbard's political philosophy? 
The State in the Rothbardian System 
The answer to the question of the government's role is quite logical: 
There is no role for the State in Rothbard's political system . 
. . . .  For libertarians regard the State as the supreme, 
the eternal, the best organized aggressor against the 
persons and property of the mass of the public . . . .  Jn 
fact, if you wish to know how libertarians regard 
the State and any of its acts, simply think of the 
State as a criminal band, and all the libertarian 
attitudes will logically fall into place (Rothbard, 
1978b, p. 46).9 
Governments, according to his essentialist definition, commit violence 
through avenues not usually open to private institutions in society. 
Governments are not institutions built upon any notion of a social contract, 
but rather they are formed and are maintained through the continuance of 
conquest and force. Their most common violation is the confiscation of 
property through taxation. The State also frequently requires service or denies 
otherwise legitimate activities of persons . It is responsible for the majority of 
destruction historically, largely through its ability to monopolize and coalesce 
aggression. Moreover, it lacks any "guardian" to check the actions of this 
9. For extended discussions of this same theme, examine Rothbard 
(1974a); (1972a, pp. 60-75); (1978d, pp. 191-207). 
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monopoly force. Crime, obviously, occurs in the "private" world. But the 
State provides a "legal, orderly, systematic channel for predation on the 
property of the producers; it makes certain, secure, and relatively 'peaceful' 
the lifeline of the parasitic caste in society" (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 51) .  
Since the State is built upon a grand scheme of theft, Rothbard 
concludes that we have no obligation to obey its commands. This principle 
provides a far-reaching conclusion: Ethically, one is free to evade taxes, to 
homestead government (stolen) property, to violate government contracts, 
and to refuse to follow government orders. (For practical reasons, he does not 
necessarily suggest civil disobedience, however!) The State is not merely 
another entity in the private society; it is "an inherently illegitimate 
institution of organized aggression" (Rothbard, 1982.a, p. 186). 
Rothbard finds the overwhelming support of a monopolistic State 
apparatus to be highly ironic, given the treatment usually afforded "private" 
monopolies in social theory. Citizens have granted incredible powers to 
governments--to control money, to dispense j ustice, to regulate 
transportation avenues and postal services, to police society and the defense 
apparatus, to name a few--that few individuals in theory would tolerate in 
the market sector. Unlike a legitimate private organization, the State may 
force persons to purchase their "product. " Always, Rothbard concludes, 
taxation represents theft. 
It would be an instructive exercise for the skeptical 
reader to try to frame a definition [of taxation] 
which does not also include theft. Like the robber, 
the State demands money at the equivalent of 
gunpoint; if the taxpayer refuses to pay, his assets 
are seized by force, and if he should resist such 
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depredation, he will be arrested or shot if he should 
continue to resist. It is true that State apologists 
maintain that taxation is 'really' voluntary; one 
simple but instructive refutation of this claim is to 
ponder what would happen if the government 
were to abolish taxation, and to confine itself to 
simple requests for voluntary contributions. Does 
anyone really believe that anything comparable to 
the current vast revenues of the State would 
continue to pour into its coffers (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 
163)? 
In Rothbard's  view, the answer to this question is obviously "no". But 
does this response settle the issue, or has he conveniently dismissed the 
complex question of "free riders" in social exchanges? Are there not "public 
goods" that individuals demand but, due to the product's special 
characteristics of non-exdusibility, would largely avoid the costs of in a freely 
functioning economy? Would not in these cases individual rationality 
mislead a free economy interested in the "actual" demand by permitting free 
riding? And, would not these goods then be severely underproduced? To the 
degree any of these questions raise legitimate concerns, how else might these 
products be provided without the use of government coercion, i.e., taxation 
and regulation? Otherwise, what incentives exist for the user of the product 
to bear the costs and, consequently, what advantages exist for the producer to 
provide the good when profits disintegrate due to free riding beneficiaries? 
Rothbard responds to this dilemma in a number of ways. First, the act 
of requiring the less than interested person to contribute still represents 
coercion; the inclusion of the entire set of persons does not eliminate the 
non-voluntary nature of requiring an act that would have gone unperformed 
otherwise. And these principles still take precedence over the potential 
underproduction of particular goods. 
152 
Secondly, by providing these so-called public goods there is no way to 
ascertain the levels of contributions that the person would have been willing 
to provide in a voluntary setting. In a free society with an open market, the 
exact amount of individual demand is known and shown by the 
demonstrated preferences of the involved actors (Rothbard, 1956, pp. 225-232) . 
If the payment is due to forced action, one cannot know the extent of demand 
any given person has for the project. It is, for instance, very unlikely that a 
libertarian "volunteers" the payment for specific government projects, 
despite the claims that these items represent public goods. 
Thirdly, in the statist solution to the free rider problem there is a 
component which likely results in the overproduction of the given item. 
Through the use of coercion, the "voluntary" portion is expanded to entail 
levels well above "true" demand. As a result, rather than satisfying "true" 
demand, these programs simply increase the size of the State at the expense of 
individual consumer sovereignty. 
Rothbard evidently denies the entire idea of public goods and free 
riders. In fact, he follows Austrian subjectivism to conclude the only true 
demand is the demonstrated preferences of free exchange. One might argue 
that he places too much emphasis on the unfrettered market. Might not 
demand for these goods also be demonstrated through political mechanisms? 
These factors are unreliable signals, according to Rothbard. As we 
demonstrated in Chapter III, voting and day-to-day activities of apparent 
political consent do not satisfy the requirements of demonstrated preference, 
not even for those persons who participate politically or even those 
individuals who appear to support the proposed action. The existence of 
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democratic decision-making powers has only "enabled an ideological 
camouflage to be thrown over the naked exploitative reality of political life." 
Democracy creates the fictious "we" and, therefore, buries the concern for 
individual ethics. If, for example, "we" impose involuntary servitude, certain 
persons will suffer the costs of aggression whereas others will benefit from 
this criminal activity. In no way, for Rothbard, can the number of persons 
within a society alone ever establish justified action, nor may decisions made 
under the duress of political processes be viewed as voluntary decisions. 
Political acts represent actions of aggression or responses thereof, whereas 
market processes represent freely chosen activities. 
Therefore, the discussion of the voluntariness of democratic processes 
is largely idle chatter for Rothbard, since consent and the State mix like oil 
and water. The usual political condition, he argues, is oligarchy. This 
tendency is due to two separate reasons. In the first place, there is a natural 
inequality and subsequent division of labor unavoidable in human relations. 
Diversity and differing levels of talent are inherent in society. In the second 
place, the State is an organization controlled by a powerful minority who 
exist off the "fruits of parasitic exploitation." Whereas a market economy 
based on the principles of non-aggression relies on legitimate means to 
achieve the means of survival, the political system depends on the transfer of 
one's legitimately attained wealth to non-producers, or, "parasites".  
Who are encompassed in this oligarchic organization? They include 
the full-time administrative and/ or elected structure and those private 
individuals or groups who successfully seek priviledges of some form from 
the first group. From our discussions in Chapter III, we found that Rothbard 
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divides society into two portions: those who make up this ruling structure, 
the "tax-consumers", and those who support the rulers, the "tax-payers". 
Based on this distinction, the State is tantamount to nineteenth century 
American anarchist Lysander Spooner's highwayman--only worse! 
. . .  .It is a status that allows the State to feed off its 
victims while making at least most of them 
support, or at least be resigned to, this exploitative 
process. In fact, it is precisely the function of the 
State's ideological minions and allies to explain to 
the public that the Emperor does indeed have a fine 
set of clothes . . . .  The ideologists must explain that 
murder by one or more persons or groups is bad 
and must be punished, but that when the S ta te 
kills it is not murder but an exalted act known as 
'war' or ' repression of internal subversion' . . . .  
(Rothbard, 1978b, p. 167). 
Rothbard, however, faces a perenial problem in political philosophy. If 
parasitism is successful only if maintained by a rather small numerical 
minority (a self-evident truth), then why does this criminality continue? He 
may not argue that the subjects are actually consenting to the criminality, nor 
does he want to rely on tradition or habit to explain the inactivity in the face 
of what appears to be such obvious aggression. For his own theory to be 
"activated" there must be a substantial role for human reason. Yet, reason, in 
his view, would not lead humans to consent to the actions of the State. Thus, 
consensus theories are empirically incorrect. He attempts to escape this 
dilemma by expanding the oligarchic structure to include an additional class 
of historically influencial individuals, namely, the intellectuals .  "Rulers" 
have used this very important alliance to increase their control with the aid 
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of a given society's intellectuals, who, in turn, use ideology as their weapon. 
Essentially, the masses have been duped . 
. . . .  The masses do not create their own abstract ideas, 
or indeed think through these ideas independently; 
they follow passively the ideas adopted and 
promulgated by the body of intellectuals, who 
become the effective 'opinion moulders' in society. 
And since it is precisely a moulding of opinion on 
behalf of the rulers that the State almost desperately 
needs, this forms a firm basis for the age-old alliance 
of the intellectuals and the ruling classes of the 
State. The alliance is based on a quid pro quo : on 
the one hand, the intellectuals spread among the 
masses the idea that the State and its rulers are wise, 
good, sometimes divine, and at the very least 
inevitable and better than any conceivable 
alternatives. In return for this panoply of ideology, 
the State incorporates the intellectuals as part of the 
ruling elite, granting them power, status, prestige, 
and material security. Furthermore, intellectuals are 
needed to staff the bureaucracy and to 'plan' the 
economy and society (Rothbard, 1978b, pp. 54-55). 
Rothbard goes to great lengths to defend this position (Rothbard, 1978b, 
pp. 54-69) . Whereas the original intellectual "class" was found within the 
Church, today one is more likely to locate it in the realms of expertise, i.e., 
"value-free" scientists, economists, planners, political experts, etc. A number 
of techniques have been employed to keep the masses in line, including the 
glorification of tradition or habit, the deprecation of the individual, the 
subsequent exaltation of the collectivity, the smashing of dissident voices in 
the bud, the establishment of the notion of ruler inevitability, the 
collectivization of State criminal actions, the creation of the fear of other 
States (and the subsequent necessity of one's own government), the creation 
of a nationalistic spirit, the infusion of guilt for persons too successful for the 
156 
good of the rulers, and the exploitation of fear for the unknown alternatives 
to the status quo. All of these arguments may be categorized in one of two 
ways: The rule of the State "is inevitable, absolutely necessary, and far better 
than the indescribable evils that would ensue upon its downfall" or the rulers 
represent "especially great, wise, and altruistic men--far greater, wiser, and 
better than their simple subjects," as in the form of divine right or today in 
the fashion of a technocracy (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 59) . 
But why do intellectuals need the State? The masses have little use for 
the "product" of the intellectual. Therefore, it likely follows that one finds a 
high propensity of parasitism among intellectuals. Their "product" is 
unmarketable in a free economy driven by consumer demands. It also seems 
to follow that where the State controls more of society's wealth and property, 
one is less likely to encounter intellectuals who are not "lapdogs" for the 
existing political power elite. Yet, as Rothbard notes, even in Western 
societies where there has existed important criticism against the powers of the 
State, it is still highly possible for the rulers to turn the intellectual elite and 
their arguments to the benefit of the government:. For example, one might 
argue that the surrendering of portions of the American Bill of Rights to 
expediency is pertinent in this regard, as demonstrated by the current "War 
on Drugs". Even broader kinds of concerns arise in the present-day scurry for 
government-funded research grants by the academic community. 
The State, according to Rothbard, also employs other instruments to 
maintain its control. Education especially is crucial in the maintanence of the 
"moulded" mind. This is an extremely important point that is often subtly 
avoided in the contemporary debate over the perils of education. Lower level 
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schools are heavily dictated by the whims of the State apparatus through 
public education, while post-secondary education is increasingly coming 
under the spell of public monies and, in turn, public control. In addition to 
these influences, there is the "virtually total control" the State has over the 
airwaves through heavy regulation and, consequently, quasi-nationalization 
(Rothbard, 1982a, p. 169). All of these factors serve as major sources of real or 
potential abuse. 
It must be emphasized that the State does not 
merely use coercion to acquire its own revenue, to 
hire propagandists to advance its power, and to 
arrogate itself and to enforce a compulsory 
monopoly of such vital services as police 
protection, firefighting, transportation, and postal 
services. For the State does many other things as 
well, none of which can in any sense be said to 
serve the consuming public . . . .  Often it pushes its 
way into controlling the morality and the very daily 
lives of its subjects. The State uses its coerced 
revenue, not merely to monopolize and provide 
genuine services inefficently to the public, but also 
to build up its own power at the expense of the 
exploited and harassed subjects: to redistribute 
income and wealth from the public to itself and its 
allies, and to control, command, and coerce the 
inhabitants of its territory (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 171) .  
This seems to cover all possible avenues; hence, the State has no purpose in a 
free society. In fact, it cannot exist if the rights of humans are to maintained to 
their fullest. 
Rothbard's criticisms of the limited or laissez-faire State are equally 
unsympathetic. Once the State is created there are no means by which it can 
be checked. It can be expected to expand. It is obviously in the interest of a 
ruler given limited power to increase his control. And with power comes the 
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ability to gain even greater domination. Hence, limited government creates a 
false security for those individuals interested in individual rights. Moreover, 
it provides an adequate window of opportunity for the expansion of statism. 
However, it seems that Rothbard paints himself into a theoretical 
corner with his attack on limited government. He argues, for instance, that 
the persons who utilize the State will have an economic interest to expand 
their powers (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 176). It is unclear why these persons must 
first put on their "political" hats before attempting to expand their realms, 
though. If we could rely on the market and a social respect for the ethics 
which presumably emerge from such an order, there would be no problems. 
But one does not eliminate "political means" simply by assuming away the 
existence of the State. Rothbard is surely correct when he argues that the 
overwhelming number of atrocities committed throughout history were 
perpetrated by or through the State. But he further argues this historical 
record of conquest "demonstrated that any power, once granted or acquired, 
will be used and therefore abused" (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 176). What he does 
not explain, however, is how in a society with admittedly differentiations in 
power, political violence will not arise and be utilized to violate human 
rights--whether through the State or some other equally ingenious 
institution. The obstacle of coercive power may not be simplistically assumed 
away. The solution to the problem of power is to determine the ways in 
which these institutions may be prevented from arising and serving as potent 
means of oppression. Eliminating the commonly defined State does not deny 
the evolution of other institutions that may provide the exact same invasive 
services . Rothbard comes perilously close at times to assuming that the 
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removal of one set of institutions (the State) creates some sort of vaccuum 
that necessarily will be filled by another set of preferred processes (the free 
market). 
For example, in a critique of Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and 
Utopia, Rothbard criticizes the "invisible hand" notion of the minimal State 
by arguing that such a structure has no historical reality. In other words, no 
State has ever evolved in the manner Nozick portrays. Instead, Rothbard 
argues, history demonstrates that conquest and force have created and 
maintained the modern State (Rothbard, 1982a, pp. 229-230) . But does not this 
criticism apply even more strongly in the case of Rothbard's anarcho­
capitalism, since no society has ever even remotely approached this model? 
If, in other words, one agrees that the State is unequivocally founded on 
conquest, what magic occurs which redirects this inherent violence toward an 
anarchy of peaceful and respectful self-ownership? Conquest theorists face a 
dilemma when they propose a system of ethics which they claim are 
achievable. Perhaps Rothbard's system approaches the utopian models which 
he criticizes more closely than he is willing to admit. 
Rothbard's cogent attack on laissez-faire fails not so much for being 
incorrect, but for failing to distinguish his own ideas from the same 
criticisms. He is correct to deny the possible existence of either the limited 
State (in revenue or power) or the "neutral" State. The twentieth century 
world's infatuation with the Big State seems to prove these assessments. In 
the United States, for example, the culture of limited government gradually 
gave way to these alternative viewpoints. He is also right to conclude that law 
need not arise through the State. Nevertheless, the critical question concerns 
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the type of mechanisms that may legitimately be employed to achieve the 
control of aggression in the real world of unequal economic power, human 
self-interest, and opportunity for illegitimate advantage. Many forms of 
anarchism face the criticism of being utopian in nature, as they rest upon a 
too elevated notion of humankind or demand unreasonable changes in 
human nature (Barry, 1986, pp. 162-163). While Rothbard may not face these 
extreme hurdles, there are still some very difficult questions concerning the 
theory's  practicality. Does he have a workable alternative that will address 
these difficult questions? 
In the next chapter, we move from a discussion of Rothbard's 
foundation of ethics and his blistering critique of the government to an 
investigation of his alternative mechanisms to the State. Chapter V explores 
the application of anarcho-capitalism in the arena of public policy. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE ANARCHO-CAPITALIST SOCIETY 
Introduction: The Stateless Society 
Rothbard seeks to establish the foundations of the just society in the 
development of his political philosophy. In the process he demolishes the 
function of . the State in terms of the definition, interpretation, and 
enforcement of these principles by opting instead for an anarchist society built 
upon the free market. Sharp criticism of the State, both historically and 
theoretically, is naturally a much simpler task than formulating a feasible and 
preferable alternative. Liberal political theorists, for example, have 
traditionally faced the rather persuasive charges of anarchist literature against 
the actions of the State. However, no Stateless model which provides a more 
desireable and/ or feasible alternative has yet to appear. 
Rothbard has at least one advantage over many previous anarchist 
writers in that he does not assume some kind of metamorphosis of human 
nature which enables the system to mesh with the real world (a common 
problem in many of the "leftist" theories of anarchism). From his 
perspective, any political system must ultimately be tested against social 
reality and if it is based on unreal or utopian foundations, it must be rejected. 
Rothbard, therefore, accepts human nature "as it is" and seeks to produce a 
workable anarchist system within these parameters. 
Chapter V investigates a large number of Rothbardian applications of 
ethics to real-world public policy problems. In each case, we examine the 
162 
arguments for theoretical consistency and practical applicability alike. One of 
the potential advantages of Rothbard's  system is that he integrates an 
optimistic consequentialism with an absolutist ethics demanded by his brand 
of libertarianism. Hence, he argues that anarchism is both ethical and 
achievable. We conclude by exploring whatever flaws or shortcomings exist 
in his integrated system. 
Specific Policies 
There is no specific order to these preliminary expositions. Each arena 
of policy is explored as a distinctive substantive issue. In each case the 
criticism focuses most prominently upon Rothbard's ability to formulate 
workable policies that are simultaneously true to libertarian principles. 
Rights of Individual Expression 
It is in many ways unfruitful or misleading to make distinctions 
among personal rights in the libertarian system. As we explained in the last 
chapter, all libertarian rights for Rothbard arise from the same foundations of 
self-ownership; hence, the dichotomy of property and personal rights is  
fallacious. Ultimately, all rights are property rights. 
This consistent ethical foundation demands a framework for the rights 
of expression that is far more absolute--relative to property rights--than any 
contemporary court would be willing to accept. On the other hand, for 
individuals less concerned with possessive rights, these arguments fall far 
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short of expectations concerning rights of expression. Rothbard, for instance, 
sets aside a number of present "exceptions" to the freedom of speech. Never, 
for example, should a speaker be restrained for "inciting a riot." Such a 
rationale totally denies human freedom of wilL One has committed no crime 
of property or person through mere incitation. Only if the speaker participates 
in the physical invasion, or in cases where the person is manager of a 
perpetrated crime, would he be guilty. And in these circumstances, one is not 
guilty of illegal speech but of property infringements. 
There is, however, a gray area in this last exception. Rothbard argues 
that the "law of accessories" dictates that the "boss" is also responsible in the 
criminal planning of events (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 95) . To distinguish the boss 
from the riot inciter may at times be a somewhat difficult task, although 
Rothbard argues that it is, nevertheless, "clearcut" (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 80). 
From the viewpoint of the listener, if individuals are not free to accept or 
reject what they hear, how may there be a distinction between the henchmen 
and the crowd participants? Since advocacy can never be considered a crime, a 
more consistent application would treat the boss as a mere supplier of 
information until whatever time he receives some share of the booty or, in 
fact, physically invades the victim. Under the same principle, one punishes 
the listeners for their actions and not the speaker for his words .  The 
consistent application would be that there may be no crime in words (or 
thoughts) . But this conclusion leads to an intriguing understanding of the 
common concepts of libel and slander, as well as other issues concerning the 
dissemination of information. Such concepts have no legal meaning in 
Rothbard's system. 
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. . . .  What the law of libel and slander does, in short, 
is to argue a 'property right' of someone in his own 
reputation. Yet someone's 'reputation' is not and 
cannot be 'owned' by him, since it is purely a 
function of the subjective feelings and attitudes 
held by other people. But since no one can truly 
ever 'own' the mind and attitude of another, this 
means that no one can literally have a property 
right in his 'reputation' . . . .  Hence, speech attacking 
someone cannot be an invasion of his property 
right and therefore should not be subject to 
restriction or legal penalty (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 95) . 
Thus, any person "slandered" has suffered no property loss. One's reputation 
in actuality is not one's property at all, since our "reputation" is solely what 
other persons think of us. If one owns his mind, then he cannot own 
another's mind, so these beliefs are not, properly speaking, his own. The 
truthfulness or falsity of the information is, as a result, insignificant. 
Would not the consequences of this position be disasterous? For 
Rothbard, this determination is the correct ethical position because it is 
consistent with the principles of self-ownership. But one may just as easily 
defend this perspective with a consequentialist argument. Today's laws 
concerning expression, for example, are riddled with exceptions which make 
the value of these "protections" less than secure (malicious intent 
requirements in libel cases, for example) . Yet, what would occur if persons 
were not programmed to believe all they read or hear, even though it is often 
false information? To allow the press, for instance, to print any information 
removes the assumption that what one reads is always true, and so 
diminishes the reputational damage, unless the printer has worked diligently 
to develop and maintain an unblemished record for accuracy. In all 
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likelihood, levels of print would arise, ranging from the most reputable to 
the completely irreputable publications, with the consumer being required to 
distinguish between the levels. Persons would be "reprogrammed" to be 
more skeptical, and an undistinguished press would face the constraints of 
the market, no longer able to wrongly hide behind amendments which tend 
to protect the reputable and irreputable publishers indiscriminately. Just as 
the market distinguishes levels of efficiency in other business realms, it 
would likewise favorably influence the production of the printed and spoken 
word. 
Therefore, persons have a right to disseminate their "knowledge", no 
matter what the consequences. For example, Rothbard consistently supports 
the act of blackmail (Rothbard, 1982a, pp. 124-125). After all, both parties 
benefit in the exchange, and without theft on the part of either person. By 
agreeing not to disseminate a certain set of information about Person B, 
Person A has agreed to an exchange of security for closed-lippedness. Of 
course, once the contract is made, both parties are bound by the ongoing 
ethical principles to uphold the agreement. 
Nevertheless, there is apparently a potential drawback in this scenario. 
What if Person A decides to "bleed" B by making continual demands for 
additional payments? There is a distinct possibility that the information is of 
the type that is inalienable for A, i.e., his knowledge of B remains even after 
the agreement to remain quiet is arranged. However, the answer to this 
dilemma rests upon Rothbard's  understanding of the nature of this 
information. B, once he reaches his saturation point for paying the additional 
blackmail, must simply allow the information to be made public, at which 
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time he may sue the blackmailer for violating the original blackmail contract. 
Before one feels sympathy for B, it is important to remember that he never 
had sole "ownership" of the knowledge. A also "owns" the information; his 
agreement exchanged some sort of property for the maintenance of silence. 
Similarly, persons have an absolute right not  to be required to 
disseminate information. This principle applies in all cases, including those 
situations that concern the State's power of subpeona. In other words, 
everyone has a right to "protect [or not protect] the confidentiality of their 
sources."  The only exception to this right of dissemination occurs "if [the 
information) was procured from someone else as a conditiona l  rather than 
absolute [ form of] ownership" (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 1 23). For example, if 
someone shares trade secrets on the condition that the information not be 
transmitted, but nevertheless releases the knowledge, he violates the contract 
established previously between the two individuals. 
A common complaint likely to come from critics unaccustomed to a 
libertarian system of ethics is that Rothbard and other libertarians fail to 
appreciate the highly conflictual nature of the different rights of expression. 
However, there are no conflicts in these rights from Rothbard's perspective. If 
modern liberals, for example, consistently founded their system of rights 
upon an idea of self-ownership, most of the "expression" questions flooding 
the courts today would be moot. 
. . .  [T]hose problems where rights seem to require 
weakening are ones where the locus of ownership 
is not precisely defined, in short where property 
rights are muddled. Many problems of 'freedom of 
speech', for example, occur in the government­
owned streets: e.g. should a government permit a 
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political meeting which i t  claims will distrupt 
traffic, or litter streets with handbills? . . . .  
The whole problem would not arise, it 
should be noted, if the streets were owned by 
private individuals and firms-as they would be in a 
libertarian society . . . .  One would, in a fully 
libertarian society, have no more 'right' to use 
someone else's street than he would have the 
'right' to pre-empt someone else's assembly hall; in 
both cases, the only right would be the property 
right to use one's money to rent the resource, if the 
landlord is willing .. . .  (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 1 1 7) . 
The right to speech, then, is  dependent upon the ownership of the 
place the speech is delivered. Or, to borrow a common example, yelling "fire" 
in a crowded assembly hall is wrong not because of some convoluted dear or 
present danger rationale, but rather because the owner of the hall would not 
allow it. If these sorts of issues were judged based upon the principles of 
ownership, any existing conflicts over rights of e xpre s s i o n  would be 
eliminated. Of course, the removal of conflict altogether would depend upon 
how well the rights of property are defined. Rights of expressions are no 
different from any other negative externality: They are the result of improper 
or underdeveloped definitions of property rights. (For more on other 
externalities, see the discussion of environmental issues below.) 
Similar principles apply to other forms of expression. The owner of a 
newspaper, for instance, is free to determine its content, just as the owner of 
the assembly hall. Radio and television stations are free to set their own 
programming wi thout regard to any sor t of governmentally founded 
"fairness" principle. (It is important to note that in conjunction with this 
freedom, there must be the application of the homesteading principle for the 
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airwaves, removing the monopoly presently maintained by the State. This 
principle would increase the number of property owners able to "be heard".) 
Rothbard's consistency demonstrates the inherent contradictions in 
systems that separate property rights from rights of expression. Without 
defined property rights, the right to communicate is perched upon an 
extremely unsteady base. Rothbard employs as an example one of the systems 
that seeks to sever the relationship of these rights, "democratic socialism", to 
make his point: 
. . . .  An abstract constitution guaranteeing 'freedom of 
the press' is meaningless in a socialist society. The 
point is that where the government owns all of the 
newsprint, the paper, the presses, etc. .  the 
government-as-owner must decide how to allocate 
the newsprint and the paper, and what to print on 
them . . . . .  Any government may profess its devotion 
to freedom of the press, yet allocate all of its 
newsprint only to its defenders and supporters. A 
free press is again a mockery; furthermore, why 
s h o u ld a socialist government allocate any 
considerable amount of its scarce resources to 
antisocialists? The problem of genuine freedom of 
the press then becomes insoluble (Rothbard, 1982a, 
p. 99) . 
There is additional criticism which might be brought against Rothbard 
and his effort to make expression rights dependent upon property rights. 
Persons who are unfortunate enough to own no property appear to be locked 
out the process of effective communication. This critique, if i t  were in fact 
true, would appear to be a rather damning one until it is understood that this 
scenario represents little or no change from the present reality. Defined 
rights of property do limit, however, the open conflict that arises when two 
or more sets of rent-seekers demanding government assistance battle over 
169 
the same parcel of land or other property in order to have their respective 
views heard. The continual growth in the amount of "public" ownership of 
lands only creates greater conflicts over the rights of individuals to possess 
these properties, so as to satisfactorily "express" themselves. It is unlikely that 
this redefinition discriminates against the poor or underrepresented any 
more than the present system. Their voices carry little weight in 
contemporary society. However, by allowing different regions to adjust to the 
demands of expression accordingly, the change would probably allow a bit 
more order, while forcing protesters to pay the "costs" of their activities. And 
these costs currently fall disporportionately upon the weakest sectors of 
society. 
"Victimless" Crimes 
In the past few years, there has been a clear diminishment of toleration 
for what are commonly called "victimless crimes". These "vices", which 
often produce detrimental results for the partaking individual but fewer 
clear consequences as spillover effects for others, are increasingly gaining the 
wrath of numerous special interest lobbies for a plethora of reasons ranging 
from health concerns to moral sanctimony. 
The terminology "victimless crime" ought to tip the reader off at once 
to Rothbard's position on such issues as gambling, pornography, illicit sexual 
activities, or drug sales and usuage. If no victim exists, there can be no crime; 
hence, neither the "State" nor "Society" has any legitimate claim to intervene 
in these arenas. Rothbard concludes that most of the debate over 
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pornography, for example, is "distressingly beside the point" (Rothbard, 
1978b, p. 103). For him, the consequences of pornography on the participating 
individual are politically non-issues. Issues are "political " only if they are 
clear acts of invasion by one person against another . Although some 
individuals may find "smut" disgusting, they are not justified to employ 
force to impose their personal values upon other persons. Indeed, to interfere 
is to make of the intervener a criminal. The act of imposing morality rests 
upon an inherent contradiction, for moral action makes sense only if an 
individual chooses the behavior by his own free will (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 105). 
An immoral act (such as a legislative dictum) cannot be applied to force a 
moral one (the choice not to be "perverted"). 
These same principles are also applicable to "sex crimes". For instance, 
Rothbard supports the complete legalization of prostitution, since it is 
nothing other than a specific occupation. Rather than focusing upon the act 
of prostitution, legal officials would be better advised to concentrate upon 
activities that are truly illegal which often accompany these businesses. (This 
argument, of course, assumes that once prostitution is removed from the 
black market, these accompanying illegal acts would remain. It is more likely 
the criminal component would disappear completely, as the profitability 
which arises from the risk of illegality is removed.) 
A common thread woven throughout the justifications for these types 
of governmental interferences in these types of activities is paternalism, i.e., 
certain persons (usually entailing the poor and/ or the uneducated) are unable 
to protect themselves against the temptations of these vices. Therefore, wise 
elites must act on their behalves. As Rothbard notes, there is nothing 
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preventing persons from "propagandizing" until their hearts are content 
concerning the "evils" of these activities. However, if one recognizes the free 
will and self-ownership of individuals, he cannot allow acts of force to make 
these decisions for persons. 
Are these acts always devoid of criminal spillover, though? For 
example, what about the complaint that the viewing of pornography leads 
persons to commit criminal acts? Rothbard is generally silent on this 
question, although from a libertarian perspective, this criticism itself is highly 
problematical. First, the proposition that there is a direct causal linkage 
between the two activities is empirically far from convincing. But, secondly, 
and more importantly for the libertarian, this sort of argument denies the 
natural human control of will. Are we, for instance, prepared to make 
criminals out of magazines, card tables, or rolled containers of tobacco? In 
other words, there can be no crime until a criminal act has been committed; 
at best, only in the most drastic cases, where spillover effects are clearly going 
to invade other persons rights, would preemption be justified. (Of course, 
would this response even be considered "preemptive" in nature at that 
point?) 
Abortion, Birth Control, and Childrens' Rights 
Perhaps the most controversial area of public policy within the 
libertarian movement concerns the issue of fetal rights. Rothbard argues for 
an extreme "pro-choice" position, concluding that the decision of whether or 
not to have a baby belongs solely to the woman. Therefore, the State has no 
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legitimate right to intervene either to deny or to require any forms of birth 
controL 
Abortion is the most thorny of these issues, obviously. Rothbard 
contends that the question of when human life begins is "irrelevant" in 
regard to the question of legality. 
If we are to treat the fetus as having the same rights 
as humans, then let us ask: What human has the 
right to remain, unbidden, as an unwanted parasite 
within some other human being's body? This is the 
nub of the issue: the absolute right of every person, 
and hence every woman, to the ownership of her 
own body. What the mother is doing in an abortion 
is causing an unwanted entity within her body to be 
ejected from it: If the fetus dies, this does not rebut 
the point that no being has a right to live, 
unbidden, as a parasite within or upon some 
person's body (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 108}. 
Ignoring for the moment Rothbard's rather shocking terminology, is not the 
mother responsible for the fetus, since she is in part the "cause" of his (its} 
existence? Since she is an absolute owner of herself, he reasons that the 
woman is free to change her mind and abort the fetus at any time during her 
pregnancy (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 108). And since the fetus represents a "parasitic 
invader", abortion ought not to be viewed as murder, but as "the expulsion of 
an unwanted invader from the mother's body" (Rothbard, 1982, p. 98) . There 
is no implicit "contract" in the act of conception between fetus and mother. 
As noted in the last chapter, promises do not represent enforceable contracts. 
The contract is enforceable only if there has been some implicit theft 
involved. Furthermore, all contracting parties must be "voluntarily and 
consciously contracting entit[ies] " (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 98}. To "enslave" the 
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woman and require her to keep the fetus violates Rothbard's theory of the 
inalienability of a human wilL 
For Rothbard, there is no "right to life" in natural fact. Even if one 
concedes that the fetus is a living human, it would have no natural right to 
obligate the mother to carry it. But to follow to completion Rothbard's own 
logic, would not one be required to abstain from the use of violence in the 
dismissal of the fetus from the body? Or, if it is an aggressive parasite, do the 
principles of self-defense allow one to abort? Would a violent abortion be 
proportional? These seem to be important questions. Although Rothbard 
dismisses the gigantic debate over the issue as to when life begins, this 
question is, nevertheless, quite important. 
Suppose, for instance, that a person driving down an interstate 
highway stops to pick up a hitchhiker. Upon entering the car, the hitchhiker 
asks if he may ride to the next town. The driver promises to carry out the 
request. Would the driver, halfway to the destination, be allowed to change 
his mind and demand that the hitchhiker remove himself from the car? 
From Rothbard's perspective there would presumedly be no invasion 
involved in the decision, since the promise is not enforceable contractually. 
What if the driver dumps the hitchhiker in a desolate desert where the 
chances of survival are nil? Rothbard would likely respond that, while this is 
morally undesirable, there is no violent invasion of the hitchhiker; thus, the 
act is legitimate. At the exact moment the driver demands that the hitchhiker 
depart, the latter becomes, one might say, a "parasite". 
Or, let us explore this scenario from another direction. Once the 
hitchhiker entered the car on the consent of the driver, what if the driver 
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locked the doors and proceeded to drive in an extremely wreckless manner, 
eventually hitting a telephone pole and severely injuring or killing the 
hitchhiker? May we still define the hitchhiker as a parasite, even though he 
is given no opportunity to leave on his own accord? Similarly, is the 
"defense" of the driver (killing or maiming) proportional to the "attack" of 
the passenger? Applying this same scenario to the abortion issue, how may 
one treat a woman's decision to abort or how does one handle the even 
thornier issue of miscarriage? 
These examples are raised not so much in order to answer these 
questions as to point to the critical components of the debate. To determine 
ethically the proper actions of driver and hitchhiker would seemingly require 
the judge to explore the original "contract" made when the two persons met. 
The judge also must be able to determine the "human-ness" of the 
hitchhiker. But perhaps there are important differences between the 
hitchhiker and a fetus.  For purposes of the abortion issue, the central 
question seems to be the nature of the conception as it relates to woman and 
fetus and to the nature of the fetus / child. But can a fetus formulate a contract 
in the absence of a third party acting with a "power of attorney" on its behalf 
(which would not seem to be allowable in the libertarian system)? At best, the 
fetus' rights require that it be taken from the mother's womb without any 
violence to the "baby". As a potential-human, it would seem that it requires 
at least this much respect; any ethical error should be to the benefit of the 
fetus. If it is biologically able to survive, then so be it. The driver may not be 
required to carry the hitchhiker to his destination without there being some 
conditions that would create implicit theft if the driver violently removed 
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the hitchhiker from the car. Of course, the newly conceived fetus has made 
no such prior arrangements. Nevertheless, the driver is not free to aggress 
against the hitchhiker except in cases of equally proportional self-defense. 
Moreover, having "consented" to bring the "passenger" aboard, both mother 
and driver must under porportional justice provide the adequate opportunity 
for the fetus and the hitchhiker to depart at the time they become parasites. 
The principle of proportionality creates dilemmas over the nature of 
miscarriages caused by abuse. While it allows the fetus to be treated as a 
parasite, would it allow the mother to act wrecklessly to the degree of 
willingly killing the fetus? Assuming they could survive, what rights, then, 
would the children have? Rothbard argues, that as the creator of the baby, the 
mother becomes the "owner" of the child . 
. . .. A new-born baby cannot be an existent self-owner 
in any sense. Therefore, either the mother or some 
other party or parties may be the baby's owner; but 
to assert that the third party can claim his 
'ownership' over the baby would give that person 
the right to seize the baby by force from its natural 
or 'homesteading' owner, its mother. The mother, 
then, is the natural and rightful owner of the baby, 
and any attempt to seize the baby by force is an 
invasion of her property right (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 
99). 
However, this principle leads Rothbard into highly murky waters . 
Obviously, he does not intend for the ownership of children to be permanent, 
nor in this special case do libertarian principles allow for the same absolute 
control of property. Therefore, the property rights of parents over children are 
limited "in time" and "in kind" (Rothbard, 1982a, p.  99). The parent is a 
"trustee", for as soon as the baby leaves the body of the mother, he "possesses 
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the right of self-ownership by virtue of being a separate entity and a potential 
adult" (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 99). 
Are these views consistent with the position Rothbard maintains on 
abortion? This inquiry explains why the concern as to when "life" begins 
remains critical, even in the libertarian model. The same negative freedoms 
which apply to new-born babies would seem to also pertain to fetuses, if they 
can be established as living human beings. At some point of the pregancy, 
survival outside the womb is surely probable. The remaining question is: 
Does abortion or abusive miscarriage constitute an act of murder? By 
employing Rothbard's own principle of proportionality, the "parasitic" 
actions of the baby would not constitute the ethical equivalancy of the 
woman's murderous act. In fact, until the woman desired to remove the 
fetus, would its actions even be considered parasitic, since they were carried 
out with the mother's (implicit) consent? 
Therefore, may a notion of negative rights based upon self-
ownership be used to prevent abortion? In a limited sense it may, in cases in 
which the fetus is formed to the point of being viable outside the womb. And 
in other circumstances, in no way may violent means be used to "kill" the 
fetus. However, before right-to-lifers leap with joy, it is important to note 
what this conclusion does not entail. On this point, Rothbard is on stronger 
grounds. While force may not be used against the baby, neither may the 
mother nor anyone else be required to take actions which have the 
ramifications of sustaining the child . 
. . .  [T]his means that a parent does not have the right 
to aggress against his children, but also that the 
parent should not have a legal obligation to feed, 
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clothe, or educate his children, s ince such 
obligations would entail positive acts coerced upon 
the parent and depriving the parent of his 
rights . . . .  The law, therefore, may not properly 
compel the parent to feed a child or to keep it 
alive . . .. (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 100). 
Is this a satisfactory principle? First, one might argue that the parents 
have an enforceable duty to feed their children, for example. As an 
undeveloped human the child is not a full self-owner and cannot be 
demanded to provide for himself. But, as Rothbard notes, in order to obligate 
one to meet the child's needs, one is required to illegitimately violate the 
rights of others by demanding an unfounded duty of them. Hence, parents 
may legitimately be liable for child abuse but not child neglect (Rothbard, 
1982a, p. 100; pp. 1 03-104) . 
Are there ethical principles which would allow one to set the parents 
aside as the persons responsible for these obligations to the new-born child? 
One might argue that the parents stand out because they are the "creators". It 
might be argued that the act of creation implies some type of contract. Of 
course, relying on his theory of contracts, Rothbard rejects this possibility. 
Yet, there seems to be some degree of arbitrariness in the Rothbardian 
definition of children. Nowhere does he adequately explain why parents 
have ownership of their offspring. Admittedly, if  homesteading principles 
are applied, it is quite logical to conclude that the child "belongs" to the 
parent (or, at least to the mother) .  But this argument hinges on the 
assumption that a child is "property", which Rothbard does not adequately 
defend. It is unclear how the failure to amount to a full human necessarily 
makes an entity property. Are there not grounds in the case of human 
children to perhaps create a third category that is neither human nor 
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property? Otherwise, one is left with the distinct possibility that children can 
be slaves--a position Rothbard rigorously denies for adults, even if the slavery 
is  freely chosen. And he consistently supports this idea of virtual 
enslavement, arguing that since children are property, they can be transferred 
from adult to adult like any other commodity. Hence, a "purely free society 
will have a flourishing free market in children" (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 102). 
Ironically, from an end-state framework of justice, this institution of 
child-trading is actually quite attractive. As Rothbard notes, this "market" 
already exists, although in the legal markets it possesses rather steep price 
controls approaching zero. It is called adoption. The consequence of 
removing these price controls would be to satisfy the dire shortages on this 
market by transferring children from less wanted situations to persons or 
families with higher demands for the children. In these exchanges, as in free 
exchange in general, all parties would be better off, he concludes. 
But Rothbard is not an ethical consequentialist. From an end-state 
perspective, one might well imagine an intricate system of human slavery 
beneficial to the slaves themselves. For him, however, such a system would 
fail since it attempts to alienate the inalienable will of individuals. Thus, a 
conclusion that results in an advocacy of "baby-selling" rests upon a rather 
arbitrary position that children are property, although no a priori reason 
exists to assume that this is the moral state of affairs. 
In denying the idea of animal rights, for example, Rothbard argues that 
humans have rights because they are 
. . .  grounded in the nature of man: the individual 
man's capacity for conscious choice, the necessity 
for him to use his mind and energy to adopt goals 
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and values, to find out about the world, to pursue 
his ends in order to survive and prosper, his 
capacity and need to communicate and interact with 
other human beings and to participate in the 
division of labor. In short, man is a social and 
rational animal. No other animals or beings possess 
this ability to reason, to make conscious choices, to 
transform their environment in order to prosper, to 
collaborate in society and the division of labor 
(Rothbard, 1982a, p. 155) . 
Would not children be as easily placed in this category as in the category of 
quasi-property? If capacity is the critical component, why must babies, for 
instance, be viewed as "future human adults" rather than simply humans 
(Rothbard, 1982a, p. 156)? If we assign babies to the category of property, why 
not also place humans who fail miserably to meet their capacities in this 
classification? 
This position of children as property places Rothbard in difficulty by 
forcing him to make exceptions to the principle of property rights. Numerous 
rights of the parent become murky in their role as trustee. One problem 
concerns at what point the trustee relationship is completed. Or, as one might 
state, when does property becomes "human"? Wishing to avoid having to 
choose an arbitrary age, Rothbard argues that the child has full rights "when 
he demonstrates that he has them in nature--in short, when he leaves or 
'runs away' from home" (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 102). Therefore, just as parents 
are free to ignore or sell their children, the children for their part are free to 
go seeking better accomodations without the parents having any recourse 
(beyond persuasion) to require the child to return. 
Does not this create further difficulties with the property argument? 
For instance, a farmer's cow might wander off to another farmer's herd of 
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cattle. No matter how long the cow remains "lost" (assuming the new farmer 
does not "mix" labor and positively transform the cow), it still rightfully 
belongs to the original farmer. To argue that cattle and children are not the 
same moral entities is to simply prove the point being made: Cows may be 
traded whereas children may not be exchanged. 
Nevertheless, in other circumstances, Rothbard recognizes rights of 
children. For instance, in consistent libertarian logic, he opposes educational 
truancy laws, child-labor laws, "incorrigibility" and "waywardness"  statutes, 
indeterminate juvenile criminal sentencing, and the absence of basic due 
process in juvenile proceedings. But the proper defense of these existing 
policy failures only increases the tensions in Rothbard's discussion of parent­
child relations and the issues of birth control. On this issue, many questions 
remain. It would seem that in the cases where the fetus is viable, the right of 
the mother to "abort" the child goes only so far as the release of the baby from 
the body. At that point, the child may be "homesteaded", i.e., adopted. For 
this reason, the rhetoric of absolute "pro-choice" often heard in libertarian 
circles seems to be an inconsistent application of ethical principles. One's 
choice extends only as far as another individual's rights. The satisfaction of 
this principle depends upon the meaning of the concept " individual"; it is 
unclear how Rothbard or libertarian theory can provide this definition with 
the mere postulation of a non-agression axiom. 
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Education 
In order to create a Stateless society, a primary function which must be 
adequately provided in a market sector is the education of the community. 
One of the sacred cows of modern statism is "public education", with all the 
advantages and disadvantages which flow from it. In Rothbardian society, 
there obviously are no public schools nor is there compulsory education. One 
of his criticisms of public schooling in America is that it forces children "into 
spending a large portion of the most impressionable years of their lives in 
public institutions" (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 1 19; also, 1 974b, pp. 1 1 -32) . 
Increasingly, a comparsion of public education and public incarceration seems 
appropriate, particularly in urban arenas. 
Part of the reason for the continuation of this farce, Rothbard argues, is 
the "misplaced altruism" of the middle classes (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 120) . 
These groups commonly seek to act in the "best interests" of other groups, 
usually lower and working classes. He contends that this misguided effort is 
the result of a confusion of formal education and education in general 
(Rothbard, 1978b, p. 120). There is no reason why certain basic skills, for 
example, must necessarily be learned in the strict confinements of a public 
school. This process constricts the uniqueness of each child. Moreover, many 
skills deemed critical by the educational establishment are not as important as 
is often contended by these groups, particularly when considered in light of 
the child's lost creativity and productive capabilities which results from the 
crippling intrusion by the State. 
Ultimately, however, it is the conscious desire to conform young 
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persons and not misguided altruism that directs public education, according 
to Rothbard . 
. . .  [F]rom the beginning of American history, the 
desire to mould, instruct, and render obedient the 
mass of the population was the major impetus 
behind the drive toward public schooling. In 
colonial days, public schooling was used as a device 
to supress religious dissent, as well as to imbue 
unruly servants with the virtues of obedience to the 
State .. . .  
One of the most common uses of 
compulsory public schooling has been to oppress 
and cripple national ethnic and l inguistic 
minorities or colonized peoples-to force them to 
abandon their own language and culture on behalf 
of the language and culture of the ruling 
groups . . . .  and to mould them . .  .into 'one people' . . . .  
(Rothbard, 1978b, pp. 123-125). 
He argues that the debilitating conformity of public education places shackles 
upon the individual. This position is completely consistent with his natural 
law perspective of human as creator and unique individual. To avoid the 
charge of unequal treatment, any education bureaucrat, he surmises, must 
treat all persons in the same way (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 1 27). Sheltered from the 
efficiency demands of a free society, the bureaucrat is likely to take the 
uniformed path. Unfortunately for the government planner, each student 
does not require the same educational methods. This tension between the 
uniqueness of children and the uniformity of centralized bureaucracy 
increases as the public sector usurps larger shares of the education market. 
Uniformity heightens conflict as fewer people are satisfied with the product 
provided. If education were left to the free market, Rothbard concludes, 
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differences in educational techiniques and substance would emerge to the 
level of diversity demanded from the consumers of the educational product. 
These arguments are applicable to many arenas beyond public 
education. Our present society is arguably a haven for public conflict. It could 
be forcefully argued that this conflict is in large part due to the increased 
"politicization" of our society in this century. In this environment, 
government decisionmaking tends to uniform the kinds of activities 
available in any given arena of human action. If the solution to a demand is 
limited to a single alternative which is determined by the State, persons with 
diverse interests and perspectives are required to struggle in an arena of 
political coercion to achieve their individual demands at the expense of all 
other parties. This struggle of different interests will not likely overcome a 
government's natural tendency to produce uniform processes and policies. 
Therefore, it is likely that most if not all parties will be dissatisfied with the 
political outcomes. This inability to fulfill particular individual needs is 
especially probable in a political process that is highly equalitarian, 
democratic, and participatory. And each new conflict and "resolution" only 
brings forth the next level of heightened conflict. I 
Thus, publicly controlled schools are not desirable because of the 
consequences they create for the persons (children and adults) subjected to 
them. But as one might have guessed, for Rothbard there is a more 
1 .  The currently popular and relatively successful reform efforts to 
increase "choice" in public education seems to demonstrate this point. Even 
the normally "liberal" Brookings Institution has arisen in support of the 
notion of vouchers. See Moe and Chubb (1990). 
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condemning reason for the removal of the public school system, namely, that 
the provision of taxes to fund a system is an ethical violation of the absolute 
right to one's property. Obviously, people without children who are 
"benefitting" from the service are heavily burdened. 
In Rothbard's view, children do not have a "right" to an education. As 
with a living wage, there is no way in natural fact that such a guarantee may 
be promised. In addition, the "middle-ground" stance often supported by 
laissez-faire libertarians which provides for the public funding of education 
without the public control of it is similarly rejected. For example, he rejects 
Milton Friedman's well-known voucher plan (Friedman, 1962, pp. 85-107; 
Rothbard, 1976i, pp. 1 02-107) . Whereas he agrees it would be a "great 
improvement over the present system in permitting a wider range of 
parental choice and enabling the abolition of the public school system," 
vouchers still represent the "immorality of coerced subsidy" (Rothbard, 1978b, 
p .  135). Moreover, one may anticipate that with the provision of any subsidy 
will come eventually (re)control of the service. 
There are, however, other problems connected to the public financing 
of education. Compulsory attendance and a subsidized product promote an 
excessive demand for the particular service. These legal and economic 
realities serve to create additional social problems by filling the classsrooms at 
all levels with students who would be better served doing something other 
than interfering with persons who demand the product at its real costs. The 
"mania for mass schooling," Rothbard concludes, has "led to a mass of 
discontented and imprisoned children" (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 136) . These 
subsidies are even more oppressive for higher education, s ince the 
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overwhelming number of persons benefitting from them come from higher 
income families . Due to the huge financial advantages enjoyed by state­
supported schools, privately funded institutions face incredibly tough odds in 
competing with the subsidized schools, especially if these schools are not 
historically well-situated. 
But does publicly provided education not produce positive 
externalities that would otherwise go unprovided in the absence of State 
intervention? As with other similar government services, Rothbard rejects 
this argument--for the same reasons. First, costs are subjective; therefore, 
social costs or benefits cannot be measured. Secondly, even if these benefits 
could be measured, there is no way to prove they are all positive externalities, 
especially in the present public education system (Rothbard, 1976i, pp. 105-
106) . The product generated by many public schools, for example, leaves 
much to be desired. Furthermore, there are no means to measure whether 
private alternatives might not provide even more positive spillovers. This 
argument in support of public education is too limiting in the way in which 
it defines education. After all, might not these positive externalities occur in 
every activity of a human's "education"? 
Rothbard's approach to the policy of education may be summarized 
rather succinctly: 
. . .  Get the government out of the educational 
process.  The government has attempted to 
indoctrinate and mould the nation's youth through 
the public school system, and to mould the future 
leaders through State operation and control of 
higher education. Abolition of compulsory 
attendance laws would end the schools '  role as 
prison custodians of the nation's youth, and would 
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free all those better off outside the schools for 
independence and for productive work. The 
abolition of the public schools would end the 
crippling property tax burden and provide a vast 
range of education to satisfy all the freely exercised 
needs and demands of our diverse and varied 
population . . . .  The miasma of government, of 
moulding the youth of America in the direction 
desired by the State, would be replaced by freely 
chosen and voluntary actions . . . .  (Rothbard, 1978b, 
pp. 140-141) .  
So far as the effects of educational subsidy are concerned, Rothbard is  right on 
target. For instance, in the past fifty years State-subsidized universities have 
achieved an undue competitive advantage in the world of tax-supported 
education. As a result the comparative enrollments of State-funded and 
privately funded schools have changed dramatically (Friedman and 
Friedman, 1984, pp. 142-147). 
Politics is in many ways the art of ordered aggression, and these 
subsidies are classic examples of this physical invasion of one set of economic 
winners at the expense of another set of economic losers. By overestimating 
the demand for formal education at all subsidized levels, the signals sent 
through the market are highly distorted. From a purely consequentialist 
standpoint, there are serious doubts concerning the usefulness of the entire 
myriad of public education. 2 
Is Rothbard's ethical grounding of the purely private provision of 
education also justified? Yes, since the rights of self-ownership supersede any 
end-state concerns in his system of ethics. Nevertheless, one might argue that 
2. Furthermore, the provision of education does not approach what 
might be viewed as a public good. For example, see Goldin (1988, pp. 77-78). 
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in certain cases persons may find themselves in situations where they are 
unable to implement any decisions. For example, would it be just to hold a 
six year old ghetto youth accountable for his condition? His advancement, 
without some form of assistance is, to say the least, problematical. Rothbard 
might respond by arguing that although this situation is an unfortunate state 
of affairs, there is no way to demand assistance legitimately in order to aid 
this child, since such aid can only come through the coercive expropriation of 
another's property. While it may be highly laudable for one to voluntarily 
intervene on the behalf of the child, there is no obligation to do so. To argue 
otherwise is to create an opening for a state of parasitism and violence. Is not 
what is true in the assisting of this child in this scenario also not as equally 
valid for many other persons in many other circumstances? If one grants an 
exception in this circumstance, he opens the floodgates to unbridled 
violations of individual rights, unless he can somehow distinguish this 
particular situation from all the other states of affairs. 
On its .face there seems to be no reason to make such a distinction with 
regard to education. First, there is no way to draw any boundaries around the 
meaning of education. One of the unfortunate consequences of the 
contemporary educational mentality is its equation of education with only 
formal education i.e., in a classroom with an instructor, which is a definite 
fallacy. Yet, something is still troubling. Education might best be defined as 
acts of learning and creation that confronts natural man. Furthermore, one 
could perhaps argue that the ability to compete in the free society rests upon 
the ability to attain the tools for that competition. If the fulfillment of human 
nature is the ultimate good, then it might be argued that the ethical priority 
188 
of negative freedom is less important than the ability to enjoy that freedom. 
Rothbard argues essentially that the satisfaction of human nature and the 
framework of negative rights are synonomous. But are they in circumstances 
such as our ghetto youth example? 
But this argument leads one directly into the fallacies of positive 
freedom. And, as a consequence, one commits the natural fallacy of 
supporting an egalitarian foundation of ethics. In nature, no one has these 
"rights"; in civilized society, these positive rights may only be gained at the 
expense of true natural rights. We are, thus, forced back to Rothbard's 
position. But we are trapped in the dilemma of this perspective's total 
impracticality. Moreover, it recognizes the harshness of natural facts, and 
persons in political society are likely to refuse to accept such realism. Perhaps 
a compromise position supporting forms of guaranteed loans or partial 
vouchers might satisfy most parties, as it is able to recognize the ethical and 
practical concerns of Rothbard's critique while simultaneously acceeding to 
the present realities of the policy debate. But Rothbard is completely correct 
on at least one point: We cannot tolerate the continuation of the educational 
status quo. In the very important arena of education, there is too much at 
stake to allow the government such dominant control. 
The State and Involuntary Servitude 
As Rothbard points out in his discussion of education, libertarian 
ethics prevents the existence of compulsory school attendance laws. Yet, 
there are many other far more insidious and life-threatening matters in 
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which the State imposes its control over one's body. As we demonstrated in 
the preceding chapter, for Rothbard, any form of slavery violates the 
inalienability of the human wilL 
Probably the most blatant example of this control in the modern world 
is the military draft. While actual conscription is presently in hiatus, 
registration remains and this would be a rather ridiculous policy if it were not 
for the likelihood that this process will be transformed again into an actual 
draft situation at the sign of the first major "crisis". Therefore, the difference 
between a forced registration and actual conscription is one of degree only. 
But how can a society defend itself against external aggression without 
some mechanism to provide this defense? The first mistake made in this type 
of inquiry concerns the usuage of the term "society". For Rothbard, this term 
is a "mythical abstraction" that certain individuals (those usually not doing 
the fighting and dying!) utilize "to cloak the naked use of coercion to promote 
the interests of specific individuals" (Rothbard, 1978b, p.  80). 
How does one provide for defense if coercion is not utilized? First, 
Rothbard argues, nothing prevents one in a libertarian society from 
defending himself individually when invaded. Of course, all of us do not 
have a comparative advantage at defense. Therefore, part of the community 
is likely to contract with the others to provide their "expertise".  Why, he asks, 
must these persons be conscripted? 
. . . .  No one is conscripted on the free market, yet on 
that market people obtain, through voluntary 
purchase and sale, every conceivable manner of 
goods and services, even the most necessary 
ones . . . .  Why can't they hire defenders as well? . . . .  
(Rothbard, 1978b, p .  80). 
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Indeed, the military never seems to have a shortage of officers, or even non­
conscripted clerical workers. But enlisted men face under a draft situation 
what is tantamount to an intrusive tax. Unwilling to pay the market rates for 
these defenders, the political system imposes the burden on a small minority 
of persons, namely, those citizens drafted and those others linked to those 
suffering the direct effects of the involuntary servitude.3 
This notion is consistent with Rothbard's theory of contracts, to the 
effect that individuals are free to employ themselves with defense 
organizations based on free exchange (ignoring, for the moment, the 
possibility that the organization is a criminal actor, in which case, the contract 
is between criminals and has no moral sanction) but they may not be required 
to carry out the length of the enlistment contract if they wish to quit. 
If we accept the human rights premises of Rothbard, there appears to be 
no grounds to challenge these conclusions. Unfortunately, this vestige of the 
past remains, despite the existence of the thirteenth amendment of the 
Constitution. Instead, in fact, there appears to be increasing support for yet 
another form of involuntary servitude, national service for (of course) young 
persons, the least powerful force in our political process. Whereas libertarian 
theory is clearly defined concerning conscription, there is a more complex 
issue of involuntary servitude, namely, forced institutionalization or 
hospitalization of mental patients. Once aimed historically at maintaining 
public order (by removing these persons from society) present compulsory 
3. Rothbard (1978b, pp. 82-83) further decries the potential violence of 
maintaining a standing army. 
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commitment is rhetorically at least more humane or, at least, more 
paternalistic.4 The logic behind commitment, according to Rothbard, is 
flawed. The central argument is generally to the effect that a person who is to 
be commited is "dangerous to self or others". But to be dangerous to one's self 
is not an issue that pertains to the State, since a person has absolute control of 
his own will and subsequently his own life. No one, therefore, has a right to 
interfere with another individual's right to chose his own course of action. 
(Criminal suicide is to the libertarian an ethical oxymoron, for example.) 
Of course, if one interferes forceably with another individual, recourse 
is required. The flaw in the logic behind institutionalization is the confusion 
of potential violence and actual violence. To act on the possibility of potential 
violence is to allow "an open sesame for unlimited tyranny" (Rothbard, 
1978b, p. 91) .  Under this principle, anyone might well be locked away, 
incarcerated until the experts deemed him safe for the rest of us! On the other 
hand, the spurious claims of insanity pleas in crimes ought not be allowed. 
Such a concept distinguishes the crime from the criminal. Conversely, it 
ironically creates for the criminal the danger of an indeterminate sentence 
devoid of any relationship to the actual crime. 
In the case of involuntary commitment, are Rothbard's principles 
consistent with the entire corpus of his thought? It appears that they are. 
However, one potential problem exists, which relates to his discussion of 
children's rights. Are there not obvious cases where an adult has no capacity 
4. For an excellent review of this radical libertarian position, see Szasz 
(1989, pp. 19-26). 
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to act sensibly? And if this is true, how would this circumstance be different 
from that of a baby or a small child? If we apply Rothbard's principle of 
"trustee-ownership" to this particular relationship, would it not be legitimate 
for the "owner" of this person to act on his behalf? If the person has never 
left his parents, it would be consistent to say they remain his trustees. But 
what of the more difficult situation in which a once well-functioning adult 
suffers a debilitating mental breakdown? In a sense these persons are no 
longer "humans", but they are, like children, still potential adults. It is easy to 
discuss the inhuman nature of mental commitment without dealing with 
the real ethical concerns in this scenario. Is this person now property, to be 
homesteaded? If he is, would not the logical historical owner be more than 
likely the relatives? And are they not free to commit the person, at least until 
that person demands to leave or runs away--as with the child leaving his 
parents? 
While Rothbard and other libertarian critics have been extremely 
astute in their critique of involuntary commitment, there remains a number 
of rather thorny ethical issues with regard to the notion of self-ownership 
and the rights of humans, as well as the rights of "less-than-humans" .  As 
with the abortion issue, these cases are found in the gray areas between 
humanity and property. 
Rights at Trial and the Judicial System 
A critical part of the anarcho-capitalist model is the judical system. It is 
through a court's legal structure that ethical principles find their identity in 
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the social world. Therefore, there must be within the judicial process the 
means to define the boundaries of property rights in society. And, of course, 
the courts themselves must also abide by the ethical principles of 
libertarianism. In other words, the legal system may not be viewed 
conveniently as some sort of super-judiciary outside the constraints imposed 
on the remainder of the society. 
This latter constraint imposes some extremely tough limitations on 
the actors involved in both the collection and utilization of evidence. Quite 
often, human property rights conflict with what are commonly viewed in 
contemporary society as legitimate enforcement powers of the State. For 
example, since within Rothbard's system all forced labor is tantamount to 
slavery, so then is the common practice of coerced testimony. In fact, the 
entire power of subpeona is illegitimate. No one, he argues, may be forced to 
attend a trial; since even the defendant is innocent to proven guilty, even he 
is not required to appear. 
The Rothbardian legal system would not have a "district attorney", 
since there exists no "State" interest. Furthermore, there would be no 
incarcaration of alleged criminals prior to their trials except in those cases in 
which "the criminal has been caught red-handed and where a certain 
presumption of guilt therefore exists" (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 88). (It is unclear 
how Rothbard can make this distinction from the general principles of 
natural fact, however. )  The common contemporary problem faced by so 
many suspects in funding bail would be eliminated, since incarcaration 
would be ended prior to the trial. Nor would society require compulsory jury 
duty. Rothbard concludes that the State (or the court) ought to be required to 
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pay market wages to attract an adequate number of jurors. Finally, no person 
would have an absolute right to an attorney, since the costs of this burden 
would have to be borne by other individuals. 
These ethical impediments would not only involve actual court 
procedures, but would also apply to the police's or security agency's collection 
of evidence . 
. . . .  [I]f everyone is supposed to be subject to the same 
criminal law, then exempting the authorities from 
the law gives them a legal license to commit 
continual aggression. The policeman who 
apprehends a criminal and arrests him, and the 
judicial and penal authorities who incarcerate him 
before trial and conviction--all should be subject to 
the universal law. In short, if they have commited 
an error and the defendant turns out to be innocent, 
then these authorities should be subjected to the 
same penalties as anyone else who kidnaps and 
incarcerates an innocent man (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 
81). 
The "authorities" would have little means to garner testimony from anyone 
except through the voluntary cooperation of the persons involved in the 
investigation. Since it is itself criminal to invade the property of another, 
there would be no legal means to conduct searches or wiretaps of another 
person's property regardless of warrants, unless one is willing to accept the 
risks of criminal trespass if the suspect turns out to be innocent or the 
intrusion by the investigator surpasses the requirement of proportionality in 
the punishment of a criminal. For Rothbard, the constraints upon law 
enforcement officials are rather confining . 
. . .  .It is proper to invade the property of a thief, for 
example, who has himself invaded to a far greater 
extent the property of others. Suppose the police 
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decide that John Jones is a jewel thief. They tap his 
wires, and use this evidence to convict Jones of the 
crime. We might say that this tapping is legitimate, 
and should go unpunished: provided, however, 
that if Jones should prove not to be a thief, the 
police and the judges who may have issued the 
court order for the tap are now to be adjudged 
criminals themselves and sent to jail for their 
crime of unjust wiretapping (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 
109) . 
Rothbard argues this principle has two "happy consequences": First, the 
officers of the court would act only in extremely certain situations where the 
evidence against the individual is overwhelming and, secondly, the 
investigators would be equally accountable for their own criminal actions 
(Rothbard, 1978b, p. 109). If police officers use undue force to gain confessions 
or information, they are liable for these actions, unless the suspect is, in fact, 
found guilty. If the suspects are found to have commited illegal activities, 
then "the police should be exonerated," unless the torture is greater than the 
crime (Rothbard, 1982a, pp. 81-82). These principles eliminate the issues 
which accompany the present debate over the Court's usuage of the 
"exclusionary rule", i .e., illegally seized evidence may not be presented 
against a suspect in a trial. Rothbard's position on this issue appears closer to 
the view of the Reagan administration and especially Ed Meese's arguments 
than to the common civil libertarian position. However, the intent of his 
views is quite different from the "law and order" mentality of Meese and 
others. Rothbard's position on rights of the criminally accused diverge 
immensely from the present interpretations of our legal system. Warrants 
would be allowed, but with a strict accountability placed upon the user and 
authorizer of these court orders. No one would be compelled to testify against 
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himself or anyone else; the ability to compel such testimony through the use 
of force would be relative to the crime of the testifier. Neither party in the 
investigation would have the power to compel witnesses to appear at a trial. 
If the party is guilty of no crime, then no testimony may be demanded. The 
issue of the right to a speedy trial is for the most part a moot point, since 
except in the most rare cases, the accused would not be retained. The right of 
counsel would be dependent on the willingness and abilities of the accused 
parties to afford such assistance. Jury trials would still exist, but compulsory 
jury duty would not be allowed. Apparently, the parties involved in the cases 
would be responsible for "purchasing" these agents. And, finally, no cruel or 
unusual punishment would occur, unless, of course, the crimes commited 
were "cruel and unusual." 
Rothbard argues that both police protection and a judicial system 
ought to be provided privately. Those critics who deny the possibility of 
private police protection operate from a critical misconception, he concludes . 
. . .  [T]here is a common fallacy . . .  that the government 
must supply 'police protection', as if police 
protection were a single, absolute entity, a fixed 
quantity of something which the government 
supplies to all . .  . .In actual fact, there are almost 
infinite degrees of all sorts of protection . . . .  
[And] the point is that the government has 
no rational way to make these allocations. The 
government only knows that it has a limited 
budget . . . .  with no indication at all as to whether the 
police department is serving the consumers in a 
way responsive to their desires or whether it is 
doing so efficiently. The situation would be 
different if  police services were supplied on a free, 
competitive market.. . .  On the free market, protection 
would be supplied in proportion and in whatever 
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way that the consumers wish to pay for i t  . . . .  
(Rothbard, 1978b, pp. 215-216). 
What may we anticipate in such a system? First, as with any private business, 
the police would face a scarcity of resources and would be unable to enforce 
all crimes. Therefore, they would rationally allocate resources and enforce 
"whatever the customers are willing to pay for" (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 216). In 
other words, those consumers with more to lose would contract through 
their "pocketbooks" for greater security in the areas most preferred by them. 
Secondly, those companies which satisfy their customers, not only for 
security but also for numerous other criteria (courtesy, for example), would be 
the most successful institutions and the businesses most likely to be imitated. 
As in the case of private education, a private security market provides a 
highly diversified product. Finally, the probability of protecting victims' 
rights and retrieving their property would be greatly enhanced since the 
consumer would be "king". The focus of criminal invesigations would be 
redirected from a vague notion of the "public interest" to the actual 
individual consumer who is faced with the real concerns of criminal 
aggression. In his anarcho-capitalist society, Rothbard anticipates that security 
would be provided by either the landowners or insurance companies. Persons 
would likely pay monthly premiums and contract protection from a specific 
company. Furthermore, nothing prevents agreements between agencies to 
handle special situations. Hence, one may expect a highly complex internal 
security network to evolve if it is given the freedom to develop through the 
trial and error processes of the market. 
One may raise at least four criticisms in opposition to a private interior 
police force. Rothbard responds to three of these concerns (Rothbard, 1978b, 
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pp. 218-222) . First, one might argue that police protection is a "natural 
monopoly", i.e., because of the unique nature of this good, no more than one 
provider of the good could survive in the long term. However, this 
argument is less a criticism against private police forces as it is an assumption 
that only one police force would survive. Furthermore, under a private 
system, there always remains the opportunity for new entry if the single 
producer fails to satisfy citizen demands. And, as technology evolves, it is 
becoming increasingly clear that in a number of areas such as security, the 
natural monopoly argument is becoming obsolete. 
A second criticism leveled against the provision of private police forces 
concerns the inability of the impoverished to be able to afford the services. If 
the services are not provided by government, would these individuals not 
have to fend for their own survival. Again, as Rothbard demonstrates, this 
criticism is not an argument against the feasibility of private-sector police. 
The concern over provision to the poor is relevant to any good or service. 
Under a market of private police, the poor would be furnished in the same 
ways they are (or are not) supplied for other goods, namely, through charity. 
Furthermore, because of the increased efficiency provided by the discipline of 
the market, the product is likely to be more affordable and in more diverse 
forms to meet differing income demands. 
A third complaint is the potential for "clashing protection agencies", 
i .e . ,  wars between different police forces. Given the current statist 
alternatives, Rothbard minimizes the dangers of these private wars. First, 
even if these kinds of actions did occur occasionally, society "would at least be 
spared the horror of inter-State wars, with their plethora of massive, 
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superdestructive, and now, nuclear, weapons" (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 220). If the 
world were privatized, conflict would be localized, meaning that destruction 
would likely be limited in scope and devastation, since great weapons would 
kill both sides . Mass destruction only arises because of the "slicing off of 
territorial areas into single, governmental monopolies" (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 
220). Secondly, nationalism, which is a critical component of modern war in 
the age of the nation-state, would also diminish. Finally, to fear the "anarchy" 
of a localized private police system is to ignore the very real and potentially 
more disconcerting "international anarchy" which exists presently between 
nations who for many reasons do not like each other (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 
221) .  
But these examples are worst case scenarios and, as Rothbard correctly 
notes, there is no a priori reason to assume these situations would occur any 
more than they do currently. Consumers pay the bills in a market system and 
they will likely demand forms of protection that are as non-intrusive as 
possible. It would be rational to solve the conflicts not by escalated violence, 
but by peaceful arbitration in the courts. Present differences between 
distinctive American states do not explode into open warfare. There are no 
preconceived reasons to assume that changes in the manner of police 
protection will fundamentally alter the levels of war or violence. 
A fourth criticism on which Rothbard is rather silent relates to the 
problems of positive spillover effects and, hence, the potential for large 
amounts of free-riding activity in the provision of internal defense. If the 
service is non-excludible, then it would seem to face the dangers of persons 
attempting to garner the benefits of the service without being required to pay 
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the costs of the product. If this activity occured, two negative circumstances 
would result. First, when persons discover that they are able to benefit the 
fullness of the pertinent protection without demonstrating these levels of 
demand by payment, they will withhold their resources. As all persons 
realize the benefits of such action, the level of protection would drop, 
perhaps, significantly. Secondly, since the company who is providing the 
service would not be able to impose these costs, the profitability of the 
enterprise would diminish substantially. Thus, the good would apparently be 
"underproduced".  To carry the argument to its logical conclusion, 
government must correct these misread demands through the use of 
coercion. 
However, is the use of force necessarily the only solution to perceived 
free-riding? Public goods theory unfortunately rests upon static temporal 
assumptions . For example, it assumes that after the parties involved in the 
series of exchanges recognize what appears to be efficient behavior through 
the withholding of their demands for police services, they would then retire 
from the process of making plans and achieving their specific ends. Hence, 
both free riders and non-free riders would cease action and stand content, 
even though a substantial set of their demands are unsatisfied. This 
assumption is extremely unrealistic. Would these individuals not observe 
the decline of the product they demand and, subsequently, note that other 
persons are following the same strategy they are attempting, to the detriment 
of both parties. It is a quite spurious assumption to completely ignore the 
potential for cooperation and exchange to alleviate these potential spillover 
effects. Since it is to the benefit of almost all the parties involved that police 
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protection exists, then we can expect it to be present. Or, over time, 
cooperation will overcome free riding. Of course, there will remain a few 
persons who are seeking to free ride or who are unable to afford or do not 
demand the service. And, these persons will overly benefit from the 
provision of the service. But there is absolutely no reason to assume that they 
will make up a substantial portion of the beneficiaries. 
Is Rothbard overly optimistic in assuming the entrance of profitable 
organizations into a free market for internal security? It seems fair to assume 
that if profits exist, entrepreneurs arise to exploit these opportunities . 
Therefore, we must not fall into the trap of defeating his argument with a 
"straw man" argument which rests upon the uncertainty, rather than the 
viability, of these contentions. The important question is whether the profits 
for private police firms would exist. Two potential problems stand out as the 
most serious concerns. The first, the potential existence of spillover and free 
riders, we have hopefully laid to rest. However, the second concern is quite 
different. Due to the "burdens" Rothbard's ethical theory requires of the 
police and courts, it is very possible that extreme disincentives exist for 
anyone considering entrance into these professions. For example, if police 
officers are held criminally liable for their actions, would there be many 
police officers, and at what price? The protection of the rights of the 
criminally accused is quite "costly". These principles might make successful 
police work much more difficult and eliminate a substantial portion of the 
savings in costs that the dynamics of a market order provides. It would also 
be much harder to provide the service. Of course, if we compared these costs 
to those the contemporary State would face if they were required to play by 
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ethically legitimate rules, then these differences in costs would likely 
evaporate. Also, Rothbard's ethics eliminates many of the extremely 
expensive traditional crime-fighting services. Since only real crimes and not 
mere vices would be the jurisdiction of the police, some of the more difficult 
problems would be eradicated. These "crimes" without victims, which for 
self-evident reasons are difficult to enforce, are the focus of a substantial 
portion of modern police budgets. 5 
An even more thorny concern in the privatization of internal defense 
is  the problem of arbitration in a Stateless society. As with the protection 
business, the "exchanges" which occur in the courts may leave at least one 
party in the action unsatisfied. Therefore, the imposition of the law upon 
individuals is unlike normal market exchanges of goods and services in that 
it necessarily must entail some degree of coercion. 
Of course, in many cases the parties involved may be willing to accept 
the verdict which emerges from the arbitration process. People are often able 
to work out their differences. In the present system, there is not an 
overwhelming effort to disregard the legal code. Obedience of the law is 
obviously not completely a function of force. Thus, the criticism that arises 
which expects high rates of refusal from individuals asked to accept private 
5. The perfect contemporary example is the United States' "War on 
Drugs". It is an exceedingly difficult task to fight "crime" when none of the 
parties involved in the activity view the act as criminal. Without the 
assistance of a "victim" the State begins its task with extreme handicaps, since 
it must capture persons who are providing their consumers with a valuable 
product. These costs are only increased when there exists the kind of demand 
that spurs the present narcotics market. 
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verdicts--within a community that presumedly accepts the decision--is 
unquestionably exaggerated. 
Nevertheless, in some cases, persons are going to deny their 
criminality even after the evidence leads to this verdict. In Rothbard's private 
system, how will courts alleviate this important problem? It may be useful to 
explain how these courts would operate privately. He concludes that they 
would function considerably more efficiently and morally than our present 
institutions. State-maintained courts, like all other government institutions, 
face the problems that are generated by the "taint" of politics and the 
inefficiencies that are chacteristic of any kind of monopoly. Rather than being 
financed by taxpayers, private courts would form agreements with private 
persons. One might, Rothbard surmises, subscribe to a permanent service; 
more likely, one would hire on a case-by-case basis. Or, courts and police 
agencies might operate through contracts or as one firm (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 
223) . The task of arbitration would be similar to the present modes of hiring 
legal defense. 
The use of private courts is not at all outlandish. In fact, it is an 
increasingly popular practice, brought on in part by the inefficiencies and 
unsatisfactory results of government courts. Rothbard's courts would operate 
in a similar fashion with the parties involved determining the rules by 
which the proceedings would operate. But these institutions would be 
devoid of the overarching arm of the federal and state governments that 
cloud present private arbitration. Instead, they would depend on what David 
Osterfeld terms "bilateral laws" which are "created on the spot by the 
individuals concerned" and, thus, are only binding upon the particular actors 
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(Osterfeld, 1 989, p. 55) . These activities would represent, then, a process 
similar to voluntary exchange and would encompass all the benefits that exist 
with this sort of flexibility. 
But is it not this "overarching arm" that ultimately determines the 
acceptance of these decisions? How would a private court enforce its decision 
if the losing party simply ignored it? Rothbard, turning to historical 
examples, argues that the most effective tool in enforcement is the power of 
ostracism and community boycott (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 224). But these tactics 
are likely only effective in cases where the "criminal" is a fixed member of 
the community who values his reputation in the region. Most criminals 
probably do not care about these matters. 
A portion of this problem is eliminated by the fact that all property and 
decisions would be private. Since the streets, roads, parks, etc. would also be 
privately owned, the incentive to prevent crime would be greatly increased. 
Public ownership of property creates a "tragedy of the commons" in the area 
of crime prevention just as it does in any other area. 
Still, crime will occur. How will the unwilling criminal be made 
willing? To understand how private courts might work, it is important to 
trace Rothbard's argument stage by stage (Rothbard, 1 978b, pp. 225-227). If a 
criminal act is commited against an individual, he would appeal to his 
protection agency who would, in turn, work to locate the criminal. Suppose 
they apprehend the person they have evidence commited the crime. Most 
likely, the case will be taken to the victim's judicial service, particularly if the 
alleged criminal is uncooperative. If both parties are members of this court, 
the problem of the arbitration's bindingness is largely eliminated. The alleged 
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criminal would be informed of the charge; he may appear at the trial if he 
desires. However, he, like all other persons involved in the case, cannot be 
forced to testify. If the defendant is found guilty, the court, through its 
marshals, would act to seize the criminal for sentencing and subsequent 
restitution. 
It is obviously more complicated if the alleged criminal is not a client 
of the same court. The victim would probably first plead his case to his court. 
If a verdict of guilty follows, the plaintiff may turn to his company and refuse 
to accept the verdict of the victim's court for what he argues are legitimate 
reasons. 
The problem arises if the two private court decisions conflict. 
However, rather than turn to open warfare, it is likely better for business that 
these courts have rules for such circumstances that allow appeals, or that they 
at least establish procedural agreements on a case-by-case basis. The 
subsequent decision would then be final and binding. Rothbard argues that 
since only two parties exist in a criminal dispute, the "sensible" number of 
appeals would be when a similar conclusion is found by two courts 
(Rothbard, 1978b, p. 227). There is apparently no reason in natural law why 
this principle must always be binding, however. 
A strength of this system may simultaneously be viewed as a 
weakness. Private arbitration avoids the dangers of the present monopoly 
structure. Persons in the process may freely choose between different forms of 
judicial decisionmaking. However, the system has no court of last resort like 
the present Supreme Court. This lack of central and final authority leaves 
open a wide range of legal processes and rules for any given community. But 
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there is no a priori reason why this diversity would be necessarily bad. 
Essentially, the only parties who have any standing in a given case are the 
criminal and the victim. The manner in which decisions are reached is not 
overly critical as long as ethical principles are satisfied. 
Rothbard, therefore, is correct to argue that a structure of law will exist 
even without the State apparatus. In his system there would be no legislative 
"will" and no statutory law. Law would arise and be defined as it has been for 
centuries through common law processes, but devoid of a legislature. 
But the most significant question in this discussion of private courts 
remains to be answered. Why are we to assume that private judges, who are 
bound ultimately by what the specific community will tolerate, will 
consistently render libertarian decisions? Or, apply this same inquiry to the 
thorny concern of enforcement of the "law". Suppose, for instance, that we 
return to Rothbard's discussion of the power of ostracism and boycott. In 
boycotting an "evil" merchant, the other merchants may surely achieve the 
results that Rothbard anticipates; lawbreakers will be kept honest by the forces 
of community influence in many cases. The power of these techniques are 
often underestimated in today's highly politicized society. However, why are 
we to suppose that the larger number of merchants are acting as the "good 
guys"? We surely may not assume that majority behavior equates to 
consistent libertarian principles in the present political system; the larger and 
more powerful majorities continually smash the libertarian rights of 
individuals.  Has Rothbard fallen prey to the utopian trap which has 
devastated the Marxist vision, namely, that under a changed environment, 
human nature transcends through some form of mystical metamorphosis 
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which overcomes present limitations. Why should we expect the state of 
anarchy to also be a libertarian system? Unfortunately, Rothbard's response to 
this concern is unclear. He argues that libertarian ethics would exist 
apparently because they represent the natural order of human society. He 
contends that a legal code must be one that is generally accepted by both the 
community and the courts (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 225). Due to this requirement, 
the code "would insist on the libertarian principle of no aggression against 
person or property, define property rights in accordance with libertarian 
principle, set up rules of evidence . . .  and set up a code of maximum 
punishment for any particular crime" (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 225). Furthermore, 
he contends: 
Of course, in the future libertarian society, the basic 
legal code would not rely on blind custom, much of 
which could well be antilibertarian. The code would 
have to be established on the basis of acknowledged 
libertarian principle, of nonaggression against the 
person or property of others; in short, on the basis 
of reason rather than on mere tradition, however 
sound its general outlines. Since we have a body of 
common law to draw on, however, the task of 
reason in correcting and amending the common 
law would be far easier than trying to construct a 
body of systematic legal principles de novo out of 
the thin air (Rothbard, 1978b, pp. 230-231) .  
I f  Rothbard is implying by these comments that to be ethical any system 
must establish these rules, then there is no theoretical dilemma. However, if 
he means that one may expect this ideal world as an historical reality, then 
the argument needs to be further defended. One may not simply assume into 
existence these principles. We must be convinced that given the State-less 
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environment, these principles would be the chosen legal code.6 Otherwise, 
we face the possibility of a society built upon a Hobbesian anarchist nightmare 
of brute force. 
Despite the unlikelihood that human society would ever approach 
Rothbard's state of ethical bliss, his model does provide a number of 
attractive advantages over the existing statist framework. First, certainly, the 
common law has distinct advantages over statutory law in providing the 
principles of individual justice. In fact, if one denies the idea of any sort of 
collective notions of justice, e.g., the public interest or social justice, there are 
no reasons for legislatures to exist. The decisions of these judges are limited 
in scope and, furthermore, focused upon the proper matters, namely, the 
persons who actually have legitimate standing in the case and the particular 
issues of that suit. Secondly, while it might in the short run create chaotic 
circumstances, the removal of monopoly status for both the provision of 
protection and arbitration provides the opportunity for both a more efficient 
and an enhanced ethical delivery of libertarian justice. 
National Defense 
A legal code's success depends in large part on the society's willingness 
6. This requirement is likely the most important difference between 
Rothbard's theory and David Friedman's utilitarian anarcho-capitalist model. 
See Friedman (1978, pp. 155-164); also see Sampson (1984, pp. 215-232). As an 
ethical skep!ic, Friedman avoids the overarching moral code in which 
Rothbard requires. Instead, he relies on the market process to determine a 
community rules. 
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to accept the rules. One of the reasons Rothbard's system of law without 
government may, in fact, be more than a utopian dream is due to the legal 
and sociological consensus that exists within any given community. But we 
live a very large world which appears quite often to be devoid of any 
common ground which would allow the forces of consensus to weave i ts 
magic. If other actors do not accept the legitimacy of the libertarian society, 
what prevents them from taking advantage of the rather fragile abilities of 
decentralized anarchist systems to defend themselves against non-libertarian 
orders? In other words, despite the potential superiority of the anarcho­
capitalist "game", can it survive if a portion of the players "cheat"? This 
question is most pertinent in regard to the dangers of external enemies and 
the requirement of an adequate defense mechanism. 
However, Rothbard is prepared to extend anarcho-capitalist principles 
to even the realm of national defense. First, he argues that the threat of 
armed invasion of our society rests in substantial part on the perceived threat 
that our own "defensive" actions create. In the anarchist society, the fear 
created by the concept of nation-states would be gone. With these critical 
"tension-makers" removed, aggressive actions would be squelched by 
coalitions of defense protection agencies who combine and defeat the 
remaining outlaws (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 238). 
Is this not an especially naive perspective? For example, suppose that 
tommorrow the United States government disbanded and left the former 
citizens to arrange their own defense and police protection. Would we 
support this action even if we were all anarchists ? If we severely 
decentralized our defenses, would we not open ourselves to armed attack 
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from other countries who maintain their centralized and coordinated 
armies? Could not the Soviets (for the sake of argument) use their 
comparative advantage of centralization, coordination, cooperation, and a 
different set of (unethical) rules to roll over each of the emerging private 
protection agencies in our newly-conceived territory? Rothbard, however, 
argues this hypothetical scenario leads to an unfair criticism . 
. . . .  When we contemplate any sort of new system, 
whatever it may be, we must first decide whether 
we want to see it brought about . . . .  [W]e must first 
assume that it has been established, and t h e n  
consider whether the system could work, whether 
it could remain in existence, and just how efficient 
such a system would be . . . .  [W]e have said nothing 
about how to get from the present system to the 
ideal; for these are two totally separate questions . . . .  If 
someone agrees that a world libertarian society, 
once established, is the best that he can 
conceive . . .  then let him become a libertarian . . .  and 
then [let him] join us further in the separate-and 
obviously difficult-task of figuring out how to bring 
this ideal about (Rothbard, 1978b, pp. 238-239). 
Unfortunately, it is not so easy to separate the proposition of the ideal 
from the accomplishment of that ideal; the two activities are inseparably 
intertwined. Even Rothbard recognizes that the larger the original group 
agreeing to end the State, the greater the likelihood one has of avoiding the 
domination by the remaining States (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 239). He fails, 
however, to realize that the dynamic processes which make size an issue also 
implies no one would likely ever "secede". A country that unilaterally 
disarms on the hope that a private sector for defense would emerge faces the 
very real possibility of being overrun by a more powerful enemy who chooses 
to remain statist. The world, unfortunately, would still retain many of the 
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characteristics of a government-sponsored jungle. All we would have done 
by ending our defense capabilities is handicap our abilities to play the current 
"game". 
Of course, one might argue that the metaphor of the jungle is itself 
mere perception, reinforced by the violence of an unjust system. Actually, 
almost everyone would love to live in libertarian peace, if they could be 
assured that everyone else would follow suit. But this assertion, right or 
wrong, ignores the most important issue. In the case of persons making 
decisions in our example, perception, one might say, is reality. And we must 
accept these realities in building a system of ethics. Because of the frictions 
generated between behaviors based upon interests and ethics, one faces all the 
components of a classic prisoner's dilemma in which, although all parties 
may view the present circumstances less desirable than the libertarian model, 
they will remain as they are. To act otherwise allows other players to coup 
substantial benefits by avoiding the ethical rules. Hence, human self-interest 
might well dominate ethical considerations. If the nature of the act of 
dismantling the State's military structure can generate such a complex set of 
decisions, then it is obvious that the questions of anarchist tactics and the 
proposition of the good society are not as separable as Rothbard wishes to 
argue. If the ideal is utopian and the effort to achieve it creates circumstances 
far inferior to the present system, why consider the route at all? 
Yet, for Rothbard, even unilateral reform does not create overly dire 
circumstances . 
. . .  .In the first place, the form and quantity of defense 
expenditures would be decided upon by the 
American consumers themselves . Those 
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Americans who favor Polaris submarines, and fear 
a Soviet threat, would subscribe toward the 
financing of such vessels . Those who prefer an 
ABM system would invest in such defensive 
missiles. Those who laugh at such a threat or those 
who are committed pacifists would not contribute 
to any 'national' defense service at all. Different 
defense theories would be applied in proportion to 
those who agree with, and support, the various 
theories being offered . . . .  
But let us assume the worst. Let us assume 
that the Soviet Union at last invades and conquers 
the territory of America . . . .  [T]he Soviet Union's 
difficulties will have only just begun. The main 
reason a conquering country can rule a defeated 
country is that the latter has an existing State 
apparatus to transmit and enforce the victor's 
orders onto a subject population .... 
Furthermore, the occupying Russian's lives 
would be made even more difficult by the 
inevitable eruption of guerrilla warfare by the 
American population . . .  [N]o occupying force can 
long keep down a native population determined to 
resist. . . .  And surely the anticipation of this sea of 
troubles, of the enormous costs and losses that 
would inevitably follow, would stop well in 
advance even a hypothetical Soviet government 
bent on military conquest (Rothbard, 1978b, pp. 239-
241). 
While these arguments may be partially valid, they unfortunately do not 
respond to our concerns. Once again, Rothbard ignores the possibility of 
substantial free riding activity. Despite Rothbard's argument to the contrary, 
there are many modern cases in which occupying forces, in fact, did control 
countries despite a citizenry which would have preferred alternatives. Look 
at the Czechs, for instance. We may not, then, simply assume the existence of 
what would appear to him to be rational activity on the part of resistors or, 
for that matter, the invaders, to be the norm. 
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Tibor Machan, representing a common minimalist criticism, directs a 
slightly different argument against private defense. He argues that the service 
implies some "type of geographical homogeniety" among the areas to be 
covered by the defense agency (Machan, 1975, p. 149) . How would police 
agencies, for example, move from area to area, since property rights are 
absolute? What guarantees exist that these companies would be able to 
effectively carry out their services? However, it is unclear why this complaint 
is a problem. This same concern might be applied to any delivery system, 
from milk delivery persons to defense agencies. What makes defense services 
different? 
The crucial difference concerns the extremely high costs of transition 
from the statist society to the anarchist world. The incredibly high levels of 
uncertainty impose especially high costs upon the transformation. There is 
no guarantee that these defense forces would arise in a private economy to 
adequate levels fast enough to prevent the incentive of other states to take 
advantages of the turmoils of transition. The prevention of free riding, as we 
noted in our discussion of police protection and courts, requires both 
adequate levels of time and a pre-existing degree of consensus. Without these 
variables there appears to be no reason to believe that persons would not free 
ride, seeking to benefit from the largely non-excludible good of defense from 
foreign invasion without facing the costs . Hence, those persons not 
purchasing defense protection would likely include more individuals than 
simply those who are pacifists or those who scoff at the risks of invasion. 
However, unlike the free riding with other goods, in which large portions of 
free riding dissipates once the actors are given time to reconsider the 
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consequences of their choices, the temporal factor in the military arena opens 
a window of opportunity for annihilation. Modem war technology makes the 
s takes of advancing into the unknown highly problematical, while 
generating increased pay-offs for exploiting those groups implementing these 
efforts. And the possibility of achieving an enforceable and universal 
transformation of the entire world simultaneously goes against astronomical 
odds. Private defense is not possible because it fails logically but because the 
world simply cannot reach this system from where we are today. 
Due to these problems, the tactics of reform are not simply strategic 
obstacles. This issue must be the foundation of the discussion of the private 
provision of defense. Libertarianism would be best served by locating means 
by which the coercion of government may be kept to a minimum within the 
defense arena. Rothbard's anarcho-capitalist system approaches its limits with 
the private provision of defense. He must surrender to the possibility of the 
existence of a "public good" or to at least the possibility that time and space 
factors deny his system the ability to overcome certain free riding 
propensities. 
War and Foreign Policy in the Less Than Anarchist World 
In the ideal Rothbardian world, of course, there would be no foreign 
"policy". But if we assume that governments exist, we may still be able to 
apply the ethical imperatives of libertarian justice upon the actions of the 
State. Unfortunately, due to his absolutist ethical monism, Rothbard's 
215 
discussions of foreign policy often become confusing and even ethically 
arbitrary. 
For Rothbard, the same negative rights framework of non­
intervention which applies to acts between individuals also holds true for the 
conduct between governments. Therefore, intervention is allowed only in 
cases of self-defense or restitution and may only be imposed upon those 
persons responsible for the transgression. This latter requirement makes the 
act of war in the modern world ethically problematical. 
War, then, even a just defensive war, is only 
proper when the exercise of violence is rigorously 
limited to the individual criminals themselves . . . .  
It has often been maintained . . .  that the 
development of the horrendous modern weapons 
of mass murder .. .is only a difference of degree 
rather than kind from the simpler weapons of an 
earlier age . . . . [A] particularly libertarian reply is that 
while the bow and arrow, and even the rifle, can be 
pinpointed, if the will be there, against actual 
criminals, that modern nuclear weapons cannot. 
Here is a crucial difference in kind. Nuclear 
weapons . . .  are ipso facto engines of indiscriminate 
mass destruction . . . .  We must, therefore, conclude 
that the use of nuclear or similar weapons, or the 
threat thereof, is a crime against humanity for 
which there can be no justification (Rothbard, 
1982a, pp. 190-191). 
The requirement that any military action must pinpoint the enemy is 
perfectly consistent with libertarian ethics. However, the discussion of 
nuclear weapons seems quite arbitrary, especially when it is related to 
Rothbard's position on gun control. Humans act; lifeless objects do not. 
Moreover, th
_
e right of self-defense is only meaningful if one provides the 
victim the instrumentation to successfully ward off the invader. He correctly 
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argues that bearing arms and using them are entirely different ethical acts. 
Yet, concerning nuclear weapons or other non-selective weapons, he 
concludes that their ."disarmament becomes a good to be pursued for its own 
sake," or the "highest political good" (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 191).  How Rothbard 
can square these two positions is unexplainable. He confuses in the most 
obvious ways the possession of potentially violent items with the actual use 
of them. It is unclear how a weapon's selectivity establishes distinct moral 
principles which are prevailing over human action. Such a principle denies 
the possibility that these weapons might be used for beneficial non-violent 
reasons. Before one dismisses this proposition as completely unfounded, it 
might be useful to consider the relatively peaceful state of affairs in the 
"nuclear age". If we may grant the deterrence argument any creedence, then it 
would be premature to reject a priori the existence of this weaponry. 
Rothbard contends that all State-sponsored wars are illegitimate 
aggressions since they entail violence against the property owners within 
their own territory (taxation) and usually involve the indiscriminate killing 
of persons in or from the enemy territory. The consequences of these acts of 
violence linger endlessly. Echoing the writings of Randolph Bourne, 
Rothbard concludes: 
. . .  [W]e must allude to the domestic tyranny that is 
the inevitable accompaniment of inter-State war, a 
tryanny that usually lingers long after the war is 
over . . .  .It is in war that the State really comes into its 
own: swelling in power, in number, in pride, in 
absolute dominion over the economy and the 
society. The root myth that enables the State to wax 
fat off war is the canard that war is a defense by the 
State of its subjects. The facts are precisely the 
opposite. In war . . .  the State frantically mobilizes the 
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people to fight for i t  against another State, under 
the pretext that it is fighting for them. Society 
becomes militarized and statized, it becomes a herd, 
seeking to kill its alleged enemies, rooting out and 
supressing all dissent from the official war effort, 
happily betraying truth for the supposed public 
interest.. .. (Rothbard, 1982a, pp. 195-196). 
Only in those occasions deemed "vertical violence" by Rothbard, when the 
citizenry carries out revolution against the State, may there be ethical 
justification for war. Unfortunately, the greater the success the State has at 
creating the "herd" mentality among its citizens, the less likely revolution 
opposing the government will occur. 
What, then, should libertarians do in the support or opposition of a 
government's foreign policy? According to Rothbard, one should, first of all, 
support the least aggression possible by limiting coercion to within his own 
borders. Essentially, this principle requires the "total avoidance of war" 
(Rothbard, 1982a, p. 193). Secondly, cases in defense of one's own citizen's 
person or property ought not to extend beyond existing territorial borders. 
Persons who move beyond their original "countries" must accept the new 
rules of that territority. Thirdly, in situations in which war presently exists, it 
would be the libertarian position to "reduce the scope of assault against 
innocent civilians as much as possible" or, to "induce the warring States to 
observe fully the rights of neutral citizens" (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 194). The 
military policy of any State would be especially limited. Similarly, foreign aid 
would be eliminated. Since the aid comes from the forced taxation of 
person's property, it also represents aggression, as do other forms of political 
or diplomatic involvement. 
This idea of "peaceful coexistence" would entail free trade and 
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exchange on one hand, and military and political "isolation" on the other 
hand. On the surface, it seems to be quite consistent with the overall domestic 
program of libertarianism. Yet, as Rothbard willingly admits, individual 
libertarian ethics lose much of their clarity in foreign policy because of the 
monumental level of the effects of military and political acts at the inter-State 
level (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 268) . A libertarian foreign policy would not entail 
the mere "turning of the cheek". Nevertheless, the State may not ethically 
expand beyond its borders in warlike fashion. The level of involuntary 
involvement of persons in these scenarios makes the application of any 
libertarian pr�nciples in relations between States extremely problematic. 
To provide an example of this dilemma, let us explore one of the 
fundamental tenets of libertarianism, namely, the support of free trade 
between nations. On the surface, it would appear completely consistent to 
argue that free trade is the only ethical route of economic activity. But 
consider this issue as it might be applied on the individual level. If a person 
stole from another individual to obtain the capital needed to produce his 
product for trade, would this theft not be viewed as a criminal activity? Ought 
not the resources be returned to the rightful owner, even at the expense of 
whomever made the mistake of purchasing the item from the thief? This 
conclusion is deeply embedded in libertarian ethics. Yet, how in principle 
would this scenario be different from cases where certain countries subsidize 
specific exports to increase their sales--at the expense of the country's 
taxpayers? 
Or, let us investigate a second example: Why would it necessarily be 
illegimate for the State to become more involved in citizens' problems in 
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other countries than within their own territorial boundaries? If one's rights 
have been violated, why should the arbitrary boundaries of nation-states 
dictate the responses of persons coming to the aid of these victims? 
Therefore, because of the ethical "taint" in which States and their 
political acts create, it would be quite feasible to argue that libertarianism 
offers very little guidance for most foreign and military policy issues. Most 
libertarians, including Rothbard, strongly promote both political and military 
non-intervention. Yet, it is unclear exactly how useful these theories are in 
providing general policy guidance, since there are no purely political nor 
perfectly economic actions in existence in contemporary political economy. 
There are obvious reasons to superficially argue that the non­
interventionist perspective is consistent with the whole fabric of libertarian 
ethics. Non-intervention in the protection of self-ownership might be in 
theory as con.sistently applied to collectivities of persons as it may be to single 
individuals. And Rothbard supports that conclusion, advocating the closing 
of foreign bases, the removal of foreign troops, the end of espionage activities, 
the shutting off of all foreign aid for all reasons, and consequently, the 
significant reduction of military capabilities (Rothbard, 1978b, pp. 291-294). 
However, there is an additional libertarian principle that would seem 
to be as pertinent in this situation, namely, the right of persons to defend 
themselves from real aggressors. The determination of the circumstances 
surrounding the rights of self-defense is purely historical, i.e., it emerges from 
past acts which violates one's rights. For example, what does the notion of 
principled isolationism imply for certain Middle East countries who have 
been aggressing against each other for literally centuries? Do we define an 
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military act by the Palestinians as an act of aggression or an act of self-defense? 
If it is self-defense, it would be perfectly legitimate under the libertarian code 
of ethics for the Palestinians to enter the territory of the Israelis and act 
aggressively. How, then, may libertarians in the topsy-turvy world of nation­
states and infinite historical aggression formulate any a priori principles in 
support of isolationism? 
Suppose Person A aggresses against Person B at Time-1 . B then returns 
to his own territory. To capture B, would not A be justified to transgress into 
B's territory? Or, in his search to catch or protect himself from B, would it not 
be perfectly legitimate for A to contract with C for the use of C's territory in 
exchange for whatever C values? Are these contracts on their face 
illegitimate, and if they are (for the reason that they are established by the 
State apparatuses), then is not the entire discussion of libertarian non­
intervention moot? Hence, one may not conclude, for example, that the 
participation of the United States in NATO, in the Phillipines, or elsewhere is 
illegitimate without an extremely careful case-by-case analysis. 
Rothbard may be correct in his stinging criticism of political and 
military intervention by the United States and other governments. However, 
this criticism is based on practical, not principled, argument? Libertarianism 
may no more justify total non-intervention in the area of foreign policy than 
it may in the realm of individual ethics. Persons have a right to self-defense. 
One may not discern before the fact what sort of actual arrangements will be 
7. Libertarian theory may begin with identical premises and reach 
alternative conclusions in foreign policy issues due to complex historical 
factors. See, for example, Cox (1990, pp. 15-19) and Richman (1990, pp. 32-37). 
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produced between States. One may only define and justify the manners in 
which forms of intervention may occur. 
Public Welfare for the Rich and the Poor 
It is rather simple to infer the role Rothbard surmises for what is 
commonly called "public assistance" or "welfare".8 Forced charity is 
illegitimate. Only voluntary charity may be allowed in his libertarian society. 
Since each person is absolute owner of himself and his property, he is free to 
provide his labor and goods to persons as he sees fit. 
Rather than repitiously proceeding through the ethical arguments, let 
us examine what Rothbard anticipates from a world without governmentally 
provided assistance. First, he does not expect massive suffering. As he 
indicates, there was very little public assistance in America prior to the fateful 
Great Depression; nevertheless, the world survived--and at a much lower 
standard of living (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 148) . Religious organizations and 
other private institutions filled what today would be viewed as a large void. 
And these groups satisfied these needs without generating the horrible 
disincentives .  found in the contemporary policy structure which often locks 
persons into a cycle of failure.9 Rothbard accepts the generally conservative 
8. For a critique of the Welfare State's "finest hour", i.e., the Great 
Society, see Rothbard (1973b, pp. 88-94). 
9. For an historical example of successful provision of private charity, 
see Rothbard (1978b, pp. 148-1 51 ) .  On the unfortunate dynamic that 
accompanies government aid, see particularly Murray (1984, pp. 205-218) . 
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critique that a major portion of the problem of poverty is due to 
"irresponsible present-mindedness" and argues that the solution requires the 
"inculcation of 'bourgeois' future-minded values" (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 154) . 
Yet, he also willingly endorses the popular left-wing criticism that public 
assistance "demoralizes" the recipients. Both of these arguments seem to fit 
neatly into Rothbard's conception of the individual creative human. Thus, 
publicly coerced welfare is injurious to taxpayer and tax consumer alike. 
But Rothbard's most damning criticism is that welfare does not even 
achieve what the rhetoric purports to accomplish, namely, the redistribution 
of wealth from rich to poor. In fact, many programs accomplish the exact 
opposite result, benefitting the rich at the expense of the poor and politically 
underrepresented (Rothbard, 1978b, pp. 157-162) . 
What, then, according to Rothbard, should government do to 
eliminate its involvement in welfare? First, eliminate (or at least "drastically 
reduce") taxation and allow the consequent expansion of the economy to 
truly assist the poor. Secondly, significantly reduce government programs, 
especially those which create regressive tax transfers. Instead, one ought to 
leave these resources with the private consumers who will allocate them 
much more efficiently and equitably. Thirdly, eliminate government 
"roadblocks from [the poor's] productive energies," such as minimum wage 
and licensing laws (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 165) . 
Would government "getting out of the way" in the area of public 
charity be the best solution? Perhaps the best responsive question is: For 
whom? It is obviously not the best answer for certain powerful corporate 
giants who since at least the Progressive Era have significantly benefitted 
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from their under-the-table alliances with the State. Neither is it beneficial for 
the corporate farmer who rakes in huge subsidies at the expense of the 
taxpayers, the consumers, and the small farmers forced to compete on a very 
unequal "playing field". Nor is it preferred by union leaders and members 
who benefit from the security of the effects of minimum wage laws and State­
enforced job protection. But these specific groups in no way represent "the 
poor". If they are benefitting from these "assistance" programs, is it not 
conceivable that, overall, the poor represent "taxpayers" in our political 
process and not "tax consumers"? And, if this is the case, would not the 
removal of these programs generally benefit the poor? Of course, when one 
examines the problem of poverty, the general improvement in the lot of the 
impoverished sectors likely will not be sufficient for the supporters of public 
assistance. Will there not still be a set of poor persons who will suffer--even 
die--without public aid? Must we tolerate the huge levels of usurpation of 
these programs by middle and upper class citizens to prevent the potential of 
dire consequences for a small number of extremely underpriviledged 
individuals? 
Both libertarians and welfare socialists provide less than satisfactory 
responses to these questions because both perspectives are required to heavily 
speculate as to the world that would exist devoid of government welfare. 
Nevertheless, Rothbard's arguments are quite convincing. First, he is very 
likely correct that without public assistance the standard of living in a given 
economy would be substantially higher. Accordingly, either fewer people will 
be poverty-stricken or the society will be able to maintain a larger number of 
persons. (This is an important and usually overlooked point: "The poor" will 
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always be with us. But this phenomenon is due to the fact that when the 
economy enjoys real growth, it generates an influx of new marginally 
survivable persons, either through immigration or heightened birth rates. It 
is, then, mere rhetoric to speak of the ending of all poverty, unless there are 
incredible and oppressive forces at work in the world.) 
Secondly, the ability of the private sector to coordinate the provision of 
charity is highly underrated. As Hayek has often argued in his criticisms of 
centrally planned socialist systems, expanding social complexity demands 
further division of both labor and information and, thus, an increasingly 
decentralized social system. Some critics argue that without coercion persons 
would not provide the resources required to fund the elimination of poverty. 
But this argument is mere speculation, since both the heavy burden of 
taxation and, more importantly, the creation of a morally irresponsible 
attitude among individuals would be removed from the formula of the 
debate if public assistance suddenly evaporated. It is just as likely that a 
complex network of charity would arise, tailored to meet more diverse needs 
and assist those persons that donators deem deserving. 
Thirdly, Rothbard is correct in pointing out the regressive nature of 
many of the present welfare programs. This argument ought to be even more 
cogent for egalitarians, who support progressive taxation and the 
redistibution of wealth. Of course, they might still support only reform rather 
than complete elimination of public aid. But does not the existence of these 
programs for the politically and economically weak depend upon the political 
support of the very powerful interests in society? Is it, then, possible to 
discuss a truly egalitarian-centered redistributive State? In any case, a large 
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portion of these resources never make their way to the lowest economic 
classes in the system. 
Finally, there remains for Rothbard, at least, the ethical illegitimacy of 
public assistance. These programs are a clear violation of one's rights of 
person and property. Moreover, they are a demoralizing process for both the 
"giver" and the "receiver" . The former is denied the satisfaction of a freely 
chosen moral choice. The latter is denied control of his own will, forced to 
subsist in an inhuman way off the dictates of an impersonal State. 
Environmental Policy in Anarchy 
Environmental policy represents one of the most hotly debated issues 
on the contemporary political agenda. The heavy involvement of the media 
and special interest groups, as well as several real environmental concerns, 
places conservation at the top of the public debate. Environmentalism is also 
an area in which libertarian scholarship may offer a great deal of assistance. 
Rothbard is extremely critical of the political establishment's overall 
treatment of the issue of economic growth and its ecological consequences. 
He contends that the American liberal intellegentsia has waffled to and fro on 
these controversies, passing through at least seven "stages" of contradictory 
and confusing changes of perspective in post-war America (Rothbard, 1978b, 
pp. 242-244). · First, there was the notion around the time of World War II that 
capitalism faced "secular stagnation" which required the institution of certain 
forms of central planning. In the 1950's, though, despite record expansion, 
liberals joined a "cult of economic growth" which demanded government 
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intervention or planning to "force-feed" the economy. Then enters the 
quintessential liberal J. K. Galbraith who argued that we have grown too 
much and, thus, were "suffering" from too much affluence. Again, the 
solution to this pressing problem was government intervention. 
Nevertheless, only four years later affluence gave way to the suddenly 
discovered vast poverty of Michael Harrington's America. The solution was, 
again, increased government intervention. However, the next great 
expansion generated the great fear that growth was becoming so rapid that all 
employment would be ultimately automated out of existence. Once the 
economic problems of the late 1960's occurred, this fear was quickly replaced 
by the return of a philosophy of "gloom and doom". By the mid 1970's, 
however, liberals had returned to a "super-Galbraithian position" as 
spaceship-earth sped out of control without the able leadership that could be 
provided through, again, government involvement. All of these rapid 
intellectual posturings ultimately left the establishment's position in a 
contradictory bundle of several positions drawn from particular stages in the 
evolution. For example, Rothbard concludes that these interpretations place 
us in a world of post-scarcity yet, for some reason, our resources are being 
rapidly depleted by the greed of the market system. 
This confusing journey through recent liberal intellectual history 
concerning the environment and the economy provides an excellent means 
to establish perhaps the two most important planks of Rothbard's discussion 
of environmental policy. First, the debate over the environment is soaked in 
unfounded rhetoric and cloaked with an anti-free market ideology. Secondly, 
it is the market with its thoroughly developed system of property rights, and 
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not socialism and central planning which best provides for conservation of 
the ecology and stable unintrusive economic growth. 
The common attacks on materialism and technology in modern 
environmental debates, Rothbard contends, are based largely on economic 
naivete. These market forces generate the contemporary standard of living; 
they provide those wishing to kill the goose that lays the golden egg with 
their subsistence.lO Therefore, the removal of these economic activities, he 
concludes, cannot be the solution to environmental problems. 
What we need is more economic growth, not less; 
more and better technology, and not the impossible 
and absurd attempt to scrap technology and return 
to the primitive tribe. Improved technology and 
greater capital investment will lead to higher living 
standards for all and provide greater material 
comforts, as well as the leisure to pursue and enjoy 
the 'spiritual' side of life. There is precious little 
culture or civilization available for people who 
must work long hours to eke out a subsistence 
living . . . .  What we need is for government to get out 
of the way, remove its incubus of taxation and 
expenditures from the economy, and allow 
productive and technical resources once again to 
devote themselves fully to increasing the well­
being of the mass of consumers . . . .  (Rothbard, 1978b, 
pp. 246-247). 
But are there not limits to this economic growth? Economic resources 
exist in a world of scarcity. If we place such emphasis on growth, will not 
these resources "run out" because of wreckless and indulgent use of them? A 
10. Of course, subsistence is a definite misnomer; it is unlikely the 
environmental movement will ever be heavily populated by the lower 
classes! 
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popular point of humor among modern libertarians concerns the practically 
infinite number of "doomsday" reports which reappear year after year which 
warn of the world's diminishing resources. Each period seems to have its 
own resource of concern. In the 1970's it was crude oil. Today a favorite is 
timber (although oil seems to be returning to these discussions) .  Each of these 
fears has at least one thing in common: They ignore the price mechanism in a 
market economy. Prices, by sending the signals of the existing supplies and 
demands for any given product, conserve the product and prevent rapid 
depletion if the market is allowed to function. 
For exc:tmple, let us assume that we own a tree farm. As owners of the 
trees and not some other resource, we may first conclude that we view the 
production of trees to be in our comparative advantage. Otherwise, we would 
sell the property or use it for other more profitable activities. However, the 
environmentalist might argue that this private tree industry allows the 
owner to deplete important natural resources purely for the sake of profits. 
But how do profits arise in a free economy except through the satisfaction of 
the consumers who, evidently, in this particular case do not value as much as 
the environmentalist the maintenance the present level of trees?l l  If these 
critics truly view the protection of our trees as crucial, they are free to "put 
1 1 . These actions would be preferable to spending large amounts of 
funds in rent-seeking and/ or rent-avoiding through the "lobby-regulate" 
network of politics. Environmentalists might be served investing in the 
purchase of "set-aside" conservatories rather than focusing so many resources 
upon government assistance. There is little doubt society would be better 
served. 
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their money where their mouths are", purchase the property from us, and 
conserve the lands as a tree sanctuary. 
Would we not go on a wild spree of cutting and selling the timber as 
private owners? Not unless there is an incredible demand for the resource 
and the prices for the product skyrocketed. If that occurred, one would 
literally see the "asphalt jungles" being returned to nature, since huge profits 
would follow from these transformations . More likely, though, we would 
consider present and future income requirements and withhold part of our 
resources, accordingly--as would other tree owners. Otherwise, the price of 
trees would plummet because of the sudden influx of the goods on the 
market. 
Suppose, on the other hand, we actually believe some of the doomsday 
reports and feel that there will be a substantial shortage of the resource. We 
would withhold our product until the future. The price would increase, as 
demand remained constant while supply diminished. We, in turn, would 
garner greater profits and, at the same time, we would provide a "social" good 
by withholding the timber until a period when it will be in greater demand. 
Finally, as the owners of the land where the trees grow, it would be 
rather irrational for us to cut the trees and flee the property. Instead, knowing 
that unless we die we will require subsistence in the future, it is quite likely 
that we would refurbish our resources by planting more trees. 
But certain items cannot be replaced--at least not at our current levels 
of technology. Still, for Rothbard, the same principles would apply equally for 
non-reusable products such as oil. Conservation is best protected through an 
undistorted price system which drives up prices in times of relative shortage 
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of the good and creates incentives for more thorough conservation of the 
good, a search for adequate less expensive (more plentiful) substitutes, and 
the discovery of new technologies to respond to these existing demands. 
Are there, however, in a market economy adequate incentives to 
prevent the long-term depletion of resources? In other words, why would we 
as owners desire to conserve resources across generations? Is there not instead 
incentives for each generation to deplete as many resources as possible before 
their deaths? This enticement for rapid consumption and short time 
horizons is potentially a serious concern. However, what often gets lost in the 
debate over resource depletion is whether any known alternatives to the 
market economy would be any more successful in alleviating this problem. 
As Rothbard argues, the public ownership of resources tends to guarantee that 
the resources will be exhausted (Rothbard, 1978b, pp. 250-251) .  Without 
private ownership, the property is left to the "tragedy of the commons". 
Collectization of property generates incentives for individuals to compete for 
a set of resources without regard to the long term consequences of their 
present usuage. One is required to consume the resource as quickly as possible 
or surrender it permanently to other actors facing the same constraints. Take 
for example the common "cut and run" practice which occurs with forests on 
government-leased public lands. Without any future connection to the 
property, the cutters are induced to strip the property of all valuable resources. 
Leasing strips away the constraints or expectations of future returns from the 
lands. 
There are no convincing arguments which would provide for the 
allocation and control of these resources which are more persuasive than 
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those in support of a market price system. Moreover, if resource allocation 
were left to the political process, it would be logical to presume that the 
corporatists would have substantial advantages in the competition over these 
rent-seeking activities. Of course, this conclusion is unacceptable to the 
environmentalists who are convinced that they understand these issues 
more clearly than the consumer. Again, nothing prevents these individuals-­
if, in fact, they truly are representative of a substantial portion of the 
population--from pooling their resources and purchasing the land to be set 
aside from any form of development. Furthermore, when a resource reaches 
a truly limited supply, it will be "conserved" by high prices. It is doubtful that 
environmental experts have a better grasp of the supply of a given resource 
than the billions of decisions that go into the composition of a given price. 
Solving the concerns of cross-generational depletion of resources, 
however, depends on extra-economic matters which, perhaps, neither private 
nor public ownership may guarantee, such as cultivating family structures 
which might lengthen human time horizons. If an argument might be made 
for either system of allocation's ability to generate these kinds of sociological 
needs, evidence would seem to be on the side of private enterprise in the 
fostering of the family. The dynamics of human self-interest dictate that 
under political constraints, individuals exhibit extremely short time 
horizons.  Present powerful political coalitions will not surrender the 
advantages they have gained from the obvious lack of political clout retained 
by future generations in the contemporary situation. This unwillingness to 
give up these "entitlements" is well demonstrated in the hapless struggle 
against government budget deficits. Therefore, the heightened scope of 
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government activity in environmental issues only increases the rent-seeking 
opportunities and acts to shorten human time horizons, which causes 
resources to be exploited in increasingly rapid ways.1 2 
On the other hand, public ownership of resources on some occasions 
acts to prevent development rather than overuse resources (Rothbard, 1978b, 
p .  252 ). As Rothbard points out, the classic example of this "problem" is the 
dormant state of the world's oceans. Instead of being subjected to the "cut and 
run" philosophies of government leasing, the sea suffers from the State's 
uniform application of rules in the opposite manner, as it is made almost 
completely "off-limits" .  Rather than establishing property rights for 
homesteaded ocean areas, which would provide a stable development of 
numerous aquacultural opportunities, these waters remain in their 
"primitive, unproductive hunting and gathering s tage" (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 
252) . Yet, modern technology provides exceptional opportunities to take 
advantage of these forms of property. Unfortunately, political knowledge 
oftens fails to keep abreast with technological advances. 
While the privatization of property solves many of what are 
considered today as serious environmental problems, there remains the 
potentially more difficult problem of negative externalities.l3 What would 
the libertarian system do to prevent the imposition of spillover costs upon 
1 2. For a similar and equally pessimistic Public Choice argument, see 
Barry (1986, pp. 194-195). For a discussion of the importance of time horizons 
in public policy, examine Smith (1988). 
13. For an excellent discussion of the problems of externalities, see 
Dahlmann (1988, pp. 209-234). 
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innocent third parties? The same solution applies to these costs in the 
environmental arena as in all other areas of policy, namely, the continual 
clarification of individual property rights. Rothbard, for instance, applies this 
principle to the most difficult forms of externalities, water and air pollution. 
By leaving the "ownership" of these resources in the hands of the 
government, he argues, individuals have incentives to impose spillover costs 
onto persons through these resources, e.g., dirty water. But if the rivers were 
owned privately, then persons would noticeably suffer the costs of these 
spillovers. If the resources are not owned, however, other private individuals 
and government controllers of other goods have an additional incentive to 
heighten pollution-causing activities. Public ownership, in other words, 
encourages water pollution! The technology of industries evolve around the 
notion that the industry is sanctioned by the State and is a legitimate polluter, 
since it does not have to consider these costs in the operation of its business. 
May we apply these same principles to the ownership of air, though? 
According to Rothbard, there are no reasons not to adequately define property 
rights with this good, also . 
. . . .  But in the case of air pollution we are dealing not 
so much with private property in the air as with 
protecting private property in one's lungs, fields, 
and orchards. The vital fact about air pollution is 
that the polluter sends unwanted and unbidden 
pollutants-from smoke to nuclear fallout to sulfer 
oxides-through the air and into the lungs of 
innocent victims, as well as onto their material 
property. All such emanations which injure person 
or property constitute aggression against the private 
property of the victims. Air pollution, after all, is as 
much aggression as committing arson against 
another's property or injuring him physically. Air 
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pollution that injures others is aggression pure and 
simple . . . .  (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 256). 
Pollution controls, then, would follow the same principles of liability 
which any other spillover problem would face. Though Rothbard rejects the 
ad coelum rule that property owners possess airspace indefinitely above 
them, he accepts the view that persons own "zones" dependent on the 
definitions of the owner's homesteading activities. Hence, ownership would 
be defined by historical understanding of the owner's level of use of the 
property (Rothbard, 1982b, pp. 84-91) .  If aggression occurs there would be 
liability. Of course, the plaintiff must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he 
has suffered actual harm, that the pollutants caused the harm, and that the 
other party was directly responsible for the production of the pollutants.14 
Injuries from environmental hazards would be handled just as any 
other impairments. Persons who believe they have been injured by, say, an 
industrial pollutant would be free to bring a suit against the alleged aggressor. 
If the court finds the industrialist guilty, then he is liable in proportion to the 
crime. This would not open the courts to infinite numbers of frivolous cases, 
since the burden of proof would still rest with the accuser, and the loser may 
be liable to pay the court costs. However, if, by clarifying property rights, these 
costs were no longer allowed to be passed on to third parties indiscriminately, 
the number of cases which exist under the present failed regulatory model 
14. Rothbard (1978b, pp. 74-76) rejects the often applied principle of 
"vicarious liability" which originated in medieval law and is occasionally 
applied to contemporary employer-employee relationships, so as to hold a 
third party employer liable for torts commited by an employee. 
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would diminish immensely. This point is particularly true if common law 
class action suits are allowed. 
These principles may be applied to any externality. There seems to be 
no reason to conclude that a court, operating on a case by case basis with the 
proper rules of property, would be unable to determine criminal activity. If 
public ownership exists this clarification is less than ideal, though. Rothbard's 
proposals concerning environmental issues appear to have the greatest 
potential for correcting current policy problems. By choosing a "middle­
ground" between a position which contends that economic growth 
supersedes all concerns of the environment or that environmental concerns 
are not real on the one hand and the misguided and exaggerated arguments 
of "no-growth" and ecological hysteria on the other hand, libertarianism 
offers a viable and ethically sound theory of environmentalism which seems 
best able to balance the concerns of the environmental debate. 
Yet, there are many remaining concerns that are not so easily solved by 
the Rothbardian property rights framework.15 One such problem which has 
received little attention in libertarian theory concerns the issue of humans' 
relationships to the animal kingdom. Rothbard is extremely brusque with 
animal rights. Unlike humans, he concludes, animals do not have the ability 
to reason and consequently do not have natural rights. Animals should have 
rights "whenever they petition for them;" that they obviously cannot file 
such a petition demonstrates to him that they do not possess rights 
15. For an excellent trilogy of articles on the concerns of libertarians 
regarding environmental and animal rights issues, see Hospers (1988, pp. 23-
31); (1989b, pp. 46-49); and (1990, pp. 26-36).  
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(Rothbard, 1982a, pp. 155-156) . Yet, this radically anthropocentric ethical 
perspective seems arbitrary. First, it is unclear how these conclusions so 
obviously follow from his political philosophy. As we argued in Chapter IV, a 
political theory may outline relations between rights-bearers; more discussion 
is required to determine who shall be these rights-bearers. Secondly, it is also 
unclear how a system founded on a teleological notion of natural rights may 
so abruptly dismiss the possibility of an evolving and expanding community 
of morally sanctioned entities. 
Furthermore, there exists several potentially huge problems at the 
international ecological level such as the "greenhouse effect" which, if real, 
pose a dilemma for Rothbard's individualist model. His responses to these 
issues--that animals have been going extinct since the beginning of time and 
that scientists cannot agree what ecological catastrophe is going to actually 
occur--are less than satisfactory arguments, to say the least (Rothbard, 1 989a, 
pp. 13-14) . Faith in the market process may at some point become a blinding 
force which obscures serious short run problems from the theorist which 
might make the long run obsolete. While market arrangements and property 
rights clarification may be able to solve these serious problems, one may not 
presume that these concerns will magically disappear or that they do not 
exist. 
Transportation in Anarcho-Capitalism 
If privatization of the oceans and rivers is achievable in Rothbard's 
anarcho-capitalist system, then surely private ownership of the highways and 
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thoroughfares is also possible. These businesses might range from a merchant 
association's ownership of the city streets around their shops to the corporate 
ownership of super-highways. There is a distinct possibility that police 
protection and street ownership might well be combined in urban areas. In 
some cases, street ownership might be a separate business in itself, similar to 
a corner grocery store. The street owners might charge the involved store 
owners and I or their customers for the benefits of the street. They would be 
required as any industry to maintain their product or face the loss of 
customers. 
Rothbard argues that the rules of the roads would be established by the 
owners. Would this privatization not create chaotic circumstances in which 
each new street (with different ownership) would have its own set of rules 
and, hence, make travel hectic or even impossible? Rothbard considers such a 
concern as "absurd" . 
. . . .  Obviously, it would be to the interest of all road 
owners to have uniform rules in these matters, so 
that road traffic could mesh smoothly and without 
difficulty. Any maverick road owner who insisted 
on a left-hand drive or green for 'stop' instead of 
'go' would soon find himself with numerous 
accidents, and the disappearance of customers and 
users . . . .  (Rothbard, 1978b, pp. 207-208). 
Therefore, the realities of the market would demand the consolidation and 
cooperation of the diverse owners of the properties. There is no reason to 
believe that these characteristics would be any more difficult to achieve than 
with any other market activity that requires a common set of rules and 
similar language. The notion that these rules would not exist comes from the 
limitations that arise currently from the non-existence of a developed set of 
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real world examples. When one examines numerous other products which 
are provided by the free market, he does not find the high degrees of chaos. 
For instance, there is an "order" in the manner shoes receive their sizes, 
despite the fact that no one actually planned this conformity across industries. 
And, there are particular examples of roads or comparable items which are 
privately maintained (ferries, for instance) that have relatively no significant 
problems. If one were to speculate what would occur if the world of 
transportation went private, it would be more likely that there would not be 
widespread chaos in regard to the nature and enforcement of traffic rules. 
A more challenging criticism of private roads concerns the potential 
inefficiencies of toll collection. It might be argued that the present ownership 
of the roads by the State relieves the users of the troublesome problem of the 
toll road. However, Rothbard argues, a toll would not likely be the means of 
collection except in a very limited number of cases. In the congestion of urban 
traffic, for instance, licenses or stickers may be required. Or, there is the 
possibility in the near future of the technology of electronic equipment which 
would not only register one's travel on specific streets and roads, but also 
could record the time of the road's usuage, allowing the owners to price­
discriminate to stabilize periods of congestion. In fact, perhaps the most 
promising aspect of highway privatization concerns a private owner's ability 
to distinguish rush hours from slow times in road usuage. Present means of 
financing highway use do not rationally allocate the use of roads. A gas tax is 
collected based on the number of miles one travels and his vehicle's fuel 
efficiency, with no knowledge of when the travel occurs. Roads become 
congested, then, because the costs of travel at peak times are held far below 
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true market rates. If road owners were allowed to price-discriminate based on 
the periods of highest congestion, then traffic would flow more smoothly and 
safely on probably less highway.1 6 One might witness an increase in 
commuter pools or even the change of the normal business workday if the 
true costs of the present structure were uncovered. 
There is one additional issue concerning privatized roads which 
Rothbard does not address. Under the present system the government enjoys 
the "benefit" of eminent domain, which allows the taking of property for 
"public" use. Of course, in Rothbard's system of ethics, this activity is 
immoral. Yet, how would private road-builders handle the single property 
owner who is unwilling to sell his land which rests in the center of a 
proposed highway construction? Suppose Person A decides to build this 
super highway across the country. He is able to purchase all the property 
except Farmer B's large farm which substantially blocks the building of the 
road. From a utilitarian perspective, eminent domain would likely be 
justified; one may not allow one person to defeat the demands of so many 
people. However, under Rothbard's ethics, one either meets the farmer's 
demand or, if that option is unavailable, he builds around the farm. Are not 
the consequences of this stalemate highly "inefficient"? 
The problem in this scenario is more than likely overrated. Such a 
highway would surely generate substantial increases in the value of the land 
the farmer retains. In fact, if one is concerned with the economic potential of 
16 .  A similar type of program might be applied to the airline industry. 
Through price-discrimination private airports could eliminate congestion 
and improve airline safety. See Rothbard (1987b, p. 1). 
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one's property, he would quite rationally beg the highway-builders to 
construct through the farm. One might even pay the road builder for the 
rights to be included in the route. But let us assume the farmer places a 
greater value on privacy. If he would not sell, the costs to go around him are 
minimal in most cases, especially if the purchase and planning of the 
highway properties precede any actual development. Finally, why would it be 
so detrimental for the whole project to fall through? Why would a trans­
continental highway necessarily be preferred to a network of shorter roads? 
One may easily imagine a system of private roads servicing parcels of 
landed property or businesses, providing each person with adequate 
easements to prevent property blockade. Part of the world would proceed as it 
always has, only minus the failures of a congested and rather dangerous 
public highway system. It is quite likely market accountability would be 
preferable to government control. The reform however, might drastically 
change the modes of transportation, since persons would be required to pay 
for the total cost of their "product".1 7 
17. See Rothbard (1978b, pp. 212-213). For example, if the "subsidies" 
were removed, one might even witness a revitalization of more "collective" 
forms of transportation, e.g., buses, trains, etc. Of course, these industries 
would also be required to surrender their current government assistance. 
There is one additional criticism which is occasionally brought against 
private highways. Initially, part of the rationale behind the interstate system 
concerned national defense matters. What would happen to defense 
capabilities without an integrated transportation system? Rothbard is 
apparently silent on this question, although based on similar issues, we may 
assume this lack of government networks would not be a serious concern. 
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Conclusion: Anarcho-Capitalisrn in Perspective 
Excluding the criticisms we have noted, Rothbard's anarcho-capitalist 
system represents a consistent, ethical, and even a potentially workable social 
model. Several important critiques do stand in the way of its ideal existence, 
though. First; Rothbard's presentation of private national defense is less than 
convincing. Security against groups of persons who do not share one's 
common language or culture is probably the only good which approaches the 
definition of a pure public good. Even it is not "pure", but the circumstances 
surrounding the provision of the good do not allow any community the 
luxury of developing the necessary private processes or institutions which 
would overcome the initial dilemma of non-excludibility. Thus, the 
provision of private defense faces a classic case of the prisoner's dilemma, in 
which no single group has the incentive to end State coercion and privatize 
defense unless all other "players" do the same. Since the potential for 
unanimous consent occurring approaches zero, it would probably be more 
fruitful for Rothbard and anarchist libertarians to focus on the limitations of 
government coercion within a limited State which provides national 
defense. 
Secondly, while one may be able to conceive of an actual anarcho­
capitalist system, Rothbard never is able to inescapably unite libertarian ethics 
and the Stateless society. There are no assurances that libertarian ethics would 
be retained in anarchy, although the legitimacy of the anarchist society 
requires their maintanence. Whereas there are reasons to believe that 
libertarian rights would have a better opportunity for survival in a common 
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law system which is devoid of the strong monopolistic forces of a State and 
the "social" components of the legislative process, there still remains the 
possibility of a reemergence of the State (in form and/or in name) through 
the denial of libertarian ethics by the more powerful forces in the 
community. 
Thirdly, Rothbard never addresses the transitional consequences 
imposed upon persons if the system actually transformed into anarcho­
capitalism. He would support an immediate transformation from existing 
statism if given the alternative. But these radical reforms generate results 
which are themselves a separate ethical concern. How does one sort out the 
incredible costs to individuals in the dismantling of State programs and 
processes and the consequent reformation of plans (Barry, 1986, pp. 189-190)? 
From Rothbard 's absolutist position this problem would surely be 
outweighed by the primacy of libertarian ethics. Nevertheless, it might be 
convincingly argued from an overtly conservative stance that these reforms 
would be too "expensive". 
Finally, there is a very practical concern which remains: The radical 
nature of Rothbard's libertarianism far removes his theories from the 
mainstream of both policy debate and philosophical discussions. As he 
recognizes, the overcoming of these differences in perspectives poses perhaps 
the greatest hurdle in the achievement of the libertarian society. 
People tend to fall into habits and into 
unquestioned ruts, especially in the field of 
government. On the market, in society in general, 
we expect and accomodfte rapidly to change, to the 
unending marvels and improvements of our 
civilizations . . . .  But in the area of government we 
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follow blindly in the path of centuries, content to 
believe that whatever has been must be right. In 
particular, government, in the United States and 
elsewhere, for centuries and seemingly from time 
immemorial has been supplying us with certain 
essential and necessary services, services which 
nearly everyone concedes are important . . . .  So 
identified has the State become in the public mind 
with the provision of these services that an attack 
on State financing appears to many people as an 
attack on the service itself.. .. (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 
194). 
Furthermore, a libertarian, immersed in the tradition of free markets and the 
spontaneous order, faces an additional problem when trying to convince the 
heavily "constructivist" and rationalistic modern individual to make this 
potential "leap of faith".  The libertarian cannot outline the "nuts and bolts" 
of each and every privately provided service . 
. . . .  The point is that the advocate of a free market in 
anything cannot provide a 'constructive' blueprint 
of such a market in advance. The essence and the 
glory of the free market is that individual firms and 
businesses, competing on the market, provide an 
ever-changing orchestration of efficient and 
progressive goods and services: continually 
improving products and markets, advancing 
technology, cutting costs, and meeting changing 
consumer demand as swiftly and efficiently as 
possible. The libertarian economist can try to offer a 
few guidelines on how markets might develop 
where they are now prevented or restricted from 
developing . . . .  (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 195). 
The failure to provide exact formulas, frameworks, or facts seriously 
threatens reform and, hence, fails to convince the twentieth century human's 
constructivis� mentality. The modern citizen demands a "plan"--the kind of 
details provided by the socialist modeL But the evidence seems to challenge a 
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polity's ability to control or manipulate these complex policy issues. Rothbard 
(and libertarians in general) face a perplexing dilemma: The sorts of policy 
positions he supports by their nature leave many individuals unimpressed or 
unconvinced because of their lack of detail and/ or control. Unfortunately, 
simplicity is . seldom a virtue in structuring a complex society. Thus, we 
continue to face failed policies. 
As Rothbard clearly understands, the success of the libertarian 
movement ultimately rests on its ability to educate and persuade persons of 
its validity and value. For that reason, he focuses substantial attention on the 




STRATEGIES FOR ATTAINING THE LIBERTARIAN SOCIETY 
It is obvious that the kind of society which Rothbard argues is ethically 
imperative is vastly dissimilar to the present world. These differences require 
him to provide guidelines for a system of political ethics and also to produce 
a theory of strategy for the accomplishment of these principles. 
Libertarianism is "a philosophy seeking a policy" (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 
253) . The non-aggression axiom is applied to any given situation to judge the 
morals of that particular circumstance. This employment of a universal rule 
is especially pertinent to Rothbard's non-consequentialist version of 
libertarian principles. By grounding ethics in natural law, he formulates a 
theory which provides "an iron benchmark with which to judge . . .  any 
existing brand of statism" (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 253). As we noted in Chapter 
IV, Rothbard's anarcho-capitalist theories are radical in nature and demand 
massive changes from the status quo. In fact, the factor that poses the most 
serious challenge to the success of libertarianism is probably the huge gulf 
between its ideal society and the current world. If his system of thought is 
both a feasible alternative and preferable to the existing political realities, 
then the only remaining problem is the practical concern of achieving these 
outcomes. 
This issue is a critical problem in the contemporary libertarian 
movement. As Rothbard notes, tongue in cheek, at times it has been apparent 
that liberty is not always the "highest political end" for a number of the 
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movement's proponents; some advocates find "the desire for self-expression, 
or the bearing witness to the truth of the excellence of liberty" as the more 
important political principle (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 254). There is within the 
movement a definite propensity toward intellectual scholasticism at the 
expense of the potentially more difficult tasks of political activism and 
reform. 
What must this libertarian strategy entail? Rothbard argues that it first 
must be thoroughly grounded in a sense of justice that is essentially 
unbending in all situations . 
. . . .  Hence, to be grounded and pursued adequately, 
the libertarian goal must be sought in the spirit of 
an overriding devotion to justice. But to possess 
such devotion on what may well be a long and 
rocky road, the libertarian must be possessed of a 
passion for justice, an emotion derived from and 
channelled by his rational insight into what natural 
justice requires. Justice, not the weak reed of mere 
utility, must be the motivating force if liberty is to 
be attained (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 254). 
These principles of action are not without controversy. An ongoing 
and often heated struggle among libertarian strategists concerns one's 
approach to seeking reform. Some tacticians within the movement argue in 
support of a more practical strategy which may "bend" to the current political 
realities and is more open to short-term compromise in the hope of 
achieving more substantial long-run objectives. Advocates of this position 
are openly more political, attempting to "live in the world" they seek to 
change. Political success requires one to be a viable alternative in the process 
of debate and reform. To affect policy requires both a technically workable 
solution and the ability to get on the "agenda". To focus upon notions such as 
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the privatization of national defense, for example, leaves one open to serious 
accusations of being utopian. As a consequence, there is the distinct possibility 
that all the libertarian's perspectives may be dismissed or ignored. In other 
words, the pragmatic libertarian strategy "comes down" to the less than 
perfect real world and, by maintaining realistic goals in a give-and-take 
environment, directs the world toward more libertarian-oriented solutions. 
Not only does this pragmatism allow libertarian alternatives into the policy 
dialogue, it also forces the movement to recognize the complexity of the 
social order. While liberty may well be the greatest good in the long term, its 
achievement requires a framework in which persons accept and respect it. 
One simply cannot radically transform society, a la the French Revolution, 
and expect to. be able to maintain a stable system. Change of any kind must be 
gradual, for there are too many established institutional norms and 
expectations among individuals to allow immediate and drastic reform.l 
Rothbard rejects these pragmatic perspectives to the degree that they 
are not consistently and unidirectionally aimed at the fulfillment of absolute 
ethics. If liberty is the highes t good, then the strategy must be to achieve it by 
"the most efficacious means" (Rothbard, 1 982a, p. 254) . One must be "an 
abolitionist" who would, if able, "abolish instantaneously all invasions of 
liberty" (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 254). To deny this perspective, he concludes, is to 
give some other political ideal priority and, thus, to ultimately defeat the 
strategy. For example, the fear of upsetting present social institutional 
1 .  Hospers ( 1 989a, pp. 29-36) draws a similar dichotomy within the 
movement between "open" and "closed" libertarianism. 
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connections demonstrates that one may value order, rather than liberty, as 
the highest political good. 
The demand for such extreme results, according to Rothbard, is not 
utopian. To consider the absolute support of the libertarian model as utopian 
is to misuse the concept. 
While it is vital for the libertarian to hold his 
ultimate and 'extreme' idea aloft, this does 
not . . .  make him a 'utopian'. The true utopian is one 
who advocates a system that is contrary to the 
natural law of human beings and of the real world. 
A utopian system is one that could not work even if 
everyone were persuaded to try to put it into 
practice . . . .  
In short, the term 'utopian' in popular 
parlance confuses two kinds of obstacles in the path 
of a program radically different from the status quo. 
One is that it violates the nature of man and of the 
world and therefore could not work once it was put 
into practice. This i s  the utopianism of 
communism. The second is the difficulty in 
convincing enough people that the program should 
be adopted. The former is a bad theory because it 
violates the nature of man; the latter is simply a 
problem of human will, of convincing enough 
people of the rightness of the doctrine . . . .  (Rothbard, 
1978b, p. 303). 
Of course, the immediate support of complete abolition will not likely 
produce these results in the real political world. But the problem with 
gradualism, in Rothbard's view, is that it undercuts principled action prior to 
the political confrontation it will surely face in the social arena. It is the 
libertarian's function in the compromising state of real politics to "keep 
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upping the ante" (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 301) .2 If one enters the political debate 
with a less than absolutist attitude, he is destined to fall short of his goals. 
Moreover, Rothbard's libertarianism is founded on a procedural 
notion of justice, i.e., it rejects the common view of consequentialism that 
"ends may justify means" .  Unfortunately, the "means" applied in each of the 
gradualist's compromises are ends in themselves--further aggressions against 
specific members of the community--that surrender additional portions of 
the only legitimate position (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 2.1:)6). For example, there are 
many utilitarian-libertarians who, in effect, argue that the provision of 
individual liberty maximizes total individual satisfaction. But "social" 
welfare and not liberty become the highest goal in this perspective. As a 
advocate of an "end-state" notion of justice, there is really no reason why a 
utilitarian might not be quite willing to accept rather brutal "compromises" 
upon some persons so as to achieve higher satisfaction in the long-run for 
other individuals who, of course, are not the ones suffering the sacrifice. For 
Rothbard, these principles necessarily contradict the theory of liberty. His 
position does not demand "all or nothing" immediately. It merely requires 
that the tactics for achieving a libertarian society do not contradict themselves 
2 .  One might argue this strategy was used quite successfully by 
American socialists in the twentieth century. While socialism has never 
appeared attractive to the American ethos, it has over time chipped away at 
the country's value structure. For example, one may compare The Socialist 
Party of America's early twentieth century platforms to the policy agenda 
today. There are practically no parts of the document that are not commonly 
accepted policy in the contemporary setting. This circumstance lends 
creedence to the view that more often than not one may expect an especially 
gradual transformation of a successful ideological movement. 
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by either setting some other principle above liberty for certain purposes or by 
taking actions that redirect even for apparently temporary parcels of time the 
achievement of these ultimate principles. In other words, transitional steps 
are welcomed and, obviously, if any success occurs, expected. But an 
unqualified strategy that results in transitionalism and a predetermined tactic 
of moral give-and-take are quite different, ethically speaking. 
In the process of reform it is difficult to imagine libertarian principles 
not becoming intermingled with the State. It is virtually impossible to 
separate the effects of the government from any "private" act. Furthermore, 
social reform itself has increasingly fallen within the domain of State activity. 
If the State is, as Rothbard concludes, the "permanent enemy of mankind" 
(Rothbard, 1982a, p. 257), then libertarian strategists face an apparently 
unsolvable paradox: How can one bring about political change without the 
use of political action? This dilemma seriously threatens libertarian political 
aspirations (or, if one prefers, it has kept the levels of libertarian coercion to 
minute levels). Is not the Libertarian Political Party, for instance, at root an 
ethical oxymoron? If the use of politics is tantamount to aggression in 
Rothbard's ethics, in what direction may the movement turn to achieve its 
goals? 
Consider a recent argument of libertarian George Smith which 
demonstrates the kinds of tensions that emerge when an absolutist systems of 
ethics meets the impure world. He challenges the "disturbing trend" of 
libertarian intellectuals entering careers in State-funded universities and 
colleges. These "welfare intellectuals", he concludes, are selling out to statist 
interests (Smith, 1990, p. 37) . This view held by some libertarians denies any 
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bending from the straight and narrow path. However, it would seem that in 
the real world the path is wide and full of crooks (no pun intended); if 
libertarians are going to have any real policy success, this attitude must 
subside. 
Can Rothbard's principle of unidirectionalness avoid this dilemma? 
Perhaps. If the party were to gain political power and use it only to reduce 
their function of power on every occasion, then there would appear to be no 
necessary contradiction. But with each reduction of their own control comes a 
decreasing ability to achieve the next reduction. Such efforts face the dilemma 
of diminishing abilities to achieve these ends. The simple abdication of 
control does not solve the libertarian agenda. Even an anti-government 
policy plan requires positive actions by the State to cultivate and enforce these 
changes. Freedom is not attained merely by the creation of a political 
vacuum. 
Moreover, to expect any political leadership to relinquish power goes 
against historical realities and practically all the wisdom of libertarianism's 
own principles! Are there not, for example, the uncontrollable temptations of 
power once control of the State is attained? Why are we to assume that 
h umans with libertarian proclivities are different from any other 
individuals? This perspective comes perilously close to making the same 
unfounded class distinctions that Marxists made years ago. As Rothbard and 
many others, including the nation's founders, have eloquently demonstrated 
time and time again, humans (of which libertarians are a subset) are not 
angels, and if they are given the monopoly powers that accompany political 
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control, they will likely use them for the satisfaction of their own interests 
and not the maintenance of any moral imperative. 
To be true to his principles, the libertarian must deny the existing 
world--at least the part called politics. Does this leave him with any tactics 
that might be successful? There is at least one possibility, and Rothbard gives 
it high priority. He concludes that ideas ultimately rule the world. For this 
reason, libertarianism's success hinges on the development, dissemination, 
and persuasion of these ideas . These activities require a libertarian 
"movement"--an "active group of dedicated libertarians" willing to spread 
the gospel (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 259) . 
Education, then, is obviously the most important component. 
Rothbard argues for a two-front assault. First, there must be "hard thinking 
and scholarship" among the more intellectual members of the movement to 
develop, refine, and reinforce the theory of libertarianism. But, secondly, 
there must also be activism to allow the dissemination of these ideas in ways 
that may be appreciated by the population-at-large. This interaction is crucial 
both to spread the word to the "unwashed" and to provide for the inner­
health of the movement itself. As Rothbard readily understands from years 
of scholarly seclusion, one of the most difficult parts of emerging alternative 
movements is that, at least in the beginning, it is "a lonely creed" subject to 
the pitfalls of intellectual isolationism (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 299). 
While it may seem self-evident that any successful political movement 
requires an influential cadre of leaders, the more pressing and unique 
concern for the libertarian movement relates to the general nature of 
movement politics. If one lives by the ethical proposition that non-
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intervention or pnvacy m person and place is the highest ideal, it is 
extremely difficult to be convinced to cooperate in collective activities. 
Whereas collectivist-thinking persons might be much more inclined to 
participate in group action, the libertarian culture tends to look upon such 
activity with suspicion or even disdain. Part of this problem apparently 
results from an important difference among certain groups within the 
libertarian circles as to how they view the notion of "individualism". For 
some (particularly the followers of the philosopher Ayn Rand) individualism 
• 
represents a philosophical form of egoism and subsequently contains definite 
threads of atomism. These individuals in particular are not likely to be 
joiners. To differing degrees, these same attitudes permeate the greater bulk 
of the libertarian political culture. 
Yet, there is nothing in the body of mainstream libertarian thought 
that denies the importance of cultivating community or acting collectively, as 
long as these actions are voluntary. Humans are social animals. In fact, one 
might argue that the reason liberty is the highest ideal is due to the fact that 
only in a free society may humans discover the communities or "utopias", to 
borrow Nozick's terminology, which provide for their individual happiness. 
Still, the paradox remains for Rothbard's libertarianism. If we assume 
that these concerns may be overcome, how does he envision the activities of 
these intellectual cadres? The fundamental goal would be to work to "raise 
people's consciousness" toward a higher acceptance of the principles of 
liberty. 
. . . .  [W]e might conceive of the adoption of 
libertarianism as a ladder or pyramid, with various 
individuals and groups on different rungs of the 
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ladder, ranging upward from total collectivism or 
statism to pure liberty. If the libertarian cannot 
'raise people's consciousness' fully to the top rung 
of pure liberty, then he can achieve the lesser but 
still important goal of helping them advance up a 
few rungs up the ladder (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 260) . 
In this consciousness-raising, Rothbard provides a role for some 
pragmatic coalition-building with alternative ideological perspectives. On 
issues concerning freedom of markets and property rights, he suggests the 
potential of "united front activities" with sympathetic conservatives.  
Similarly, the same possibilities exist to ally with modern liberals on rights of 
expression and other "personal" rights. These alliances, he concludes, serve 
two distinctive functions: 
By engaging in such united fronts on ad hoc issues, 
the libertarian can accomplish a two-fold purpose: 
(a) greatly multiplying his own leverage or 
influence in working toward a specific libertarian 
goal--since many non-libertarians are mobilized to 
cooperate in such actions; and (b) to 'raise the 
consciousness' of his coalition colleagues, to show 
them that libertarianism is a single interconnected 
system, and that the full pursuit of their particular 
goal requires the adoption of the entire libertarian 
schema. Thus, the libertarian can point out to the 
conservative that property rights or the free market 
can only be maximized and truly safeguarded if 
civil liberties are defended or restored; and he can 
show the opposite to the civil libertarian. 
Hopefully, this demonstration will raise some of 
these ad hoc allies s ignificantly up the libertarian 
ladder (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 260). 
Both of these functions have critical importance in the advancement 
of the libertarian movement. First, there are substantial gains presently being 
made by libertarianism because of its rather unique position between liberals 
255 
and conservatives on many policy issues today. While self-identifying 
libertarians are extremely outnumbered by both liberals and conservatives 
(Maddox and Lilie, 1984), they have infiltrated the policy arenas to the degree 
that they can have substantial (although, perhaps, indirect) influence within 
both political institutions and interest group movements . In the recent 
decisions of the Supreme Court, for example, there is evidence of how this 
dynamic unfolds: As liberal and conservative judges continue to split over 
issues as they have done historically, a small number of libertarian-leaning 
justices often become critical "swing votes" .  For example, while liberal and 
conservative commentators angonize over how the same Court could hand 
down anti-Affirmative Action decisions and uphold rights to burn the 
American flag, libertarians hail both as well-reasoned decisions.3 The same 
apparent inconsistency involving public support of the right to abortion and 
public opposition to tax increases is also explained by the existence of a 
significant libertarian culture. While liberalism and conservatism are 
established and are generally defined and understood in the political process, 
libertarianism faces the identity crisis which always accompanies new 
political movements. However, because of its unique policy prescriptions of 
"fiscal conservativism" and "social liberalism", libertarian theory has the 
distinctive advantage of being able to infiltrate the ideological status quo. 
The second purpose of this infiltrating strategy is even more 
significant. Libertarianism's ultimate success may rest upon its ability to 
3. As of yet, it is unclear how the appointment of David Souter will 
affect this dynamic. Likely, we may expect either a more conservative and 
restrained Court or a more libertarian activism. 
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demonstrate the super-ethical nature of its theory. In other words, 
libertarianism's political ethic does not rest on the same ideological plane as 
simple conservatism, liberalism, socialism, etc. These ideologies postulate a 
universal ethic of the good society too narrowly and then require all persons, 
by force if necessary, to live by these principles. Libertarianism, on the other 
hand, is distinctive in that it imposes no limiting set of political guidelines 
upon individuals beyond the idea that every person is free to choose his own 
"good society" and obligated to allow the same freedom for others. Or, as 
Robert Nozick argues, persons are left to find their own utopias (Nozick, 
1974) . Libertarian theory seeks to escape the confines of an overly limited 
notion of political philosophy . By highlighting a philosophy of human 
individual rights and a toleration for divergent views of the good society, this 
perspective expresses a set of ethics which may be superimposed over 
common ideologies and ways of life. 
It would seem apparent that a political ethic which seeks to expand 
individual control/choice over one's decisions as a general rule would be 
well-received. Despite these advantages, libertarianism has not been able to 
mobilize the kind of consensus it potentially could amass. On one hand, one 
might argue that these ideas are extremely "elitist"-·-a criticism that seems to 
deserve some creedence if one merely investigates the common demographic 
features of libertarians. On the other hand, there are persons in the present 
"illegitimate" system who would not accept change and view libertarian 
theory as a radical threat to the status quo. Due to this problem, Rothbard 
argues that there are particular groups more assessible to education efforts 
(Rothbard, 1978b, p. 308). Convincing defense contractors, politicians, and 
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bureaucrats of the evils of statism, for instance, is unlikely. Instead, one ought 
to focus on attempting to "convert the mass of the people who are victimized 
by State power, not those who are gaining by it" (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 308). But 
to succeed in these arenas, the movement must be able to overcome the 
elitist stigma. Being "elite radicals" obviously creates some rather peculiar 
problems. 
Where, then, may the libertarian movement turn for support? Will 
not the achievement of political success necessitate the forging together of 
coalitions of the exis ting power structure? Again, Rothbard's  
uncompromisingly radical nature leaves him in a dire dilemma: How may 
an ethical system based on overt anti-statism be successful in a world where 
the State and the interests it represents are by definition the dominant force? 
What prevents the State from using numerous means, including cooptation, 
censorship, or even outright violence to suppress ideas that are increasing in 
popularity and that are threatening the foundations of its power base? By 
being ethically confined from playing the political game, Rothbard's 
libertarianism leaves him with very few or no alternatives for achieving his 
objectives, since he is morally confined from using political instruments to 
realize reform. While he recognizes this dilemma, he is rather ambiguous as 
to how it may be overcome. The unfortunate fact is that, as the monopoly 
force in a given society, the government and the forces it represents retain 
huge advantages over any set of upstart ideas. 
How may Rothbard expect ethics to transcend interests among those 
very potent individuals or groups whose demands are being exceedingly 
well-served in the existing interest-founded polity? He argues that "other 
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means than education, means of pressure, will have to be used," including 
voting, the use of other non-public institutions, and massive boycotts . 
Unfortunately, it would seem each of these actions face serious problems. 
First, is not voting illegimate in the libertarian society--an act of political 
criminality? And given the environment, is voting any more than a myth­
perpetuating mechanism? Secondly, if non-public institutions could actually 
attain significant power, it is quite likely that the government would employ 
either collusion, cooptation, or premature destruction to prevent these 
alternatives from ever arising. Thirdly, boycotts are not likely to be any more 
successful than the other alternatives, since the victims of continual "theft" 
are not prepared to compete with the beneficiaries of plunder. Therefore, it is 
extremely difficult to envision any sort of fair struggle between the power­
impotent and Rothbard's "Corporate Welfare-Warfare State" (Rothbard, 
1978b, pp. 308-309). 
In developing tactics, Rothbard borrows a number of ideas from the 
historically successful Marxist theories of political strategy. One example of 
this similarity concerns the theory of ideological deviation from the "correct" 
path. Movements may deviate from the ideal goals either by what Marxists 
term "right opportunism" or "left sectarianism" (Rothbard, 1982a, pp. 260-261 ;  
1978b, pp. 299-300) . Rothbard argues that libertarianism faces dilemmas 
similar (though over very different issues) to those that challenged Marxist 
strategy. Right opportunism threatens the libertarian movement by allowing 
it to "immerse itself in minor and short-run gains, sometimes in actual 
contradiction to the ultimate goal itself" (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 261) .  Conversely, 
left sectarianism leans to the other extreme, always prepared to purge the 
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movement of any individual who supports anything but the immediate and 
complete transformation of the world to libertarian ideas. Furthermore, there 
is a tendency for some persons in these kinds of movements to leap from one 
end of the continuum to the other edge. Thus, in a rather strange way, the 
two extremes may in reality "feed on and reinforce each other" (Rothbard, 
1 982a, p. 261) .  Once this phenomenon begins, it is likely that the movement 
will tum on itself and disintegrate into petty internal squabbling. 
There is some evidence of this sort of struggle occurring within a part 
of the libertarian movement. During the last four Presidential elections, for 
example, the Libertarian Party has ridden a tactical "roller-coaster", rotating 
between pragmatism and ideological purity in alternate elections from 1976 to 
1988. While the Party is by no means the bulk of the libertarian movement, it 
seems fair to conclude that it represents a fairly reliable subset of 
libertarianism. If this behavior can lead us to make predictions about the 
candidate and strategy for 1992, we may expect an ideological purge after the 
more pragmatic candidacy of Ron Paul in the 1 988 election.4 
Rothbard also accepts the Marxist notion that a radical program's 
success requires both "objective" and "subjective" pre-conditions (Rothbard, 
1982a, pp. 261-262). In other words, the success of a movement depends upon 
the self-conscious support of its principles as well as the existence of crises 
that severely fault the existing system and often weaken the support of the 
4. Despite the political squabbling, the body of libertarian sholarship 
continues to grow--perhaps far out of balance in relation to the successes of 
libertarian political activism. Unfortunately, the popular press tends to focus 
upon the Party activities. 
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ruling groups. The radical cadre must be in place to exploit the crisis when it 
occurs, filling the intellectual vacuum that results from the loss of faith in 
the status quo. Those systems of thought that have a history of predicting the 
actual problems which eventually occur obviously have the advantage in 
filling the arising void. 
Like the Marxists, Rothbard is optimistic that such a crisis must occur 
in contemporary society, due to the system's inherent inner contradictions. 
Obviously, these contradictions are not the same for Rothbard as for the 
Marxists. Rather than the market order disappearing, it is discovered in the 
libertarian ideal world. But like Marxism, libertarianism is a "highly 
optimistic creed" because of the perceived inevitability of the failure of 
statism. 
. . .  [F]ortunately for the cause of liberty, economic 
science has shown that a modern economy cannot 
survive indefinitely under s uch draconian 
conditions [ as despotism, stagnation, and 
totalitarianism] . A modern industrial economy 
requires a vast network of free-market exchanges 
and a division of labor, a network that can only 
flourish under freedom. Given the commitment of 
the mass of men to an industrial economy and the 
modern standard of living that requires such 
industry, then the triumph of a free-market and an 
end to statism becomes inevitable in the long run 
(Rothbard, 1982a, p. 263). 
Libertarianism, then, will "win" because only it is compatiable with the 
nature of humans and the realities of nature. According to Rothbard, history 
made a "great leap, a sea-change" with the Industrial Revolution that cannot 
be undone without causing massive death (Rothbard, 1982a, pp. 314-315). He 
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comes exceedingly close to guaranteeing, at least in the long run, the 
inevitability of libertarian society. 
Yet, these contentions seem built more upon faith than either logic or 
historical evidence. Outside a relatively small temporal span of world history, 
humans have existed primitively and often in virtual slavery. As we noted 
in the preceding chapter, it is difficult to imagine how the triumph of liberty 
is inescapable. There is little reason to believe that the world is indeed 
commited to the modern market economy and the standard of living that 
free trade (of all contemporary known alternatives) allows.S Furthermore, 
there is no guarantee that even if humankind is commited to these living 
standards it will be able to intelligently link prosperity to certain economic 
and political ideas. 
Still, there are many reasons to at least be hopeful if one, like Rothbard, 
supports the principles of libertarianism. Much of the socialist world is facing 
the inner contradictions of central planning, for example. After having 
drifted toward state capitalism and the Welfare State for decades, much of the 
"free" world also faces the tough problems of no longer being able to provide 
programs without serious political and/or economic repercussions. As a 
result, we are witnessing world-wide privatization and deregulatory 
movements. Perhaps the natural fact that one cannot live beyond one's 
means indefinitely has come to be realized in the contemporary world. 
Rothbard's contention that economic laws ultimately demand the 
5. For example, there is very little reason to anticipate that substantial 
portions of the current ecological movement will ever endorse libertarian 
policy prescriptions. 
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recognition of the role of markets and subsequently facilitate the advent of 
libertarian principles seem especially persuasive. 
Yet, on other fronts, the world seems to be heading in the opposite 
direction. The United States is a particularly good example of these trends. 
Today, we face the real potential for a new age of neo-prohibitionism aimed 
at eradicating many of the "vices" that diverse religious, medical, racial, 
ethnic, gender, and other assorted ideological groups find offensive. As a 
consequence, large numbers of activities are defined as negative externalities; 
hence, toleration for these actions evaporates. Rather than becoming less 
politicized, society becomes a pit of open public conflict where all decisions 
fall within the jurisdiction of the State. 
Therefore, it is quite possible that we are we only witnessing the 
changing of the "ideological guard".  What we define in the modern 
American context as conservativism may merely be replacing contemporary 
liberalism. This political realignment brings with it minor changes when 
examined from a libertarian perspective. While State-sponsored aggression 
may appear in different garb, there is no substantial weakening of statism. 
Needless to say, the signals for the future of the libertarian movement 
are, at best, mixed. While libertarianism has made inroads in academia, 
journalism, and even politics, it would be overly optimistic to argue that it 
will inevitably score a victory over its intellectual rivals. However, political 
philosophy is. presently in one of those periods of void which arises following 
the destruction of the previously dominating world-view. If we may argue 
that Marxism-socialism was, in fact, the ideological paradigm of the twentieth 
century, then we do seemingly face an intellectual vacuum. The perspectives 
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which most convincingly provide the best explanations for socialism's 
apparent failures and the most attractive guide for future political action 
have the advantages in filling this void. While libertarianism is not alone in 
this intellectual struggle, it does hold distinctive advantages, since it has been 
one of the most consistent and thorough alternatives challenging socialist­
Marxist ideology.6 And, of course, all of these speculations presume that 
ideas ultimately shape and direct the world order. 
However, is Rothbard's rather absolutist approach the optimal strategy 
for winning over libertarian converts and, subsequently, bringing on the 
advent of libertarian society? Unfortunately, his approach faces extreme 
dilemmas which all too often leaves one with little or no course of effective 
action. While it may be ethically true that the ends do not justify the means, 
if libertarians are not willing to play political hard-ball and/  or involve 
themselves in the compromising and negogiating atmosphere of power­
politics, they may be destined to faiL This possibility is unfortunate since the 
body of libertarian scholarly writings represents a substantial and convincing 
alternative to the less than successful ideological status quo. There may be an 
imbalance in the libertarian movement toward intellectual pursuits that all 
6. In fact, Peterson (1987, pp. 237-245) explores the common complaints 
that anarchism is impractical and concludes that such perspectives result 
from low levels of moral development! Using modern cognitive 
development theory, he argues that persons who are at higher levels of 
moral development are much more often able to envision society without 
the coercion of the State apparartus. Moreover, as higher order organizations 
evolve, one may anticipate less government in this emerging 
"postconventional" stage. 
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too often leaves these ideas on the "drawing board", deficient of the 
willingness to slice through the soiled activities of a political process. 
Moreover, the absolutism prevalent in a substantial portion of the 
movement handicaps the open dialogue which must emerge for these ideas 
to receive a fair hearing. Unfortunately, neither Rothbard's monistic 
foundations nor his propensity to use the instrument of shock in his rhetoric 
are conducive to that kind of interaction. Therefore, while the anarcho­
capitalist model may have important points to add to the debates in political 
ethics and public policy, it faces the dilemma of finding itself increasingly 
preached to the previously converted. 
In a recent article, libertarian theorist Loren Lomasky argues for a 
"partial compliance theory" within both libertarian strategy and its code of 
morals (Lomasky, 1990, pp. 39-40). Lomasky recognizes that success may only 
come in gradual intervals. A useful libertarian strategy, then, demands 1 .) the 
existence of legitimate expectations in light of present political realities and 
the subsequent human expectations derived from these realities; 2.) the 
realization of the transaction costs in reform and the subsequent recognition 
that one might not prefer immediate reform even when the ultimate 
morality demands it; and 3.) the recognition that in many circumstances the 
best case may be the avoidance of the worst case, or at least the one true way 
may not be attainable. 
Of course, this argument surely leaves Lomasky susceptiable to charges 
of impurity from those in the inner circles. And, to follow the "low road" of 
ethics poses some very serious concerns. One always faces the "slippery slope" 
of compromising the movement into an untimely death. But if libertarian 
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supporters are not careful, they will miss a glorious opportunity to fill the 
void created by the demise of world socialism. Whereas it may not be 
necessary to relegate ethics to the Hobbesian world of fantasy, it is probably no 
more preferable to rest uncompromisingly upon absolutist ethics. If  
libertarianism takes this route, its program is destined to fail--similar to all 
other brands of utopianism--as it will become unachievable in reality and 
unfamiliar to anyone outside the small circle of ardent believers. 
With these issues taken into consideration, our discussion of 
Rothbard's social theory is completed. Chapter VII concludes our discussion 
by examining the importance and place of Rothbard, in particular, and 
libertarianism, in general, in the evolution of American political thought. 
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CHAPTER VII 
ROTHBARD, LIBERTARIANISM, AND THEIR PLACE IN 
AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 
Introduction 
We conclude our discussion of Rothbard's work by attempting to bring 
his writings into an historical focus. This effort requires that we examine four 
interrelated subjects in Chapter VII: 1 .) Rothbard's  (and libertarianism's) 
historical heritage; 2.) libertarianism's relationship to the modern American 
ideological setting; 3.) Rothbard's status in the evolution of libertarianism 
and his influence in the present revival of these ideas; and 4.) the future of 
libertarian thought in regard to the theoretical and historical advantages or 
disadvantages it possesses within contemporary American political thought. 
America and the Libertarian Heritage 
Although libertarianism has in recent years spread in influence 
worldwide, it is at root an American phenomenon. It is clearly a child of this 
country's experience with the ideas of classical liberalism. And Rothbard's 
anarcho-capitalist writings are as pure a statement of American radicalism 
that has ever been penned. By extending the logic of the philosophy of 
individualism and individual rights, he carries classical liberalism into the 
realms of anti-authoritarian anarchism. It is unlikely his thought would be 
understood outside this context. 
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In a recent work on modern American ideology, William Maddox and 
Stuart Lilie correctly articulate the fundamentally classical liberal character of 
the United States (Maddox and Lilie, 1984, pp. 7-12) .  They identify six 
important tenets within this political perspective. First, and most 
importantly, classical liberals maintain the idea of individualism. Humans 
are autonomous; they precede society and/ or the State and create these 
institutions to match their own personal interests. Hence, individuals are 
viewed as "ends" and not "means" in the social order. Secondly, classical 
liberals accept an instrumental or mechanical notion of government. Political 
obligation is usually a function of individual self-interest, based on the idea of 
the contract or constitution. Thirdly, through the "social contract", the State is 
limited to the protection of the rights and/ or interests of the members of the 
community. These limitation generate the "nightwatchman" State 
politically /legally and support an economic system founded on the principles 
of laissez-faire. Fourthly, classical liberalism endorses the notion of 
individual rights which create separate spheres of action within the society 
for particular individuals. These rights specifically include the rights to life, 
liberty, and property. Fifthly, the rule of law is preferred--particularly the idea 
of legal equality. Through this tenet, the classical liberal seeks to dissolve 
existing priviledges and guarantee equal protection of individual rights 
through the requirements of generally applied rules. The final, and least 
important, tenet for classical liberalism is the existence of representative 
government. While democracy was a central part of government for most 
early American liberals, its significance was as an instrumental force in the 
checking of political power, not as a primary factor in the benefits of actual 
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participation in the political community. Since the goal of the classical liberal 
theorist is to limit the State, participation is not an important item of concern. 
Libertarianism is quite clearly a reawakening of these tenets in modern 
political debate. The only factors which separate the two sets of ideas are time 
and the degree of "purity". Libertarians face a different agenda in the 
contemporary world. Moreover, writers such as Rothbard are much more 
sophisicated ideologically than past orthodox liberals. 
Nevertheless, the similarities are quite strong. Rothbard, for instance, 
draws an extremely dose connection between the two schools of thought. 
Accordingly, libertarian theory has been a significant component in the 
history of American thought. The initial foundations of the movement are 
found in the English writings of the Levelers and, of course, John Locke. In 
America, the more radical Lockean writings of John Trenchard and Thomas 
Gordon, in Cato's Letters, laid the framework for an American libertarian 
ethos. These principles are exemplified in both the revolutionary war debate 
and in the Articles of Confederation, the United States' first government. 
These ideas enjoyed the advantages generated by the unique nature of the 
American situation which provided a cultivating atmosphere for classical 
liberalism. These views began unimpaired in the United States, minus the 
feudalistic and aristocratic priviledges and institutional constraints which 
impeded European classical liberalism. Moreover, they possessed the popular 
support of overwhelming numbers of the citizenry. Finally, our geographical 
isolation provided a nurturing atmosphere for these ideas, exemplified in 
both our early domestic and foreign policies. America, Rothbard concludes, 
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was "born in an explicitly libertarian revolution" (Rothbard, 1978, p. 6). 1 
These foundational principles have never completely disappeared. 
In Rothbard's view, early libertarian America was the nation of the 
Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Confederation, and the principles 
of the Anti-Federalists, and not the America of the pragmatic and ordered 
liberty of the Constitutional Framers. While Federalist theory maintained 
great influence in the early years of post-Constitutional America, he 
concludes that libertarian values began to dominate thought in the early 
nineteenth century. He particularly links modern libertarian thought to the 
Jeffersonian and Jacksonian movements which, he argues, "explicitly strived 
for the virtual elimination of government from American life" (Rothbard, 
1978, pp. 6-7).2 
Despite the "grave antilibertarian flaw in the libertarianism of the 
Democratic program" of slavery in Jacksonianism, Rothbard refuses to accept 
the notion that the new emerging Republican coalition had any libertarian 
influences (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 8) . He views the nineteenth century 
Republican Party as statist, nationalist, anti-secessionist, and corporatist. 
Eventually, however, the Democratic Party also surrendered these classical 
liberal principles, domestically in 1896, and internationally in the 1910's. 
1. For a more extended discussion, examine Rothbard (1978b, pp. 1-19). 
For a divergent perspective which views libertarianism as "gravely flawed," 
see Newman (1984, pp. 50-75). 
2. Rothbard's discussions of history often unfortunately tend toward 
hyperbole. For example, it is unlikely that Native Americans viewed the 
"Trail of Tears" as an example of the United States striving for the 
elimination of the State. 
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Therefore, in Rothbard's view, by the twentieth century both major political 
parties in America, and the ideas they represented, had surrendered the 
traditional libertarian ethos which had been so significant to the nation's 
early experience. 
It is in what Bernard Bailyn calls the "permanent legacy" (Bailyn, 1967, 
pp. 1-21) of the Revolution and the grassroots classical liberalism of 
Jeffersoniani sm and Jacksonianism that Rothbard roots  modern 
libertarianism. He defines the evolution of ideas in America political thought 
in a rather unique manner, viewing them as a struggle between the liberatory 
ideas of classical liberalism versus a series of conservative traditions in 
different "clothing" which sought to prevent the dynamic extension of 
individual freedom. These conservative propensities began to reshape 
American thought in the late nineteenth century, he contends. Radical ideas 
faced extreme reaction from what he terms the "Old Order", which sought to 
return to a society of priviledge, hierarchy, mercantilism, militarism, and 
absolutism through the usurpation of the opportunities in which the 
Industrial Revolution and its consequences provided. Rothbard heaps the 
greatest blame for the diminishing of libertarian values in the Western world 
upon this "conservative" tradition. As a "dressed-up version of the a ncien 
regime," the conservative forces reconnected old priviledged alliances within 
the new institutional arrangements of the modern industrial world of the 
late nineteenth century (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 10). In Rothbard's view, then, the 
Progressive movement was anything but forward-looking. Its fusion of labor, 
corporation, and State contrived to reestablish a new conservative ruling 
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class.3 Ultimately, the final collaboration with intellectuals (see Chapters IV 
and VI) gave this New Order the ability and opportunity to reshape public 
opinion in Western democracies. Hence, the ethos of classical liberalism 
passed away--or, at least, went into hibernation. 
Rothbard realizes that one of the most effective means in achieving 
this transformation was through the expropriation of political labels. The 
twentieth century's "New Order", fundamentally reactionary in nature, was 
able to capture the "progressive", "radical", and even "liberal" labels. 
Conversely, classical liberalism, particularly in America, was stuck with the 
"conservative" stigma (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 12) .  Even today, classical liberals 
are incorrectly positioned in the same ideological camp as traditional or 
communitarian conservatives. (See the proceeding section for additional 
discussion. ) A central thesis in his historical analysis is that these 
classifications are fundamentally incorrect. 
There was, according to Rothbard, a second reason for the 
disintegration of classical liberalism in the nineteenth century, namely, the 
advent of socialism. Socialism represented a "confused, hybrid movement" 
which combined parts of both classical liberalism and conservatism. It 
3. Note the similarities of Rothbard's interpretations of American 
political and economic history and those of Neo-Marxism. Both views, for 
example, highlight the emerging collusion between State and Business which 
arose rapidly in the Progressive Era. Obviously, however, these 
interpretations use similar evidence to reach wholly different conclusions. 
Whereas Marxists view collusion as a demonstration of the inherent 
inevitability of capitalism's failure, libertarians conclude that this evidence 
shows the necessity for limiting or (in Rothbard's case) removing the 
temptations of government and the political process. 
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coupled liberal ends (liberation) with conservative means (centralized 
authority) and, in the process, silenced the radical purpose which once 
defined liberalism (Rothbard, 1978b, pp. 12-13). The camouflaged Old Order-­
veiled in the radical rhetoric of Marxism--was able to "outflank" liberalism in 
the arenas of hope and reform. Whereas liberalism once represented radical 
change, it settled into a moderate and, subsequently, stagnant gradualist 
position with the advent of socialism. Rothbard, thus, interprets modern 
liberalism's efforts to reform and / or reject the classical tenets as a 
surrendering of its initial purpose to a series of collectivist and/or 
conservative ideologies. 
Hence, from Rothbard's perspective, it was not the competition with 
superior ideas, but the "inner rot within the vitals of Liberalism" that 
ultimately defeated it (Rothbard, 1979d, p.4). First, it surrendered its devotion 
to abolitionism for adherence to a conservative gradualism as the proper 
ethical position. Secondly, it abandoned natural rights philosophy for 
utilitarian ethics. Accordingly, expediency and the acceptance of the status quo 
replaced militancy and change (Rothbard, 1978b, pp. 1 5-16) .  Consequently, 
without these specific ethical imperatives, liberalism suffered a gradual 
devolution toward statism. Thirdly, a substantial portion of liberalism came 
to accept social Darwinism, which a priori rejected the path of radicalness. 
Theorists such as Herbert Spencer, Rothbard concludes, "abandoned 
liberalism as a fighting, radical creed and confined [ their] liberalism in practice 
to a weary, conservative, rearguard action against the growing collectivism 
and statism of [ their] day" (Rothbard, 1979d, pp. 4-5). Finally, liberalism's 
historical co:r:nmitment against imperialism and militarism, exemplified in 
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the writings of the English Manchester School, passed away as the world 
entered the twentieth century. As a result, the guiding principles of neutrality 
and non-intervention were replaced by foreign involvement and power­
driven nation-states which, Rothbard contends, led to the devastation caused 
by this century's wars. Modern liberalism, then, lost sight of the values of 
non-interventionism and classical rights, turning instead to an economically 
and militarily intervening State that redefined its rights framework to 
include overtly egalitarian overtones. 
And for the substantial part of this century the ideas of classical 
liberalism have been in deep hiatus in America. The "isms" of the twentieth 
century which arose from the turbulence in Europe dominated political 
debate and practice. The scattered remnants of what was termed liberalism 
gradually became co-opted by these similarly collectivist ideologies. Only 
muffled criticisms from a few remaining critics of this evolution toward 
statism remained. 
However, as Friedman and McDowell note, at the close of World War 
II, there were arising concerns which were to foreshadow the reemergence of 
classical liberalism in America and elsewhere (Friedman and McDowell, 1983, 
p. 48) . Beginning with the trenchant arguments found in Hayek's Road to 
Serfdom, a reappraisal of the directions that liberalism was taking began 
(Hayek, 1944) . While one of the "isms" seemed buried, namely, fascism, a 
substantial threat to liberal values remained after World War II, evidenced by 
the spread of socialist influence. Hayek's criticisms of the popular modes of 
central planning joined a set of historical enemies by demonstrating the 
economic and political shortcomings of both fascism and socialism. His work 
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laid the groundwork for the critiques of socialism and the milder social 
liberalism which was to follow. 
Initially, the criticisms of expanding collectivist thought arose under 
the larger umbrella of what was called in America, at least, conservatism. 
However, the movement itsel f possessed fundamentally divergent 
perspectives. The tensions which existed in the "right-wing" of American 
ideology between traditional conservatism and libertarianism rested dormant 
when focused upon the critique of the modern social liberal agenda. It was 
not until the crisis of Vietnam and the turbulence of the 1960's that these 
fundamental differences overwhelmed the possibility of a permanent 
alliance. The core value of individualism which most assists in 
distinguishing the libertarian movement from traditional conservatism was 
bound to become elucidated in times of political and intellectual crisis. 
The contemporary period has produced crises that have further 
distinguished libertarianism from either American conservatism or modern 
liberalism. In the past thirty years events have redefined the political 
spectrum, threatening the Keynesian policy paradigm, the militaristic and 
anti-communistic policies of foreign intervention, and the entire socialist and 
central planning mentality. Libertarianism's uniquely individual istic 
message continues to separate it from the traditional views of the American 
ideological mainstream. 
Yet, in a difference sense, the definition of these ideas are merely the 
rediscovery of a heritage. No serious political perspective in America may 
expect to achieve popularity without retaining some degree of this libertarian 
inclination; there still remains a fundamental reverence in American to the 
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tenets of individualism; although classical liberalism may be deep below the 
apparent contemporary political debate, it  is still present. Of course, at times, 
these impulses demonstrate themselves in unprincipled and illogical ways 
and stray substantially from the founding principles of America. But they 
ultimately provide the most rudimentary drive in American public policy. 
Contemporary libertarianism may be understood as a concerted effort to 
rediscover these first principles through a thoughtful and principled 
development of these tenets. 
It is not difficult to understand why libertarian ideas have flourished 
the longest and most thoroughly in their American contexts. Criticisms 
which arose against the expanding statism in this century were often the 
works of American critics (Nock, 1983; Chodorov, 1980) . Likewise, it is not 
surprising that the libertarian revival first reemerged on the American 
political scene. In fact, David DeLeon argues that there is an 
"anarcholibertarian sensibility" in the American political tradition (DeLeon, 
1978, p.6) . He identifies this sensibility in three distinctive strands: 1 .) the 
radically Protestant and individualistic nature of American religion; 2.) a 
sense of economy that highlights the singular spirit rather than the collective 
spirit, in which community is often defined through market processes; and, 
3.) a feeling of openness and opportunity and all that is derived from these 
sensations in the historical boundlessness of America physically. All of these 
factors combine to create radical, liberatory, and even utopian core values. 
American liberalism, which is arguably more of a way of life than a set of 
ideas, is the moderate expression of these values. Libertarianism, when 
viewed in this light, is simply the more radical and consistent expression of 
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the first principles of classical liberalism and the American way of life. And 
surely Rothbard represents the purest modern statement of this "sensibility". 
However, radicalism has historically been characterized by violence, 
inconsistent writings, and utopianism. To the degree in which libertarianism 
represents American radicalism, it seems to be different. First, its focus is 
upon ideas and not action. Different from both the active but intellectually 
devoid "New Left" and the fatalistic but intellectual sophisicated traditional 
conservative movement, the libertarian movement seeks to synthesize 
activism with the intellectual forces that shaped the American experience. 
Secondly, these ideas are attractive to individuals who are not normally 
found in radical political movements . Libertarianism has in many ways an 
ironic middle class, or even upper class, attraction (Maddox and Lilie, 1984) . 
As DeLeon argues, anarcho-capitalism allows "college kids [to] find the 
transition from Republican to anarchist much less difficult than may be 
imagined" (DeLeon, 1978, p. 123). It is, then, an anarchism for middle 
America which is both intellectually sophisicated and American to the core. 
The libertarian heritage represents the subtle foundations for much of 
everyday pragmatic American politics. In unusual ways it transcends 
common contemporary ideological labels and provides a deeper 
understanding of our intellectual heritage. It is able, for example, to 
simultaneously accept Paine and Jefferson, Thoreau and Emerson, the 
abolitionists, Henry George, anarchists like Lysander Spooner and Benjamin 
Tucker, Randolph Bourne, and Albert Jay Nock while also being able to claim 
the writings of John C. Calhoun, William Graham Sumner, Ludwig von 
Mises, Friedrich von Hayek, Frank Chodorov, Henry Hazlitt, Ayn Rand, 
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Milton Friedman, and even a substantial portion of Barry Goldwater. 
Radicalize any of these writers and discover a piece of Rothbardian thought. 
Libertarianism's Position in the Modem I deological Spectrum 
As we noted in the preceding section, it has been common to classify 
libertarianism as a subset of the larger conservative movement which grew 
in influence in America after World War II. Yet, this classification has never 
really done justice to either libertarians or traditional conservatives because 
of their fundamental differences. For example, traditional conservative 
Russell Kirk assesses libertarianism.4 
It is of high importance, indeed, that American 
conservatives dissociate themselves altogether 
from the sour remnant called libertarians. In a time 
requiring long views and self-denial, alliance with 
a faction founded upon doctrinaire selfishness 
would be absurd-and practically damaging. It is not 
merely that cooperation with a tiny chirping sect 
would be valueless politically; more, such an 
association would tend to discredit the 
conservatives, giving aid and comfort to the 
collectivist adversaries of ordered freedom. When 
heaven and earth have passed away, perhaps the 
conservative mind may be joined in synthesis-but 
not until then. Meanwhile, I venture to predict, the 
�ore intelligent and conscientious persons within 
the libertarian remnant will tend to settle for 
4. For a thorough discussion of the libertarian-conservative "fusionist" 
debate, by a number of respected scholars, examine the works collected in 
Carey {1984). 
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politics as the art of the possible, so shifting into the 
conservative camp.  At  Last  Judgment, 
libertarianism may find itself reduced to a minority 
of one, and its name will be not Legion, but 
Rothbard (Kirk, 1984, pp. 123-124) . 
Kirk argues that a number of fundamental distinctions separate 
libertarians and conservatives (Kirk, 1984, pp. 120-122). First, libertarians deny 
the existence of a "transcendent moral order" for humans, and thus are 
"converts to Marx's dialectical materialism." Secondly, libertarians grant 
primacy to liberty, whereas conservatives are concerned first with social 
order. Thirdly, libertarians view the cement of society as self-interest bonded 
through the "nexus of cash payment. " Conservatives, on the other hand, 
accept society as a "community of souls" linked by friendship and love. 
Fourthly, l ibertarians believe in the goodness of human nature; 
conservatives argue that it is "irremediably flawed". Fifthly, the libertarian 
views the State as the "great oppressor."  Conservatives see it as "ordained of 
God," as the instrument toward which virtue may be achieved. Sixthly, Kirk 
concludes, libertarians see the world as "a stage for the swaggering ego." 
Conversely, conservatives respect tradition and the ancient customs. 
These comments are significant not because of their validity--on most 
points Kirk woefully misunderstands the libertarian perspective--but because 
they demonstrate the grand chasm between traditional conservative and 
libertarian perspectives. In a more balanced argument, Rothbard points out 
five potential issues which separate the two systems of ideas (Rothbard, 1981a, 
pp. 355-362). 
The fir?t difference concerns the relationship of freedom and virtue. As 
Kirk notes, conservatives view the State as the instrument by which humans 
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may become virtuous. Libertarians, on the other hand, see the State as the 
worst possible institution for this purpose; since it rests on the initiation of 
force, the government guarantees that virtue will not be achieved. Secondly, 
whereas libertarians see individuals as the only "life-stuff" in the social 
world, conservatives grant a reality to collective entities such as the State or 
society. For libertarians these institutions are abstractions. However, the 
traditional conservative often comes quite close to giving these items ethical 
priority. The libertarian would generally argue that efforts to achieve State­
enforced community ultimately disintegrates true community which evolves 
through voluntarism. Thirdly, a conservative is at root "an empiricist, 
distrusting rational abstraction and principle, and wrapping himself in the 
custom of his particular society." A libertarian, on the other hand, (quoting 
Lord Acton) "wishes for what ought to be, irrespective of what is" (Rothbard, 
198la, p. 357) .5 There is, then, according to Rothbard, a role for rational 
thought which may supersede tradition and habit. Fourthly, as Kirk argues, 
conservatives grant priority to order. Libertarians, on the other hand, contend 
that order may only emerge through the provision of individual liberty. They 
view State-imposed order as "artificial and destructive of the harmony 
provided by following the natural order" (Rothbard, 1 98la, p. 360). Thus, 
libertarians would thoroughly agree with Proudhon's famous dictum that 
liberty represents the mother, and not the daughter, of order. Finally, there 
5. While this distinction surely applies in Rothbard's  case, there 
appears to be no reason why a libertarian must accept these rationalist 
constraints. For example, Hayek clearly would not; nevertheless, he claims he 
is not a conservative. 
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has been a traditional disagreement between the two groups over who should 
rule, namely, the "populist" versus "elitist" debate. But, as Rothbard points 
out, this distinction has become muddled in recent years because of the 
contemporary conservative's attraction to "ultra-populism", a rather clear 
break from the traditional elitist notion of rule in historical conservatism 
(Rothbard, 1981a, p. 361) .  He argues that libertarians have consistently 
maintained a "commonsensical" perspective which neither grants the masses 
eternal wisdom nor the elites complete confidence, yet still holds to a long­
run optimistic view of society. 
Although there have been sporadic efforts to achieve a "fusion" of 
libertarian and conservative theory, there is little reason to believe this 
synthesis is, in reality, possible. Might, then, libertarianism find a home 
within modern liberalism? There are definite reasons to en vision an 
ideological unification. As we noted in the previous section, both modern 
liberalism and libertarianism emerge from the same classical liberal genes. 
Many libertarians share with modern liberals common Enlightenment 
principles such as the rationalistic and science-focused approaches to 
structuring society, for instance. Nevertheless, each would view the other as a 
gross mutation in contemporary policy debates. Modern liberalism in many 
ways resembles a "garbage barge" of ideas scarred by the years of intellectual 
battles with alternative perspectives. Consequently, it has co-opted a vast 
array of conflicting and moderating perspectives . It is a hybrid mix of 
democratic socialism, theoretical egalitarianism, and pragmatic 
utilitarianism, with remnants of old liberalism and individualism. Rothbard 
is completely correct when he argues that modern liberalism has lost its 
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"fire". It represents in the modern political struggle the force for the status 
quo. Modern liberalism is devoid of vision and, like a boxer who has fought 
one too many rounds, does not seem to have the fortitude to rediscover a 
new one. The chances of libertarianism realigning with its historical name 
are, therefore, unlikely. The differences from the many years of separation are 
much too significant to overcome to allow a chance for a new fusion. 
Hence, it appears that libertarianism fits into no pre-existing notions of 
ideology in contemporary American society. It would be more fruitful to 
define the movement as a separate and viable alternative to the common 
ideological systems available in the modern American context. In fact, one 
might procee
.
d even further and speculate that the present set of ideological 
alternatives are no longer applicable in our present policy context. This point 
assists in explaining the success of modern libertarianism. Novel technology, 
new political and economic realites, and transforming cultures make the 
older definitions and classifications of ideologies obsolete in the new world. 
The instability of internationalism, for example, makes the questions which 
loom in the future larger and more significant and, in turn, causes the 
answers which traditional ideologies provide to be insufficient and small. 
The world is passing through a set of events that may define a new 
millennium, and its emergence transforms the existing set of questions 
which define political debate while enlivening the opportunities and dangers 
these ideas produce. It is a period which cannot rely on humdrum politics-as­
usual. A more comprehensive world order requires a more extensive 
intellectual perspective than either traditional American liberalism or 
conservatism may provide. 
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One of these transformed and fundamental questions goes to the root 
issues concerning the role and even the existence of the State. On one hand, 
we may be entering a world which demands high levels of authority and 
hierarchy to
· 
diminish the dangers of international economic and political 
disorder. On the other hand, we might be engaging a new age of individual 
and industrial mobility and technology which makes old definitions of the 
State or perhaps even the nation-state itself obsolete. We are entering an age 
that will first, judge the consequences of the past sixty years of American 
politics and, secondly, provide a new guide for the next era. Of course, it is 
still too soon to know exactly what this guide will entail, but it seems that 
libertarianism is an especially useful model for meeting these new challenges. 
Rothbard and Modern Libertarianism 
Where· does Rothbard's writings fit in this libertarian renaissance? He 
represents in many ways the "Marx" of the modern libertarian movement. 
First, he developed many of his ideas in a period when libertarianism did not 
have the substantial intellectual following it boasts today. Secondly, in his 
work is the ideological and rhetorical fire which sparks an intellectual 
movement. Many of the ideas that Rothbard's radical arguments first 
(re)developed are found in the practical and more acceptable writings of 
numerous contemporary minimalists and laissez-faire proponents today. 
Although he is extremely critical of Rothbard's system of thought, 
Stephen Newman calls him "the founder of the modern libertarian 
movement" (Newman, 1984, p. 27) . He concludes that Rothbard represents a 
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"model of the secular intellectual who has discovered a new faith" (Newman, 
1 984, p .  27). While Newman provides these comments in a derogatory 
manner, there is an important function to be served by these attitudes, 
especially in the embryotic stages of a movement. 
Furthermore, more than perhaps any other libertarian theorist, 
Rothbard has actively worked to diminish the gulf between the American 
Left and Right. Libertarianism possesses the advantage of being able to 
dialogue with both liberals and conservatives. Depending upon the specific 
issue, Rothbard has been over his career equally at home with both ends of 
the tradi tiona! spectrum. As a revisionist historian and a severe critic of 
American foreign policy, he finds allies on the Left (Radosh and Rothbard, 
1972; Rothbard, 1972c, pp. 66-110) .  As a dogmatic free market Austrian 
economist, he is equally at ease with numerous conservative groups. He is 
definitely a unique mixture of American political thought. 
Norman Barry correctly identifies a number of philosophical roots or 
sources of Rothbard's unique substance and style (Barry, 1986, p. 173). Three of 
these influences stand out as most important. First, there is the influence of 
the political philosophy of John Locke, especially his notions of property 
rights and his theories of ownership. Rothbard formulates his natural rights 
theory which rests upon the principle of self-ownership. It is quite clear that 
he identifies himself as a part of both of the natural rights tradition and that 
he understands his mission as one that is focused upon correcting the 
contradictions which remain in Lockean political theory (Rothbard, 1982a, pp. 
21-22) . The second influence, the Austrian School of Economics, entails the 
largest portion of Rothbard's scholarly work. Accepting his mentor Mises' 
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scientific method and style, Rothbard carries forward the Austrian paradigm 
in substantial ways. Praxeology and the use of apriorism--in economics and 
ethics--serve as the foundation for the entire bulk of his work. He is 
consistently able to merge these "value-free" perspectives with the ethics 
found in his theory of liberty to provide a double front in his ongoing 
intellectual struggle against statism (Barry, 1986, p. 1 73) . Rothbard's third 
significant influence, Barry concludes, is distinctly American. There are clear 
similarities between Rothbard's writings and earlier native American 
anarchism. This inborn critique of the American State differs from 
"imported" syndicalism and communistic anarchism in the same ways 
America itself differs from the Old World. His writings resemble the 
"peculiar kind of moral fervour" that is found in the individualistic 
anarchism of writers such as Spooner, Tucker, and Stephen Pearl Andrews. 
And i t  also differs in substance from collectivist anarchism, as it attempts to 
remove the "chains of authority" in uniquely American ways, namely, 
through homesteading, the marketplace, and the destruction of politics. 
The unusual combination of influences allows Rothbard to borrow 
from diverse traditions, often filling apparent voids in each set of ideas. He 
brings to Locke's theory the rigorous logic of an a priori axiomatic method, 
leading him to recognize the contradictions that Locke, trapped between two 
epochs of human history, could not realize. Rothbard rescues political 
philosophy from the error of the classical theorists who sought to establish 
ethics in collective society rather than upon the individual moral actor. He 
provides the Austrian program the ethical foundations for the free market 
that praxeology alone cannot generate. Conversely, to the moral fervor of 
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native individualistic anarchism he brings the insights of post-marginalist 
economics, correcting the weakest portion of American anarchist theory 
(Rothbard, 19.74d).6 Barry concludes of Rothbard's writings: 
Rothbard's social thought, quite unjustifiably 
neglected in the contemporary teaching of social 
science, represents a remarkable synthesis of 
economics, politics, jurisprudence and the 
philosophy of social science, directed entirely at the 
problems, and indeed prospects, of a free society. 
His work constitutes perhaps the most powerful 
and sophisicated form of individualistic anarchism 
this century, if not in the entire history of this 
particular social philosophy (Barry, 1986, p. 173). 
How, then, does one explain the almost complete scholarly ignorance 
of the substantial body of Rothbard's writings? One might argue that his 
views are too far outside the mainstream of American political thought. Yet, 
a cursory investigation of any major university l ibrary will uncover 
numerous works on other anarchists. Most (if not all) of these writings entail 
analyses of either communists or syndicalists. Perhaps radicalism is more in 
style on the Left or, maybe anarcho-capitalism does not have a significant 
scholarly following. 
However, Rothbard's approach to theory does not facilitate a 
propensity for scholarly dialogue, either. For example, he continues to write 
in a style more appropriate of a movement in its embryoic stages. His 
absolutist and monistic foundations also limit analytical discourse. Mutual 
6. Rothbard correctly interprets Benjamin Tucker's theory of interest as 
flawed, for example. He includes Lysander Spooner's views in that critique, 
although there are seemingly important differences. See Hall (1986, pp. 226-
229). 
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exchange of ideas with other systems or perspectives seems to be fruitless 
when one feels he possesses the absolute truth. Nor is there much to be 
gained in continued investigation by critics of Rothbard who reject the initial 
premises in his thoroughly logical chain of axioms. While these criticisms 
provide no evidence in favor or against the truth-claims of his ideas, they do 
raise the equally important issue concerning the necessity of having an 
intellectual audience. Due to the nature of his work, Rothbard may be 
destined to be ignored in American political thought. 
Rothbard's often brusque style further hinders the generation or 
maintenance of an audience. For example, he is presently working toward the 
completion of a comprehensive history of economic thought. But the small 
examples of that research which are proceeding the text seem unnecessarily 
controversial and devoid of a comprehensive understanding of historical 
circumstances. Consider his assessment of Adam Smith: 
. . . .  [Smith's] devotion to laissez-faire was dubious at 
best, and his 'contributions' to economics were 
retrograde and disastrous. It took a century for 
thinkers outside of Britain, especially in Austria, to 
revive and develop the French utility and 
subjective value tradition . . . .  (Rothbard, 1987a, p. 8). 
Smith was off the mark on value theory. Furthermore, most of the ideas of 
The Wealth of Nations may now be pieced together from earlier sources to 
demonstrate that Smith was also not all that original when we investigate his 
theories from our modern perspectives. Moreover, Smith had numerous 
exceptions to his principle of a laissez-faire economy. Finally, Smith, as 
Rothbard is prone to note, may well have been sympathetic to the State 
Church and he may have been a diligent customs officer. Nevertheless, from 
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a strategic standpoint, what purpose do these criticisms serve in the 
development of modern libertarian theory? Furthermore, the assessment 
itself suffers from the dogmatic application of an unbending universal code 
that is apparently oblivious to historical factors. Are we in 200 years, for 
example, to ignore or condemn the contributions of Rothbard and focus 
instead on the fact that he was employed by a State-supported University? 
Having developed the "gospel" of anarcho-capitalism, Rothbard may now 
ignore his intellectual opponents and chastise his comrades in the 
advancement of the free society--although the first group surely outnumbers 
the second set. This attitude might best explain why his works may never 
receive the attention they deserve from even fellow libertarians. His radical 
style and reproachful rhetoric served a younger movement well; his ideas 
provided the foundation for much of the libertarian paradigm today. But 
libertarian theory has matured intellectually from the questions of 
foundations and first principles. Today, it faces the equally difficult issues of 
concrete policy and application of libertarian ethics. Rothbard served a crucial 
role in the advancement of these ideas, but as a founder and historical figure 
rather than a contemporary and continuing influence. 
The Future of Libertarianism 
Nevertheless, that libertarianism has been able to reach a "mature" 
stage speaks optimistically about the possible intellectual and political 
successes of these ideas. In our final section, we explore both reasons for this 
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optimism and also some remaining problems for libertarianism, in general, 
and Rothbard, in particular, concerning this system of thought. 
If the program were given the opportunity, what kind of world would 
the ideas of Rothbard and libertarianism create? During the course of our 
previous discussions, we attempted to critique Rothbard's arguments from 
within the libertarian mentality, setting aside other distant criticisms which 
might arise. However, one who does not accept the premises of this model 
may provide a number of additional criticisms against the system. Some of 
these complaints result solely from critiquing portions of these ideas too 
narrowly or from pulling items out of context. A second set of critiques arises 
from the realist set of assumptions, which contend that human society 
cannot exist under the (lack of) constraints imposed by libertarianism. In this 
critique, libertarian theory is guilty of failing to recognize the additional value 
and role of order in society. Thus, these ideas represent not the heritage of 
American politics, but what Friedman and McDowell call "a brilliant 
caricature" of it: Through the exaggeration of individualism and the 
apolitical portions of human existence, libertarianism "disfigures" political 
life by ignoring or at least underestimating the institutional and political 
power necessary to secure a balanced liberty (Friedman and McDowell, 1983, 
pp. 62-63) . By overemphasizing individual liberty, this movement ironically 
increases disorder and the demands for authoritarianism. 
Stephen Newman, in one of the few mainstream critiques of modern 
libertarianism, carries this criticism further. He concludes that libertarianism, 
rather than being a response to the modern crisis of public authority, 
represents a· "symptom" of the disease itself (Newman, 1984, p. 49) . 
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Following the well-known writings of Theodore Lowi, Newman argues that 
the combination of limited public resources and weak governments created 
circumstances which ignored the crucial issue of the "public interest". 
Libertarianism's unfortunate response is to deny the existence of the concept 
of an overarching public purpose and, subsequently, reject a role for political 
power. Its solution to the crisis of authority is to abolish politics and to 
replace it with the market (Newman, 1984, p. 42). But, in Newman's view, 
this solution begs the question, for it merely replaces poli tical power with 
economic power. Unfortunately, he concludes, libertarianism tends to ignore 
the potentially oppressive consequences of private power and creates a world 
in which persons "may be formally free but have little or no control over 
their own lives" (Newman, 1984, p. 48). 
Rothbard's system seems to be quite susceptible to these criticisms. If 
freedom is defined completely in regard to one's property rights, i.e., 
limitations on movement are dictated by the space one is in control of, then it 
is possible that persons who own no property could be completely free and 
unable to do anything (Barry, 1986, p. 173)! Rothbard might respond to this 
criticism in one of three ways: 1 .) So what? The dictates of ethics demand this 
conclusion and, thus, it is imperative that property rights take precedence 
over any other values; 2.) There must be additional components in the 
definition of freedom and rights; it may not be solely the result of property 
ownership; or, 3.) It is morally imperative that this definition of freedom 
remain inseparably linked to a self-ownership and homesteading framework; 
however, the consequences of this imperative are such that the concerns 
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raised by these criticisms are unfounded. In other words, these complaints fail 
to investigate the entire anarcho-capitalist "package". 
Rothbard obviously may not accept the second choice without 
surrendering his entire system of ethics. Yet, if the implicit assumption of the 
first alternative is correct, i.e., that one may anticipate inequality of outcome 
in the libertarian system, then these ethics may create severe hardships for 
numerous persons (and, at times, he comes very close to supporting this 
untenable position). Even if absolute property rights are ethically necessary, it 
would be an unacceptable consequence for the persons who suffer the fate of 
impoverishment; therefore, there are serious concerns involving the degree 
of social order which would be retained in such a system. But is not third 
possibility empirically unattainable? Will not the "play" of market forces 
guarantee an emerging inequality of property and, subsequently, eliminate 
the effective use of one's rights? May rights of any kind be protected within a 
system which generates inordinate differences in the levels of resources each 
individual possesses and, consequently, the amount of economic power one 
retains? 
There is a long-standing and implicit assumption in the vast majority 
of liberal thought which concludes that unhampered markets create unequal 
material outcomes. Even Rothbard seems to accept this conclusion in his 
criticisms o( egalitarianism. However, if inequality is the rule, his entire 
system is threatened by the critique leveled above. These outcomes likely 
erode a community's respect for ethical principles, creating more of a 
Hobbesian condition than a Lockean one in a state of anarchy. If this 
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inequality reached substantial portions, the entire order itself would be 
severely threatened. 
Is, then, the maintenance of social order (which presumedly would be 
threatened by vast difference in wealth among persons) a "public good" 
beyond private provision in an anarchist system? There appears to be no 
reasons to assume that free riding would not be overcome by cooperation in 
this area as in almost all the arenas we discussed in Chapter V. The extreme 
transitional costs which apply to external defense are surely not applicable in 
this case; social disorder brought about by wealth inequities would evolve in a 
very gradual manner. There are no theoretical reasons to presume private 
charity would not prevent social turmoil. But the need for these actions on 
the part of wealthy individuals is itself built upon an assumption as to 
consequences of a market process. The outcomes of an unbridled free market 
is an empirical question and, as of yet, we have had no perfect laboratory to 
test this proposition. Neo-Marxists and libertarians alike have indicated the 
tendencies of alliances to arise between businesses and the State. From 
pol i t i ca l  collusion follows monopoly and inequality. Without the 
monopolistic instrumentations of political power, might the concern over 
inequality largely disappear? Might it be more likely that economic inequality 
is the result of allowing the use of governmental institutions? And, if this 
argument is correct, would it not be best to eliminate or at least severely 
restrict these institutions? Rather than define libertarianism as a means of 
protecting existing priviledge through the language of human rights and 
markets, why not view its market process as an essential ingredient in 
accomplishing the exact opposite results of breaking priviledge and dispersing 
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wealth in increasingly equal increments? From this perspective, the most 
effective way to prevent undue social power is to avoid the formation of any 
forms of State-maintained monopoly power. 
But the main criticism in which Newman levels against libertarianism 
is that it destroys the notion of the public life. In opposition to this "vision", 
Newman supports a "classical" view of participatory politics which he argues 
will foster a strong sense of collectivity and community. Unfortunately, this 
critique seems to arise from a misconception of libertarianism. Newman 
argues, for example: 
Libertarianism aims at nothing short of the 
privatization of social existence. True to its liberal 
origins, libertarianism rejects the public life in 
favor of the private life cultivated by self-interested 
bourgeois individualists . . . .  [T]his position overlooks 
the broader conception of politics that derives from 
the classical republican tradition and the ancient 
Greek polis . It denies the element of collective 
purpose essential to their understanding of political 
life. Libertarianism carries liberal privatism to an 
extreme by redefining the state (in terms of its 
functions) as a kind of private enterprise and 
moving to replace politics by the market. 
In the world projected by libertarian theory 
the individual stands in relation to the whole not 
as a citizen but as a consumer . . . . .  (Newman, 1984, p. 
162). 
This familiar complaint misunderstands the depth of libertarian social 
theory. First, Newman misconceives and underestimates the breadth of the 
libertarian "marketplace" .  A libertarian market (in the Austrian tradition, at 
least) encompasses all exchanges, not merely those within the "cash nexus"; it 
remains neutral on the issue of the value of the action except to protect the 
principle of non-interference. The difficult burden of demonstrating how a 
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political structure better facilitates the plans of individuals than the actual 
individual falls upon the proponents of the doctrine of a specific "public 
interest". Secondly, he substitutes for the liberal instrumental conception of 
the State a naive and utopian view of the polity. Somehow, "citizenship 
expands the power of the individual to shape the social environment in 
collaboration with others. "  On the other hand, "consumership requires that 
the individual confront the world as given. " For reasons he leaves unknown, 
the market order must be "accepted as a fact of social life" waiting for 
entrepreneurs and powerful corporations to move the world (Newman, 1984, 
p. 163). Yet these same "isolated" individuals are able to discover the warmth 
and community of the State. In the polity, the individual is significant and 
enjoys a sense of belonging. In a marketplace, he is weak and isolated. 
Newman falls prey to the same dogmatic dualism that he accuses 
libertarianism of.7 It is not clear, for example, why the State is going to be any 
more responsive than the market to the needs of the "public life". If one 
compares the notion of the single individual against the force of the market 
with the idea of citizens who able to generate strong collective identity within 
the State, then, of course, the latter alternative will appear more attractive. 
But, obviously, this comparsion is a false dichotomy. More often it is 
the single citizen against the Big State. At times, it is large collectivities 
against the Big Corporation. The same human nature which helps to dictate 
actions in one of these realms remains unchanged when one moves into the 
7. On the critique of "libertarian dualism" examine Sciabarra (1987, pp. 
93-95) . 
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other arena. · Newman, for example, argues that envy is not a pol i tical 
emotion, since it "promotes the egoistic war of all against all" and will not 
"generate bonds of allegiance that transcend economic self-interest" 
(Newman, 1984, p.  164). But his notions of both envy and politics represent 
utopian, or at least highly unlikely, visions of human reality. Whether envy 
is "political" in Newman's idealized perspective is unimportant; it surely 
occurs in the political process in the real world. Theory must take humans as 
given. Newman's criticisms of libertarianism come full circle and defeat his 
own vision: The consumer and the citizen are the same individual. 
Yet, there is an even more misguided criticism in Newman' s  
argument, one that is commonly found in attacks on libertarianism. 
Politics, understood in terms of collective 
purpose, invites us to consider the public good 
before our private desires. Libertarians cannot 
contemplate this notion of politics without 
perceiving the threat of totalitarianism. They fear 
the destruction of individuality in the name of a 
higher good. Ultimately, their case rests on the 
claim that freedom and privacy are inseparable. 
Whatever its character, whether totalitarian or not, 
politics is always an invasion of privacy. It burdens 
private men and women with public obligations 
(Newman, 1984, p. 164). 
He unfortunately makes a common error in politics of creating an overly 
limited notion of what is entailed by the term "public" .  Why must the 
"public good" receive its meaning through the dictates of a government, for 
example? M�reover, why must there always be one singular purpose? For 
libertarians, politics by definition is the use of force by certain persons who 
agree with the implementation of an action against others who are not 
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willing to voluntarily go along with the decision . By definition, when it is 
possible, we ought to avoid these sorts of activities. The intent of the former 
group might well be to place the good of the public (assuming such a thing 
exists) over the selfish interests of the particular individuals. But i t  may 
(perhaps more likely) be merely the former coalition's imposition of their 
brand of interests upon all the rest of society. The articulation of the "good 
society" through monopolistic political actions quite often becomes either 
naive rhetoric or clever camouflauge for the execution of special interests. 
There is absolutely no reason why self-interest may not be transcended 
as easily in the anarchist system as within the polity. Newman's argument 
fails unless he is willing to contend that the market itself creates selfishness, 
whereas politics somehow creates the desire for an altruistic and/ or collective 
purpose. But this assumption is riddled with problems. First, it faces the 
inner contradiction that arises when one uses force through the State 
apparatus to achieve "moral" ends. A libertarian would argue that to 
conclude that an immoral action may be used to achieve a moral conclusion 
faces a severe dilemma. As Rothbard points out, freedom is a necessary, 
although not a sufficient, condition for virtue. Moreover, why would one 
turn to the State for assistance in "imposing" morality; it is arguably the worst 
form of institutional arrangement for achieving these goals, for it embodies 
the monopoly of violence (Rothbard, 1981a, p. 353; Hayek, 1944, pp. 134-152). 
While the market process cannot guarantee virtuous actions, there appears to 
be no reason to anticipate that the political process will be any more 
successful at this endeavor. 
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But Newman's additional criticism is even less appropriate in regard 
to libertarian theory. Critics perceive the market process as an atomistic, 
estranged, and alienated system devoid of any sense of community. But from 
the libertarian perspective, the only true communities which exist are those 
that emerge through the free interaction of individuals. These critiques 
unfortunately possess a limited idea of the Stateless society. For example, 
there is no reason why libertarians must support "privacy" as the primary 
value or live isolated and segregated lives. These are merely values which 
individuals may chose or reject freely. They are not, in fact, the values that 
most libertarians would expect to be dominant in a free society. Persons will 
create their own communities, their own higher values, and their o w n  
obligations in the State-less society. These values will arise without the 
(generally misdirected) intervention of the government. More importantly, 
there is no reason to assume that these community values must be imposed 
uniformly upon all individuals. Humans are free to seek their privacy, but 
this same principle provides them the freedom to create their own 
communities. Privacy, atomism, and isolation are the consequences of the 
market only if persons freely choose those values. And the extension of the 
State--the alternative in this case--surely does not eliminate these problems. 
Therefore, Newman's (mainstream) critique of libertarianism fails 
because it applies an unfortunately incorrect and overly limiting notion of 
virtue on human interaction. The libertarian principle of value neutrality 
may offend writers such as Newman who believe that a more narrowly 
defined notion of the good society ought to be imposed on their fellow 
citizens. All that libertarian theory postulates is that liberty is the highest 
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political end and not necessarily the highest human end (Rothbard, 1981a, p. 
354). Still, these perceptions remain in the academy: These ideas supposedly 
lead to societies of "isolated, hermetically sealed atom[s]," operating in a 
vacuum; they generate libertines and hedonists who "worship the Sears­
Roebuck catalogue"; or, they are atheistic and materialistic with absolutely no 
connection to spiritual matters (Rothbard, 1980c, pp. 9-13) . Sometimes in life 
persons may exhibit each of these qualities; at other times, they may be able to 
transcend these characteristics. But these qualities will exist or will not exist 
regardless of whether the State is present or absent. To conclude that within 
the market, these activities will somehow mystically increase is an empirical 
question and, as of yet, there is no reason to believe it has any foundation in 
reality. In fact, it would be perhaps easier to demonstrate a correlation 
between the growth of the public sector and the kind of materialism and 
greed that so troubles Newman. It is this type of naive perspective which 
blindly ignored the consequences of statism and gave rise to the libertarian 
renaissance in the first place. 
Hence, despite these substantial criticisms there is strong evidence that 
libertarianism is enjoying expanding influence in both political and 
intellectual circles . One may speculate that these ideas will continue to 
increase in influence into at least the near future. There are at least three 
reasons for this optimism. 
First, there is a substantial amount of evidence that there is significant 
support for libertarian policy among mass opinion, although the number of 
self-identifying libertarians remains low. Maddox and Lilie argue that the old 
liberal-conservative spectrum of post-World War II is no longer applicable in 
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the contemporary American political scene (Maddox and Lilie, 1984, pp. 1-4) . 
By further dividing ideological class ifications from two into four 
components, they are able to successfully place a substantially larger number 
of persons under fairly consistent ideological quadrants. 
Maddox and Lilie define the new category of libertarianism as 
supportive of both economic freedom and social freedom. Individuals 
exemplifying these qualities, they conclude, tend to support minimal 
government, property rights, social freedoms, and a non-interventist foreign 
policy. They also found that (by 1980) approximately one/fifth of Americans 
could be classified as libertarians. More importantly, perhaps, these numbers 
increased significantly during the period of post-Watergate/Vietnam 
America. At the beginning of the 1970's, for instance, conservatives 
outnumbered libertarians by a margin of two to one; by 1980, libertarians had 
surpassed conservatives in total numbers. Maddox and Lilie also explored 
these ideologies based on their demographic components. While populism 
(persons taking policy stances that are generally opposite those of libertarians) 
remained the largest overall category, with slightly more than one/ fourth of 
the total, libertarianism may hold substantial future advantages. The populist 
ideology is found heavily among older individuals, particularly those 
persons who came of maturity before or during the New Deal (Maddox and 
Lilie, 1984, p. 76) .  Libertarianism, on the other hand, is strongest with groups 
maturing in the period of 1950-1970--individuals who in 1990 are coming into 
positions of influence and power. Moreover, libertarians tended to be of 
middle to upper class backgrounds, with higher incomes and greater levels of 
education (Maddox and Lilie, 1984, p. 96) . All this evidence would seem to 
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indicate that the libertarian movement may find an influential and willing 
audience for their ideas in the 1990's. 
Secondly, there is an expanding network of libertarian think tanks, 
institutes, presses, journals, and educational programs and seminars to satisfy 
the demands generated by the growing mass appeaLS Furthermore, there 
seems to be an extensive crusade to attract young scholars to these ideas. In 
short, there is clear evidence that at least the intellectual portion of 
libertarianism has its house in order. Whereas the gradual influx of young 
libertarians into the academy does not compare to the rapid penetration of 
American universities by Neo-Marxists in the 1960's, the eventual effect may 
be quite similar. 
Thirdly, the "objective" criteria that Rothbard discusses seems to be in 
place internationally for the substitution of a new dominant ethic. The 
changes in the American political system in the last twenty years, for 
instance, ought not to be underestimated. The language of the Welfare State's 
Great Society and the anti-communist rhetoric of the Vietnam conflict has 
been replaced by austere budgetary constraints and military disengagement 
from the Cold War. On a grander international scale, we may be witnessing 
the demise of socialism. But while the practical political battles seem to have 
been won for Eastern Europe (at least the impediments have been removed), 
the more important intellectual battle remains . Both liberals and 
8. Friedman and McDowell (1983) include a partial and now outdated list of 
libertarian organizations. Our own unofficial count netted over thirty 
libertarian or libertarian-leaning foundations, institutes, presses, or other 
forms of organizations aimed at the dissemination and/ or development of 
these ideas in the United States. 
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conservatives in America are scrambling to respond to recent world-changing 
events. Conservativism is now required to reconsider its overt anti­
communist perspectives which won control of the movement over the 
traditional isolationist segments in the 1950's. It can no longer rely on the 
successes of the "we-them" mentality which directed its international 
"vision" in recent political debate. Today, with the possibility of their 
ultimate enemy disintegrating, this strongly negatively-oriented ideology 
faces a severe identity crisis. 
Liberals face a more subtle and potentially more damaging problem, 
though. Lost in the hoopla of the emerging "democracy" in Eastern Europe 
are the economic realities which are probably more important in the 
production of these changes. Concerning the viabili ty of centralized 
socialism, Ludwig von Mises has been vindicated. But Mises' critique was 
equally aimed at the "third way" of economic allocation, namely, the mixed 
economies of the West. While modern liberalism stresses the divergent 
political attributes of socialism and liberalism, i t  tends to ignore the economic 
arena. But there are ominous parallels between politi cal and economic 
authoritarianism. Liberation is not achieved through acceptance of only half 
of this formula. On this issue, American liberalism may face its ultimate 
challenge. 
It will be these sorts of issues which potentially may provide the kind 
of crisis that leads to fundamental intellectual change. Perhaps it will emerge 
so slowly as to be undetected until its effects have clearly restructured the 
contemporary world. As we have continually demonstrated in our 
discussions, there are numerous reasons to anticipate that the libertarian 
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movement will be a significant participant in the reforms that emerge. And 
Murray Rothbard's anarcho-capitalism has surely been a vital component in 
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